TO most ordinary Nepalis, democracy remains an elusive concept, simultaneously evoking people's aspirations, hopes and despairs. Often practices and regimes labelled as democratic are seen as a strategic ploy by a number of powerful groups, and thus contested by others. The definition of democracy and associated practices, therefore, constitutes an important site of a struggle for power.

The dominant discourse on democracy in Nepal, while acknowledging the universal principles of equality, human rights, representative institutions and the rule of law, also takes on specific meanings in the local context, often reflecting the interests of the feudal aristocracy and of the ‘high' caste parbatiya group. The practices emanating from such hybrid understandings of democratic ideals have tended to protect and promote the privileges of traditional elites while disguising the exclusion and further marginalization of indigenous peoples, dalits, women and other minorities in the country.

Under the rubric of democracy, different systems of governance have been installed and advocated in Nepal over the past years. Democracy or prajatantra (rule of the subjects) was introduced to Nepal in 1951 after the overthrow of the autocratic Rana rule. The period of early democracy, however, did not last for long. In 1961, King Mahendra banned all political parties and instituted the panchayat system of rule. The ideology of the panchayat system gradually evolved under the leadership of an active monarch and was promoted as ‘Panchayat Democracy'. This democracy which supported a one-party state was not considered undemocratic; rather it was presented as rejecting the ‘foreign ideology' of political parties and replacing it by substantive democracy through a guided mechanism.

Following the jana andolan or people's movement in 1990, Nepal adopted multiparty ‘parliamentary democracy', accommodating groups belonging to different ideological orientations. The Nepali Congress Party claims affinity to ‘social democracy'. The Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) promotes ‘people's multiparty democracy' or janata ka bahudaliya janabad for participating in the parliamentary system. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), currently involved in a violent ‘People's War', on the other hand, rejects multiparty parliamentary democracy as a bourgeois institution and aims to instal a ‘New People's Democracy'. The royal takeover of state power in October 2002 suggests yet another possible variant, which may be called democracy with ‘cons-tructive monarchy'.

These different variants propose specific sets of political institutions, government programmes and procedures, though all claim to pursue universal democratic ideals including equitable development. In practice, however, the concept of democracy is even extended to justify anti-democratic tendencies, including corruption and abuse of authority for fulfilling self-interest and the use of violent means for oppression. Another common feature is that those who hold power to define and implement democracy programmes continue to be drawn from the same social backgrounds – namely Bahun, Chhetri, Thakuri and Newars. Such imbalanced representation is directly reflected in state institutions as well as in the civil society sector. The exclusion of marginalized groups has become institutionalized across the various sectors as networks established by the dominant group expand and function in the country. In recent times, however, the systematic exclusion of the marginalized from participation in public decision-making and the perpetuation of inequality and discrimination is being contested by social movement activists.

The fact that such social movements have been made possible by a democratic atmosphere is a positive aspect. Until recently the marginalized groups and ethnic minorities lacked both intellectual resources and freedom to express their views. The arrival of democracy in Nepal after 1990 enabled innovative mobilization of social groups for resisting the abuse of state power and demanding alternative forms of democracy. Insisting on their rights as laid out in the very concept of democracy, various social groups including janajati, dalit, women and other nonparty actors have engaged in considerable political and ideological assertion for a new and representative political order. These movements represent hope in Nepalese democracy in a context wherein formal democratic institutions have failed to effectively address the profound structural problems of inequality and injustice.

The efforts to set up organs of the state in a relatively modern sense can be said to have started only after the 1951 revolution. Earlier, the state of Nepal was virtually run by the families belonging to Saha and Rana clans, with support from smaller groups of bhardars or aristocrats. When Prithivi Narayan Saha conquered Kathmandu in 1769 and made it his headquarters, he introduced a simple aristocratic system of administration inherited from his predecessors. The system was known as Thar-Ghar in which members of six elite families belonging to the Aryal, Pandey, Khanal, Pant, Thapa and Basnet clans supported the Saha kings as military generals, advisors and administrators.

The aristocratic system of Thar-Ghar ended when Jung Bahadur Kunwar took power following the 1846 Kot massacre. For the next 104 years the Rana family ruled the country with absolute power replacing the system by a Ranacracy in which members of the family occupied all the higher echelons of administration and military.

The system was extensively misused for expropriating the wealth of the peasants, especially that of the indigenous peoples and their territories using a centralized taxation system, privatizing land tenure, imposition of corvee labour and birta land grant practice. The Ranas sharing of the appropriated resource with groups of parbatiya high caste led aristocracy and bureaucracy benefited both the groups greatly. While this mechanism helped sustain their monopoly over power, the economy of the people became stagnant if not irrecoverably damaged. More specifically, the loss of land which was the base of subsistence livelihood of the indigenous peoples contributed to loss of their history, culture and identity.

The autocratic Rana rule created wide public discontent and as a result the King and the political movement succeeded in negotiating the formation of the Rana-King-Nepali Congress coalition government in 1951. The coalition government for the first time promulgated an interim constitution for Nepal which separated the executive, legislative and judicial functions of the state. A Public Service Commission, Election Commission, High Court, and Office of Attorney General were also established by the interim government. This represented a substantial modernization in the organization of the government, gradually opening up spaces for participation to increasing sections of Nepalese society.

On 15 December 1960, however, King Mahendra dismissed the parliamentary government and banned political parties, introducing in its place a new ‘partyless panchayat democracy' and creating a Rastriya Panchayat, a parliament of sorts with members both nominated and elected on an individual basis. The Rastriya Panchayat was dominated by segments of society with high ritual status and landed property who were loyal to the King. Subsequently in 1963, similar panchayats or assemblies were created at the district and village levels by setting up of 75 districts and 14 zones as political administrative units within the country. Since non-governmental organizations were banned as a potential threat to the newly introduced system, the panchayat regime created ‘class based organizations' that helped accommodate the local traditional political authorities while creating a veneer of decentralization.

The Constitution of 1962, although having a progressive appearance of separate executive, judicial and legislative branches as well as other constitutional bodies, concentrated appointments, promotions and dismissals in the expanded sovereign authority of the king. The essence of the partyless system was an absence of popular participation and centrality of the king, who skilfully managed to combine two sources of legitimacy – traditional Hindu kingly authority and the modern notion of representative democracy (Hayes 1975; Bleie 2004).

A central promise made by the panchayat regime was development. In order to implement development programmes, the bureaucracy was massively expanded under the sponsorship of international donors. The number of government offices increased from 2,419 in 1960 to 9,430 in 1990 and the number of civil servants reached 100,638 in 1990 from 27,272 in 1960 (HMG 2048 V.S.; IIDS 2055 V.S.). The wage bill of the expanded bureaucracy was met through foreign aid received by Nepal which increased from $0.13 million in 1950-51 to $196.31 million in 1990-1991, which amounted to 35.69% of the total budget of the country. The expanded institution of bureaucracy successfully incorporated educated members of middle class families, drawn mostly from hill Brahmins, Chhetris and some ‘high' caste Newars.

The collapse of the panchayat regime was inevitable as the contradiction deepened between its rhetoric of democracy and equitable development and the reality of increased political corruption, social discrimination, disparity and inequality. The Panchayat Constitution of Nepal 1963, had for the first time declared Nepal as a ‘Hindu Kingdom', pushing the agenda of ‘national integration' through the process of homogenisation and assimilation of cultural diversity. Since common culture was thought essential to nation-building, policies for ‘ one language, one dress ' were officially promoted, privileging the Khas-Nepali language and parbatiya Hindu culture as ‘national'. During this era, debate and action pertaining to ethnicity and culture other than ‘national' culture was discouraged as ‘communal' and ‘anti-national' and, therefore, met strong official opposition. Discrimination based on religion, language and culture of the indigenous peoples, minorities and dalits and their further exclusion and marginalization emerged as major issues of contestation, contributing to a delegitimization of the panchayat government.

Even though the panchayat system, as compared to the previous Rana regime, increased involvement in state structures, it only included the population belonging to traditional high caste groups. The power to define the reigning ideology of nationalism, democracy and development gained through access to politics, bureaucracy and education, including western education, during the panchayat era substantially augmented a section of the society which would eventually become even more powerful and prosperous during the democratic period.

The people revolted against the partyless system and the 1990 jan andolan succeeded in persuading the king to introduce multiparty democracy. The new constitution, ratified in 1991, had four major positive features marking Nepal's transition to a multiparty democracy. The first articulated ‘the people as the source of sovereign authority'; second, the king was designated as a ‘constitutional monarch'; third, Article 3 officially recognised the country as ‘multi-ethnic and multi-lingual' and last, it guaranteed freedom to political parties, associations and expression. Nevertheless, despite wide consensus on the democratic spirit of the new constitution, views differed on its legitimacy and character.

The extreme left political parties, for example, argue that the king still holds sovereign authority since he is characterized as the provider and protector of the constitution (Preamble and Article 27 [3]) and emergency power is vested in him (Article 127). The ethnic activists on the other hand contend that the constitution carries the basic characteristic of a ‘communal' state from the past and contradicts the democratic spirit. The new constitution, for example, reaffirms Nepal as a Hindu state where the king has to be a ‘descendant of the Great King Prithvi Narayan Saha and an adherent of Aryan culture and the Hindu religion' (Article 127[1]). It fails to recognize the country as ‘multireligious or secular' and Article 4 privileges the Nepali language as the ‘language of the nation' and to be used as the official language. Similarly, contrary to the fundamental rights granted by the constitution, Article 112(3) prohibits formation of any political organization or party on the basis of religion, community, caste, tribe or religion.

Thus, institutions of the state, even after the restoration of multiparty parliamentary democracy, continued to draw upon its past legacy. The structure, actors and values of the state virtually remained the same and its representative character continued to be in a state of imbalance. The situation in fact further added to exclusion and anti-democratic practices. What was supposed to have been the introduction of an entirely new system of government only saw many of the same players return, and led to much higher levels of corruption. (Gellner 2002:15)

Governing elites: The composition of the governing elites of Nepal in terms of caste, ethnicity, and gender between 1854 and 1999 remained more or less the same. Throughout the different political regimes, members from the minority population have controlled the state apparatus and defined the rules of the game. Table I shows the comparison of the composition of social groups in the governing elites between 1854 and 1999.

After the restoration of democracy, there have been three general elections for the lower house of Parliament in Nepal. Although the dynastic element remained dominant at the higher level of all party structures, the elections did provide an opportunity even for persons belonging to the middle class with limited means to become members of the legislature. This, however, did not alter the social composition of the legislatures. The members from Bahun and Chhetri caste groups, who constitute 28.5% of the total population of the country, continued to occupy about 60% of the positions as legislators, while janajatis or indigenous nationalities, though 37.2% of the total population accounted for less than 15% of the MPs in 1999. The dalits (12.2%) are virtually nonexistent in the legislature. The situation of Madhesis and women too is not encouraging. Structurally, the electoral system, designed in line with the Westminster-style winner-takes-all system, is responsible for such imbalanced representation as well as exclusionary practices within the parties.

A study conducted in 1999 shows a similar pattern in the representation of the people in local bodies. Out of 823 DDC members elected in 1997, the Bahun/Chhetri constituted 59%, and while the janajatis constituted 19.3%, not a single dalit was elected. Municipalities in which 116 mayors and deputy mayors were elected in 1997, the Bahun Chhetri captured 42% of the positions, Newar 17.5% and janajatis 6.9%. Interestingly, the dalits managed 11 positions in the municipalities (NESAC 1998). An analysis of the 1997 election results of 735 VDCs showed that 54.42% of the VDC chairpersons were from the Bahun/Chhetri community and 39.86% from the janajati category. The dalits fell in the lowest rank with 1.63% of representation as VDC chairperson (TEAM 1999).

The parliamentary culture and practices remained weak in terms of democratic norms – horse-trading, defections and legislative corruption. Unfortunately, instead of developing progressive laws to address the country's social, economic and cultural issues, the debate in parliament largely focused on removing the party in power or defending it. Only about one-fifth of the parliamentarians took an active part in debates in the assemblies (IIDEA 1997). The majority either lacked motivation or vision for effectively playing their role as legislators.

Currently, people's representative bodies have ceased to exist at the district (DDC), municipality and village (VDC) levels. And after the king dissolved the parliament in 2002, there exists an absolute vacuum in the democratic structure and processes in Nepal. The royal takeover in 2002 thus signifies a crisis in Nepalese democracy that emerged out of the inherent weakness in the constitution and state institutions.

After sacking Prime Minister S.B. Deuba as ‘incompetent', the king appointed L.B. Chand as the new prime minister, a prime example of the exercise of power of patronage over and against the procedures laid out in the constitution. True, the use of discretionary power in ministry making was a common practice in the formation of cabinets in the past as well. Such distribution of ministries, largely motivated by the goal of winning political support, hardly bears any relation to democratic principles. This practice contributed to unbalanced and malfunctioning ministries.

Bureaucracy: The relationship between the cabinet and the bureaucracy can be characterized as a love-hate affair. Each new minister, equipped with discretionary power to control and manipulate the civil administration, clashes with the established bureaucracy. In the absence of appropriate plans and mechanisms to translate party policies into programmes, ministers often recruit hundreds of party workers as government ‘civil servants', modify budget allocations to fund pet projects and influence the decisions on tenders and contracts for personal benefit. Senior bureaucrats who do not cooperate with the minister face difficulties.

To cope with such a situation, the Nepalese bureaucracy basically chooses two methods. The first is to share the benefits of corruption with the incumbent minister and second, ally themselves with certain political parties for protecting their self-interest. The politicization and subsequent polarization of the bureaucracy leading to inefficiency has emerged as a major feature of Nepal's bureaucratic institutions. These dynamics of conflict and cooperation between the cabinet and bureaucracy, however, have not introduced any positive changes in the legacy of political and bureaucratic culture; nor has it favourably impacted on the representation of the diverse social groups in the civil service.

Instead, indigenous nationalities, dalits, women and other minorities in the Nepalese civil service have faced consistent erosion in the last few years. Given strong elite resistance towards affirmative action for caste and ethnic equity in the bureaucracy, a perpetuation of the established groups with higher education was inevitable. Table II shows the domination of these groups in the civil service since 1959.

The Nepalese bureaucracy represents a legacy of working as clerical servants for the reigning elites for safeguarding their power and helping them to expropriate state resources. During the panchayat era, the expanded bureaucracy served as an effective mechanism to extend control over local communities, undermine their autonomy and dispossess them of natural and biological resources.

The current parliamentary democracy operates through the old bureaucratic structure erected during the panchayat period. The bureaucracy in Nepal is an interesting example of the ‘elite capture' of state institutions. It successfully asserts its interests through influencing both policy decisions, thought to be the domain of the legislature, and policy outcomes by controlling the implementation mechanism. Thus, the bureaucracy cannot be perceived as a neutral policy implementing body as was traditionally argued in the literature of civil service studies.

Judiciary: The basic structure of the Nepalese judicial system consists of the Supreme Court, appellate courts and districts courts. There are numerous other courts and tribunals such as special courts, administrative courts, labour courts, police special courts, military courts and others with their own specific jurisdictions. According to the 1990 Constitution, the judiciary has complete independence from the executive.

Until the 1960s, Nepal's legal system was explicitly based on the Hindu notion of law and social order. The Manu Smriti , which underscores caste-based discrimination through state law, provided the guiding principles for such a legal system. The legal code of 1854, Muluki Ain , for example, classified the diverse population of Nepal, including non-Hindu indigenous nationalities, into a caste hierarchy and formalized punishment for failing to observe the caste principles. In addition to codifying different punishment for the same crime according to caste status, it also used this classification of people for distributing privileges and power and as a framework of social stratification and mobility. Subsequently, elements of British common law were incorporated in the Hindu concept of rule in Nepal (CVICT 2001). The constitutional declaration of Nepal as a ‘Hindu kingdom' symbolizes the relics of its feudal past while an affirmation of fundamental rights signifies its democratic principles.

In the process of state formation, the courts were perhaps the first institutions to assert state power in public life. In the past, the courts were instituted in different regions to settle both civil disputes and criminal cases. Like all other state institutions, the courts too are dominated by members of the minority population belonging to high caste groups, with 90% drawn from Bahun, Chhetri and Newar communities, while there is no representation from the dalits. Of the 242 judges in the 92 courts, only four are women. Table III shows the social composition of the judges in various courts.

The operations of the Supreme Court have raised concern about the country's judicial system. For a start, there are no proper mechanisms to deal with controversial decisions of the Supreme Court. Critics maintain that major decisions revolve more around the personality of the chief justice than the court as an institution. Controversy over decisions has even resulted in some questioning the provision of the ‘contempt of court' clause itself as a breach of the right to freedom of expression. The indigenous peoples and linguistic minorities hold that the Supreme Court is more committed to safeguarding the status quo than democracy, as required for a multiethnic and multilingual country through a progressive interpretation of the Constitution.

The lower level courts traditionally deal with civil and criminal cases. The district courts symbolize a single institution through which the local population has some chance of accessing the justice system. Nevertheless, because of lengthy procedures, expense, corruption and inability to enforce decisions, the district courts have virtually become redundant. A case filed in the lower level court, for example, can take up to 12 years for a decision, which too perhaps would never be implemented. As a result people's faith in court justice has considerably eroded.

A study conducted on social change brought about by violent conflict in the country reports that ever since the Maoists started to operate their own ‘people's court' in the villages, the number of cases filed in the government district court has dropped from approximately 1000 to 50 per annum (Lama, Gurung et al. 2003). Like every other government offices, the conflict has forced the district courts to limit themselves in and around the periphery of the district headquarters.

Police: The institution of police as a part of the larger state structure is expected to work for maintaining law and order in the country. The Local Administration Act 1971 empowers the Chief District Officers (CDO) to command the police force in their districts. Besides controlling street demonstrations in urban areas, especially the capital, the police together with the CDO play the role of a quasi-judicial body in large parts of the rural areas. Many cases, before being reported to the court, are settled by the police themselves. This work provides the police an opportunity to extract money from the local population in the form of bribes.

Before the Maoist insurgency started in 1996, police posts were established extensively in the country with at least one station at the illaka level. The police were first mobilized to counter the Maoist insurgency. The counter-insurgency operations carried out by the police between 1996-2000 heightened the culture of breaking the rule of law among the police, leading to frequent incidents of human rights violation. Police atrocities during the early stage of Maoist insurgency significantly contributed to fuelling the violent conflict. As the Maoists systematically attacked police stations, by 2000 the number of stations were reduced to serving the immediate vicinity of the district headquarters.

The social composition of the police force shows that a majority of higher-level officers come from urban and elite backgrounds. The ethnic and caste background of the police officers as revealed in a study by DEVA Associates shows that the Bahun-Chhetri comprise 73% of the officers, Newars 12% and the janajatis, including the Tharu, have 13% representation among the police officers (DEVA 2002).

In 2001, the government passed an ordinance to form an armed police for the purpose of combating terrorism, maintaining law and order and launching rescue operations during natural calamities. The armed police is currently deployed with the military as a joint security force for counterinsurgency operations. By the end of December 2003, a total of 8,265 people had lost their lives in the conflict, of which 66% were killed by the security forces. Although more than 40% of those killed remain unidentified, the caste and ethnic pattern of fatalities suggests that state victims are concentrated among indigenous janajatis while Maoist victims are concentrated among the higher caste Chhetris, Brahmins, and Thakurs (INSEC 2004).

Political parties: After the emergence of multiparty parliamentary democracy, Nepal experienced a mushrooming of political parties. In 1991, 47 political parties applied for registration to the Election Commission out of which three were rejected (Jha 1996). Most political parties are organized around a particular ideology or personality.

During the initial period of multiparty democracy, it was widely assumed that the political processes would gradually force the parties to regroup themselves, either through polarization or cooperation, for providing a stable and efficient government leading to better socio-economic development. This assumption was belied as no mechanism served to bring the different parties together for a national consensus. Party fragmentation continued to be a characteristic of the political processes in which the major political parties with longer histories also suffered (Hachhethu 2002). By the end of the 1999 general election, along with Nepali Congress and Nepal Communist Party (UML), nine others emerged as viable political parties (Table IV).

Under the current system all Nepalese citizens aged 18 years and above can vote to elect members to the lower house of parliament. The election campaigns carried out by political parties point to three major issues that impinge upon the democratic procedure. The first relates to the tendency to use state-owned mass media in favour of the ruling party. The second is the abuse of civil administration and security by the ruling party for winning votes. The third is the continual flouting by political parties of stipulated rules in the Election Code of Conduct prohibiting vote buying and limits on expenditure by candidates (Khanal and Hachhethu 1999).

With the experience of the three general elections, public opinion is building up in favour of a proportional electoral system in place of the current first-past-the-post election system adopted by the 1990 Constitution of Nepal (Khanal 2004). The results of all three general elections since 1990 show that there exists a remarkable gap between the popular vote and the seats a party has in parliament. Table V shows the results of general elections in the 1990s with regard to various parties in terms of popular votes polled and actual seats won.

The pattern of election results finds a parallel in the lower level of political bodies. The existing first-past-the-post election system is not only responsible for incompatibility between the popular vote and actual seats in the representative bodies, but also for systemic exclusion of historically marginalized ethnic groups and other minorities. Critics argue that the current election system, so favoured by powerful groups as a democratic mechanism, often disguises its exclusionary character.

The exclusion, however, needs to be analyzed not only as inherent in the system design itself, but also in the party composition and processes. Politics in Nepal has largely been characterized by dynasty, a personality cult and kinship network (Baral, Hachhethu et al. 2001). The social composition of political parties demonstrates the capture of power by certain caste groups who have traditionally been powerful in the country. The high caste domination in the leadership of the CPN (Maoist), which is currently involved in violent insurgency with the aim of establishing a republic with ethnic autonomy, shows that even a radical left party is unable to ensure equitable representation. The entrenched domination of upper caste groups in the legislative and political executive over a long period of time was made possible by their control of the party leadership, supplemented by state policies that systematically fostered disparity in education, wealth and social status. Table VI shows the social composition of the central committees of major political parties in Nepal.

Single caste domination is a paradox for parties which claim to represent the people as a whole or a class of proletariat and workers. Social movement activists argue that without changing the composition of the party leadership, democratization in a larger context is impossible. Consequently, efforts to ensure equitable representation at the national level should start by reforming the party organization to ensure that the voices of the marginalized and disadvantaged ethnic groups are heard internally. Second, selection procedures within the party privilege people with certain kinds of qualities and cultural background – be it oratory skills in Nepali language, or a particular way of communication and cultural exchange typical to the culture of the Brahmin-Chhetri. Further, a mastery over the language of liberalism or Marxism is seen as essential to upward mobility in the party hierarchy.

Not surprisingly, members from indigenous nationalities with a different cultural background by these standards generally tend to fail in their attempt to attain influential positions within the party or in securing an election ticket. Exclusion enforced by the party organization, thus, mirrors directly the elected political bodies of the country. A member of Nepal Rastriya Jana Mukti Party (RJMP) – a pro janajati political party – characterized this process as a ‘democratic veil', which enables the dominant groups to keep the exclusion invisible.

Social exclusion: The caste hierarchy devised in the Muluki Ain 1854 provided a general matrix for political economy and social exclusion in Nepal. The unequal distribution of social status through state codification and associated use of violence, both physical and symbolic, for reinforcing such inequality resulted in a monopoly over power by the ruling elites. The different regimes employed political power to extract resources and surplus from the peasants to better the economic status of elite groups. During the Rana autocracy, such monopoly was largely limited to a restricted set of landed aristocracy and elites. During the panchayat era, however, an expansion of opportunity in education and civil service employment, supported by foreign aid, opened the way for large numbers from the Bahun-Chhetri communities to enter the power structure. Their improved educational status and resource capability further strengthened their status during the democratic period after the 1990s, characterized by liberal policies and an open market economy.

Nepal too rode the wave of liberalization that swept over the world in the 1990s. The Nepali Congress government enacted diverse legislation related to liberalization and privatization during the early 1990s. The main aim was to attract greater Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country and reduce the government's role in the industrial sector. Transnational financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monitary Fund and others played a significant role as guides in the formulation of such policies.

Despite some progress in the economy, any assessment of the impact of liberalization after more than a decade, unfortunately, shows negative trends in income distribution, employment and other human development indices in the country (Mishra 1997). During this period the state was unable to devise any special measures to uplift marginalized groups and minorities. In the absence of measures for protection and inclusion, the disadvantaged groups only fell further behind in the free competition demanded by liberal policies.

It is no coincidence that those falling in the lower hierarchy of caste structure and ethnic groups also suffer from higher levels of poverty, despite the democratic outlook of the government. This is well reflected in the human development indicators. Table VII summarizes the relative status of the various social groups in Nepal.

The government announced its Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in June 2003 based on the Tenth Plan (FY2003-FY2007), which sets out a reform and investment programme to achieve higher economic growth, improve delivery of services, improve governance including social inclusion and targeted programmes for the poor and disadvantaged groups (NPC 2003). The breakdown of the ceasefire in 2003 and subsequent escalation of violent conflict between the government security forces and Maoist insurgents, however, made implementing the plan virtually impossible. The absence of elected local bodies and incapacity of civil servants to move beyond the district headquarters and its periphery has resulted in heavy under-expenditure of the development budget during the last year, even as security expenditure increased to about 25% of total GDP (ADB 2004).

Despite a negative performance, multiparty parliamentary democracy did open up spaces for accommodating demands for social justice, rule of law and human rights. The mobilization around identities, regions, specific issues and interests led by the indigenous nationalities, dalits, women, madhesis and human rights activists in Nepal, has served as a new venue for expressing popular sentiments that otherwise seemed constrained in established political structures. Many actors, including in political parties, government, academia and civil society, have begun a conversation around these issues.

Social movements in Nepal, particularly those of indigenous peoples, dalits, women and regional based movements, depict trends and patterns similar to those in other parts of the world. Although still in infancy, they have substantially influenced the discourse and practice of democracy in the country. They have acquired influence in the public sphere and discursive space of political power. Through engaging in public discourse, movement activists have advanced reinterpretations of history, redefined the nation-state and the nature of Nepali society and exposed the exclusionary character of the present Nepali state, the historical roots of caste hierarchy and subsequent economic exploitation and marginalization.

Despite its many limitations, the processes of mobilization of socially diverse groups representing diverse constituencies and interests itself manifest a democratic practice at the lower level. Methods of operating through loose national and international networks and then linking up to local constituencies makes the form of social movement organizations distinct. For its unique modes of mobilization, critique of current structures and ability to influence democratic institutions, the social movements in Nepal represent hope for a more vibrant and inclusive democracy.

Central to resolving the current deadlock is the confidence with which forces of centralization and traditional elites have negotiated and shared power with historically subordinated groups. It is their low levels of confidence, combined with a defensiveness to protect their power which is the main cause of Nepal's democratic crisis and the perpetual cycle of violent conflict.

* Extracted from a background paper prepared for the project on The State of Democracy in South Asia/Nepal.

References:

Baral, L.R., K. Hachhethu et al., eds. (2001). Leadership in Nepal . New Delhi, Adroit Publishers.

Bleie, T. (2004). The Historical Path to Violent Destabilisation in Nepal: Elements of an Explanatory Framework. Manuscript to be published in Human Rights in Development Yearbook 2003 . M. Scheinin and R. Hanski.

CVICT (2001). Nepal's Penal System: An Agenda for Change . Kathmandu, Centre for Victims of Torture Nepal.

DEVA, A. (2002). Study of Police Public Interaction with Reference to Weaker Sections of Society. Kathmandu, Report submitted to Danida/HUGOU.

Gellner, D.N. (2002). Introduction: Transformation of the Nepalese State, in Resistance and the Nepalese State (ed.) D.N. Gellner. New Delhi, Social Science Press.

Gurung, H. (2003). ‘Trident and Thunderbolt: Cultural Dynamics in Nepalese Politics.' Kathmandu, The Mahesh Chandra Regmi Lecture delivered at a conference on the Agenda of Transformation: Inclusion in Nepalese Democracy, 24-26 April.

Hachhethu, K. (2002). Party Building in Nepal: Organization, Leadership and People . Kathmandu, Mandala Book Point.

Hachhethu, K. (2002). ‘Political Parties and the State', in Resistance and the Nepalese State (ed.) D. N. Gellner. New Delhi, Social Science Press.

Hayes, L. D. (1975). ‘The Monarchy and Modernization in Nepal'. Asian Survey 15(9): 616-628.

HMG, A.R.C. (2048 V.S.). Report of Administrative Reform Commission. Kathmandu, HMG.

IIDEA (1997). Consolidating Democracy in Nepal. Stockholm, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

INSEC (2004). Nepal: Human Rights Yearbook 2004 . Kathmandu, Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC).

Jha, R. R. (1996). ‘Political Parties in Nepal', in New Dimensions of Government and Politics of Nepal (ed.) P.D. Kaushik. New Delhi, South Asian Publishers.

Khanal, K. (2004). Consideration on Possible Model of Proportional Representation for Nepal. Paper presented at the National Dialogue on Affirmative Action and Electoral System in Nepal, 26-27 September, Kathmandu, organized by SAGUN, ESP/DFID and IIDEA.

Khanal, K. and K. Hachhethu (1999). Aam Nirbachan 2056: Sansad ra Sarkar ka Chunautiharu (General Election 1999: The Challenges for MPs and the Government). Kathmandu, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies.

Lama, M.S., S.M. Gurung, et al. (2003). Social Change in Conflict Affected Areas. Kathmandu, Assessment Report submitted to DFID/Nepal.

Lawoti, M. (2002). Exclusionary Democratization: Multicultural Society and Political Institutions in Nepal. Ph.D. Thesis. Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh.

Mishra, C. (1997). Development Practice in Nepal: an overview, in Development Practices in Nepal (eds.) K.B. Bhattachan and C. Mishra. Kathmandu, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, TU.

NESAC (1998). Nepal Human Development Report, 1998. Kathmandu, South Asia Center.

NPC (2003). The Tenth Plan (2002-2007) . Kathmandu, National Planning Commission.

Rai, C.R. (2056 V.S.). Nepal ko Sansadma Janajati haruko Pratinidhitwa: Ek Adhyayan (Representation of Janajatis in Nepal's Parliament). Master's Thesis. Kathmandu, Tribhuvan University.

TEAM, C. (1999). The Condition of Dalits (Untouchables) in Nepal: Assessment of the Impact of Various Development Interventions. Kathmandu, UNDP.

Tumbahamphe, S. M. (2059 V.S.). Nepal ma Mahila Andolan (Women's Movement in Nepal). Kathmandu, Akhil Nepal Mahila Sangh.