Will the monarchy survive?
  B.C. UPRETI
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MOST social scientists accept that democracy is the most legitimate and valid political system of governance. The forces of globalization and liberalization have also accorded an overwhelming importance to good governance, which can be best ensured by democracy. As a result, the graph of democracy has witnessed an upward mobility in many parts of the world. Countries like Afghanistan, Ukraine and Iraq have recently experienced some success with multiparty elections. Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia and others too have shown a progressive change towards democracy.

In contrast, Nepal's democratic order faces a serious setback with King Gyanendra's decision to assume all powers on 1 February 2005 for a period of three years. Now with a despotic monarch at the helm of political affairs there appears a complete reversal of democracy. Why did the monarchy take such a drastic decision? What are the circumstances and forces which have supported the royal coup in Nepal? How is the monarchy going to settle the political issues in the country? And what are the possibilities for the revival of democracy?

It is important to note that the instrumentalities which paved the way for the operationalisation of democracy in Nepal in 1951 also opened doors for the revival of the institution of monarchy. Therefore, incidents of monarchy overshadowing democracy are not new to Nepal. It is not only the prevailing socioeconomic conditions or the weak party system which have been responsible for the political assertion of monarchy, but equally the political ambitions of the king.

During the fifties, the ill-experienced and ill-structured political parties could not promote the cause of democracy. This led to an increase in the powers of monarchy. Possibly a king like Tribhuvan could not assert beyond a limit. But when an ambitious king like Mahendra ascended to the throne, he began to assert politically and in 1960 succeeded in the first royal coup. In 1962, he envisaged a new form of government – the partyless panchayat system – which provided a cover to the absolute powers of the monarchy. The monarchy remained at the helm of political affairs for a long period between 1962-1990.

The 1990 democratic movement paved the way for the institutionalization of constitutional monarchy. The then King Birendra tried to adjust to the process. But it seems that his departure reversed the process.

The failure of successive governments after 1990 to ensure stability, good governance and democratic order intensified the search for alternatives to multiparty governance. The Nepali Congress government, which came to power after the 1991 elections, had to step down due to intra-party disputes. After the 1994 midterm elections, the United Marxist Leninist (UML) party formed the government but it too had to depart under almost similar conditions. After the departure of the UML government Nepal slipped into an era of unstable governments that led to a further deterioration in the situation.

In 1995 when the Nepali Congress formed the government under the leadership of Sher Bahadur Deuba, it was believed that the second rank leadership might succeed in securing government stability. But that did not happen. Deuba too had to step down in March 1997, making way for the formation of a coalition government of United Marxist Leninist – National Democratic Party – Nepal Sadbhavana Party (UML-NDP-NSP) under the leadership of Lokendra Bahadur Chand of NDP. This coalition too could not survive for more than six months and the government was replaced by another coalition of UML-NDP-NSP under the leadership of Surya Bahadur Thapa of NDP. Interestingly, both Lokendra Bahadur Chand and Surya Bahadur Thapa of NDP enjoyed prime ministership despite a mere 19 seats in parliament. The Thapa government started facing strong opposition from the Nepali Congress and had to quit in April 1998.

The Nepali Congress once again began to examine possibilities for the formation of a new coalition government. Incidentally, towards the end of 1997 after the local bodies' elections, the UML splintered, with 40 MPs of UML under the leadership of Bam Deo Gautam and C.P. Mainali forming a new political party, called Communist Party of Nepal – Marxist Leninist (CPN-ML). The Nepali Congress and ML reached an understanding to form a coalition government. While the NC was in search of a new partner, the ML wanted to enhance its position against the UML. G.P. Koirala became the prime minister. The understanding was that the prime ministership would go to the other coalition partner after six months.

In December 1998 Koirala refused to hand over prime ministership to the ML. The two partners also developed differences over several other issues. The ML issued a 25-point programme, which included an increase in their representation in the cabinet, the Kalapani issue, and so on. Prime Minister Koirala did not accept these demands. On 10 December 1998, 13 ML members of the cabinet resigned and the party decided to table a motion of no confidence against the Koirala government. The UML, however, came to the rescue of Nepali Congress, not because it was willing to support the party but because it wanted to put down the ML. Koirala resigned, the parliament was dissolved and fresh elections declared for May 1999. The NC-ML-NSP formed a national government till the elections were held.

The coalition experiment was the most bitter experience in Nepalese politics. It not only resulted in political instability but also reduced the prospects for strengthening democracy in the country. There were a large number of problems with the coalition government and their partners.

1. The political parties in coalition governments lacked proper coordination and understanding.

2. In all the coalition governments, each constituent political party acted individually.

3. Each of the coalition partners tried to place its own men in different organizations following a sort of a spoils system.

4. The outlook of political parties was confined to short term personal gains and were insufficiently concerned about long term and national issues. None seemed concerned about the process of institutionalization of democracy.

5. The coalition governments had little time to address the socioeconomic issues and popular needs and aspirations of the people.

6. The coalition partners lacked any ideological coherence, in fact were misfits in ideological terms. Hence, it appeared that most of them were engaged only in a power game, their only motive to remain in power by whatever means possible. Each political party in the coalition wanted to accumulate more powers resulting in the failure of coalition governments.

After the 1999 elections, Nepali Congress formed a government under the leadership of K.P. Bhattarai. But the Bhattarai government soon began to face criticism from its own party cadres, being charged with ineffectiveness, an indifferent attitude towards the Maoist problem, and so on. From December 1999, the Koirala group began to oppose the government and pressurize K.P. Bhattarai to resign, threatening that a non-confidence motion would be tabled against his government. The pressure tactics proved successful and Bhattarai resigned in February 2000.

But things were no longer as smooth for Koirala as they had been earlier. Sher Bahadur Deuba also claimed the leadership of the parliamentary party. The tangle between Koirala and Deuba had to be resolved through voting in which Koirala won 69 votes against Deuba's 43 and became prime minister in March 2000.

Koirala's term as prime minister was marked by a number of developments. His government was accused of widespread corruption. The Maoist problem too had aggravated by this time. The Koirala government could not take any concrete steps towards the resolution of the problem. On 1 June 2000, King Birendra and his entire family were assassinated. The government was charged for being cool on this issue. The opposition political parties also started targeting Koirala.

In July 2001 Koirala had to resign and Sher Bahadur Deuba once again took over as prime minister of the Nepali Congress government. Deuba was serious about resolving the Maoist problem. Earlier too he had headed a committee constituted during the tenure of Prime Minister Bhattarai for the resolution of the Maoist problem. Deuba negotiated a ceasefire and succeeded in bringing the Maoists to the negotiation table. Between August and mid-November 2001 three rounds of talks were held between the government and the Maoist leaders. However, the Maoists did not agree to accept anything less than the formation of a constituent assembly, a republican state and a new constitution for Nepal, while the government was not prepared to accept any of these demands. The talks failed and the Maoists again resorted to violence.

On 26 November 2001, a state of emergency was declared in Nepal. The army was asked to bring the Maoists under control. The emergency was extended in February and May 2002. Deuba no doubt made sincere efforts towards a resolution of the Maoist problem, but there was no agreement on basic issues with none of the parties prepared to compromise. In May 2002, Deuba resigned and the parliament was dissolved. Nepal expected fresh elections. The Nepali Congress splintered into two.

The political parties clearly failed to provide a stable government in Nepal. Almost all the major political parties have been characterized by internal fragmentation, groupism, leadership clashes, weak social base, decline of ideology and intra-party disputes. The political ambitions of party leaders and factionalism have given rise to splits, further weakening the party system. The parties also failed to build up sufficient democratic space in the country. This may possibly explain why popular needs and aspirations remained unrealized and people's frustration increased. It also fuelled Maoist insurgency in the country.

In October 2002, Deuba had suggested that due to the Maoist insurgency it would not be possible to hold general elections on time and recommended a postponement. But the King did not agree and instead dismissed the government.

After the dismissal of the elected government, King Gyanendra nominated Lokendra Bahadur Chand of NDP as prime minister with a small cabinet. The largest parties like Nepali Congress and UML did not join the government. The king himself assumed the responsibility to revive the democratic process, which never happened.

In the middle of 2003, the king succeeded in bringing the Maoists to the negotiation table but failed to reach any agreement. The Maoists were not prepared to give up their earlier demands while the monarchy was not prepared to accept them. The monarch wanted to take the credit of solving the Maoists problem in which he failed. But he did succeed in marginalizing the political parties. The failure of talks with Maoists led to the departure of Lokendra Bahadur Chand, and Surya Bahadur Thapa became the prime minister.

It is noteworthy that the king has relied on the old guard of the panchayat era. Both Chand and Thapa had been strong leaders of the panchayat era and supporters of the king. Because of their pro-panchayat and pro-monarchy image, both failed to garner support of various political parties. Even their position in their own party was not strong with the NDP deciding, at the beginning of 2004, to expel Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa from the party.

The political parties on the other hand, failed to pressurize the king to either hold general elections or revive the parliament. In a statement in February 2004, King Gyanendra made it clear that the monarchy would not remain a silent spectator to people's suffering. ‘The days of the monarchy being seen but not heard are gone. We cannot remain a silent spectator to people's tearful faces.'

In the middle of 2004, Deuba was once again appointed prime minister. Deuba gave an ultimatum to the Maoists to agree to negotiations. This failed. Simultaneously there was apprehension regarding the declaration of election dates. Political parties like the NC were trying to consolidate their leadership. An impatient king was no longer content to watch political events and decided to gave a new direction to the Nepali polity with the abrogation of the Deuba government. It is clear that the king moved in a systematic and calculated manner. His intentions from the beginning were clear. He wanted to create political space for the monarchy and at the same time blame political parties for the failure of democracy, peace and stability in Nepal.

The major challenge before Gyanendra after the February 2005 coup was to consolidate his power and bring the situation under control. Towards this end he took repressive measures against the democratic forces and brought the media and other means of communication under control through the use of the army and police force. Since the army is loyal to the monarch, it was possible to take repressive measures. But for how long and to what extent is uncertain. The attempt to marginalize political parties, though momentarily successful, is unlikely to be sustainable.

Even as the democratic leaders are being subjected to corruption charges and misuse of authority, the king has looked towards the political leadership of the panchayat era, the traditional support base of monarchy, for support. Some of the old leaders are again at the political forefront. How effective they would be it is difficult to say, since in the panchayat parties' the organization is less important than individuals. Though sections of the bureaucracy might lend their support to the king, but historically the bureaucracy has displayed shifting loyalty. The army, which is already fighting with the Maoists, has to accept its new role under civilian control, thereby doubling its burden. Also the lingering fight with the Maoists has demoralized the force. Hence, the consolidation of powers by the monarchy might prove difficult.

What are the possibilities then? Though there is a political reassertion by the monarchy in Nepal, it may not be durable, not even for the time that the king has stipulated. While democratic forces in Nepal are fragmented and are victims of their own incompetence, they have the capacity to fight back. History bears testimony to the fact that people have been able to restore democracy through popular movements.

The king does not seem to have taken a forward-looking decision, little realizing the consequences of his political action. Though the monarchy's action might gain support from certain quarters – domestic, regional as well as international (for instance by some in India as being the only Hindu king) – this is likely to be more emotional and strategic and of little help in providing stable support to the political assertion by the king.

Nepal is confronted by an insurgency which demands a republican state in the country. How will the monarchy, now at the forefront, deal with the Maoists? Is there a possibility of some compromise between the two forces? Currently it seems that the Maoists are unwilling to compromise with their demand of a republican state. If so, the monarchy has reached a stage of direct confrontation with the Maoists, thereby placing the very institution in danger.

Any military solution to the Maoist problem would be largely dependent on the external assistance to the royal army. It is evident that the royal army cannot fight with the Maoist insurgents on its own resources. Therefore, external support, particularly that of India, United States, UK and some other countries is quite significant. These countries have already expressed their displeasure over the royal takeover and called for a restoration of democracy in the country. If they continue to put pressure on the king and withdraw military assistance (India and Brazil have already done so), then the royal army might find itself in deep trouble. Whether it is possible for the king to find alternative sources of assistance remains a moot question.

The different political parties in Nepal are in a state of flux at the moment, but they are not wiped out. It is possible that they will begin to assert sometime in the future as they did after the 30 year long panchayat rule, so why cannot they do it now? The only question remains whether they have learnt any lessons from the past? And how much time they would need to strike back against monarchy?

There are three political forces in Nepal: the King, political parties and Maoists. Currently they are divided – each against the other. Will this become a one-to-one fight? The polarization of democratic forces will have to follow two stages: first, forging an understanding among various political parties and subsequently the Maoists joining the parties to launch a civil movement for the restoration of democracy. Also, even if the Maoists are not prepared to join a civil movement, their indirect support to a democratic movement cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the only real question is the time it will take for the situation to ripen.

Given its strong religio-cultural basis, the monarchy in Nepal has proved to be an important social force and a symbol of unity and integrity. Much, however, has changed over the years. The king's actions might contribute to its demise.

 

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