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ELECTIONS within a democratic system provide an opportunity to take stock of the socio-economic and political situation and, through debates and campaigns on seminal issues, help us assess past policies and indicate the direction in which the polity is moving. Such an exercise assumes cardinal importance in the case of Uttar Pradesh since, given both its political importance and sheer size, whatever happens here affects the rest of the polity. Even after the decline of the Congress party, UP has retained its importance as the state where the politics of Hindutva, Mandal and low caste identity – which have acquired national importance – are centred. Traditionally, the road to Delhi has been seen as passing through UP.

Equally, the political juncture at which the 2007 assembly elections are taking place is critical for democratic politics in the country. Throughout the 1990s, UP experienced a fragmentation of parties and a breakdown of the party system – hung assemblies, short-lived coalitions leading to instability, poor governance and a fiscal crisis with negative growth. The questions remain: were the 1990s a transitional phase arising out of rapid, sudden and destabilizing social change in a conservative society? Or are these problems symptomatic of a deeper malaise in which UP remains mired with no solution in sight? An analysis of the electoral scene could provide an understanding of emerging patterns as well as the direction of change.

In the first decade of the 21st century changes have taken place in UP whose ramifications for state politics are not yet clear and need to be explored. Many believe that primordial identities that reached a peak in the middle of the previous decade and drove mass politics no longer occupy centre-stage. Does this mean, for instance, that the economy and law and order will occupy greater space and play a more determining role in the coming elections? For much of the post-independence period UP was one of the more backward states in the country. For the first time during the 1980s there was a slight structural shift in the economy, away from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors, pushing its rate of economic growth above the national average. Agricultural, particularly foodgrain, production which had stagnated for some years around the 1975 levels suddenly picked up, rice production nearly doubled and 40% of all the additional wheat production nationally was contributed by UP. This also implies that the economy of UP as a whole registered a growth rate of 4.92%, substantially higher than in the 1970s. Crucially, all regions showed higher rates of growth than in the previous decade.1

However, the 1990s witnessed a sharp drop in growth rates, rise in government expenditure, and an acute financial crisis leading eventually to a ‘debt trap’ – a vicious circle of low growth rate and fiscal crisis preventing further investment – from which the state has yet to recover. The reasons were political instability, short-lived governments and poor governance by every political party that came to power.2 This posits a close relationship in UP between the politics of identity, changes in the economy and patterns of governance. Among the BIMARU states of the Hindi heartland, UP’s performance over the last decade has been worse than that of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, placing it in the same bracket as Bihar on most indicators of growth. According to the UP Human Development Report,3 indices of development, particularly among the scheduled castes and women, remain among the lowest in the country.

However, according to some other accounts the economy is improving. A recent Joint Report by the state government and the World Bank4 claims that UP is slowly emerging from the period of fiscal stress; in 2005-06 it successfully emerged as a ‘revenue surplus state’ – nearly two years ahead of the targeted date. The state government not only succeeded in mobilizing resources for the Annual Plan 2005-06 but also fully spending the same. Investment in infrastructure, agriculture, irrigation, health and other related sectors has increased while the poverty rate has fallen. It is debatable whether the improvement is due to better fiscal management by the Mulayam Singh government or a result of the larger flow of resources from the Centre to the state courtesy the recommendations of the Twelfth Finance Commission and the Planning Commission. It is also argued that the reform process has been driven more by the bureaucracy than the political leadership, which failed to show the needed political commitment and support.

The importance of developmental issues in the forthcoming elections is evident from glossy newspaper advertisements5 through which the Mulayam Singh government has tried to showcase its alleged achievements. It is claimed that initiatives such as the Kanya Vidyadhan programme, welfare schemes for minorities, land for needy farmers, unemployment allowance and so on have reached the people directly, particularly the poor, without any caste/religious discrimination. Amar Singh, the general secretary of the SP, claims that policies initiated by the newly formed UP Development Council (UPDC) which includes important members from the industrial and banking sector, together with adoption of public-private partnerships, the Industrial, IT and Service Sector Investment Policy 2004 and SEZs has led to the ‘unleashing of unlimited potential’ of UP, and initiated an industrial turnaround and private investment more than even that of Gujarat.6 It, however, remains to be seen whether Mulayam Singh’s model of conveniently bypassing public investment in education, health, infrastructure, power, irrigation while introducing corporatization of the UP state, ensuring profits to his industrial friends but little for the common man, will actually help him in the coming elections.

More than economic development, it is concerns about law and order – increasing criminalization of politics and terrorism – that will play a contentious role in the coming elections. Not that the ruling SP alone is responsible, as every party that has come to power has contributed to the weakening and demoralizing of the instruments of the state, particularly the police. But this could be an important reason for a rejection of the ruling party by the electorate. The murder of Meher Bhargava in the heart of the state capital, increasing lawlessness on Lucknow University campus with support by the ruling party and, most important, the horrendous killings of children in Nithari village in Noida which could have been prevented by timely police action, have together raised public anger against the government.

Allegedly, many MLAs across practically every political party are criminals accused of heinous crimes. There is now a ‘mafia corridor’ starting from Siwan in Bihar to Allahabad covering virtually the entire Poorvanchal region. It is routinely described as the ‘crime nursery’ of the country, what with militants responsible for most blasts being traced to this region. After the bomb blasts at Benares, the terrorist aspect has become significant with demands for a ban on SIMI. It is also difficult to deny a close connection between law and order, corruption and economic development arising out of lucrative government contracts in UP, possibly why gangsters stand for election and maintain links with parties.7

A related feature is the politicization of the steel frame in a state described at independence as the best governed in the country, which has prevented law and order issues from being addressed. Frequent transfers of police and magisterial officers by every new government that wishes to bring in its ‘own’ has demoralized the bureaucracy. Murders, kidnapping and caste atrocities are a result of the breakdown of the administrative structure of the state. The series of shocking acts of vandalism by students together with criminal elements in schools/colleges in Moradabad, Kanpur, Aligarh and elsewhere in the state during February 2007 are evidence of not merely breakdown of the law and order machinery but a more deep-seated crisis of governance.

No wonder the Election Commission has decided that elections in UP will be held only after elections in Punjab, Manipur and Uttaranchal are over as ‘the availability of adequate force is a critical input and both central and state forces will be required.’8

Unfortunately, despite their importance for public safety, these issues have become heavily politicized with every party trying to gain maximum advantage. Opposition parties have been quick to demand dismissal of the state government and the holding of elections under President’s rule to remove the advantages of incumbency for the SP. The PM recently derided the state government as ‘backward looking’ even as the Congress party described UP as a ‘rogue state’ plagued by collapse of law and order, rampant corruption, casteism and nepotism, conveniently forgetting that it continued to support the SP government from the outside until as recently as mid-January.

In the political arena despite hope that the period of instability in UP may be drawing to a close, the apprehension is that the phase of hung assemblies could continue despite old patterns being replaced by new ones. For one, even as Mandir has reached a point of electoral exhaustion and Mandal failed to unite the OBCs, Dalit identity-based support too has reached a plateau beyond which it cannot garner votes. Two other key developments might have a determining impact on the shape of the emerging party system in the state. Caste has donned a new political ‘avatar’ in the state leading to new strategies and patterns of mobilization. With ascriptive identities losing ground there is a frantic search by all parties for new social constituencies to construct aggregative ‘social rainbow’ identities and new alignments to widen their base and capture state power.9

The SP and BSP – two lower caste parties – are both assiduously trying to woo the upper castes. Both have held numerous sammelans to gain the support of the Brahmins, Thakurs and the Vaishyas, who in the early 1990s under the impetus of the Ayodhya movement had gravitated from the Congress to the BJP but now appear eager to distance themselves from a party they view as a marginalized force. At Brahmin sammelans chanting of Vedic hymns, blowing of conches and new symbols are used to create a broad-based ‘savarna’ identity for the BSP. The SP has employed tactics such as supporting Amarmani Tripathi to woo Brahmins, harping on strongman Raja Bhaiya’s ‘persecution’ under POTA during the Mayawati regime to save Thakur pride, mobilizing the Vaishya community during the 2002 assembly elections by not implementing VAT to gain the support of the traders and engineering their defection from other parties, and so on.

Second, the decline of the BJP following the collapse of its fundamentalist Hindutva ideology alongside the failure of the Congress to revive itself, implies that the earlier three-cornered fight between the BJP, BSP and the SP is now more an intense bipolar contest between the latter two. The BJP and the Congress performed badly in the 2002 assembly elections: the former gained only 88 seats while the latter touched a historic low of 25 seats. In contrast, the SP with 143 seats emerged as the single largest party while the BSP gained 98 seats. Could we be witnessing a bi-party trend, driven by two lower caste parties, reflective of the rising strength of lower caste assertion in the country?

On the other hand the improved performance of the BJP in the recent urban bodies elections has fuelled hopes of a revival. UP is an important state for the BJP. But the base of the party in UP has considerably weakened due to internal factionalism, exhaustion of the Ayodhya issue, unhappiness of the upper castes with the party’s concessions to the lower castes, the poor record of the party while in office and, most important, despite its defeat in 2004, an inability to move from Hindutva to an economic programme for rejuvenation of the state. Consequently, apart from Varun Gandhi, the party has failed to attract young new faces connected with UP who could be given tickets in the coming elections. At the party’s national executive meeting held on 21 December 2006 at which the UP elections were discussed, although the Ram temple was not specifically mentioned, it was obvious from the speeches of senior leaders that the BJP has returned to its platform of Hindutva. Much hinges on the level of preparedness of the BJP and the issues it will use in the coming elections.

For the Congress party too the UP elections hold great significance. Will a new Nehru-Gandhi generation successfully revive the party organization and improve its performance in this key state? This is critical for the Congress-led UPA at the Centre as it has completed its halfway mark and needs greater support in the states if it is to secure another term. In a bid to rebuild the party, massive changes have been introduced in all the district and city units in UP – the first major overhaul after seventeen years. The party has also decided not to make any major political alliances as it believes that earlier ones – particularly the one with the BSP in 1996 – proved disastrous for it.

It is also trying to regain the support of the minorities, OBCs and Dalits as many of its recent policy initiatives show – the Sachar committee report, reservations for OBCs, reservation for Dalits in the private sector, and compensation for victims of the Gujarat riots. Concentrating its efforts on rebuilding the organization, the party has so far failed to advance any ideology of development that, with the decline of identity politics, could provide a vision for rejuvenation of the state. Though viewed as a favourable option in parts of Uttar Pradesh, the Congress will need strong political will, ideological clarity, leadership and organizational machinery if it is to convert public appeal into electoral gains.

Underlying the persistent political instability in the state is the decay of parties and the de-institutionalization of the party system. Due to ethnic mobilization, parties confined to their narrow sectarian bases have been unable to aggregate public opinion, obtain majority support and form stable and effective governments. Identified with caste/community leaders, parties in UP have been reduced to private fiefdoms over which the former have complete control. Consequently, they suffer from an absence of intra-party democracy leading to authoritarian structures and personalized styles of leadership. Further, centralized decision-making by the national leadership leaves little room for local leaders to emerge and build strong state units. Clearly, without reform of parties, the prospects of a functioning party system, political stability and effective governance remain dim.10 Overall, despite the decline of identity politics, fragmentation of parties, splits and defections continue unabated.

Two other factors could contribute to political uncertainty surrounding the election. The pattern of Muslim support remains indeterminate. In the late 1980s the community moved away from the Congress towards the SP and the BSP. Muslim voters have often indulged in ‘strategic voting’, i.e. joining hands to ensure the defeat of the BJP candidate in their own constituency. But over the last few years new issues such as terrorism, ban on SIMI, reform of madrasas, and the Danish cartoons among others have surfaced whose impact needs to be examined. More importantly, buoyed by the electoral success of the nascent Assam United Democratic Front, noted scholars of the community and political outfits in UP have come together to form at least two Muslim parties. The attempt is to provide Muslims an autonomous voice, their legitimate rights and a share in political power.11 However, Muslims in UP are no homogenous community; divided by class, caste and sect divisions, these developments might well add to a fragmentation of votes between different political parties.

The formation of the Jan Morcha or Third Front and the rise of small parties such as the Apna Dal have also injected an element of further uncertainty as these groupings could divide votes. The former comprising mainly of the JD(U), Lok Janashakti, the CPI, CPI(M) and NCP has challenged Mulayam’s samajwad, alleging that all the development activity in the state is suited to the business interests of the rich and the corporate sector ignoring the needs of the labouring classes and weaker sections. The Front has taken up issues such as acquisition of farmers’ land for development of hi-tech cities and industrial development, particularly in the Ghaziabad district where the Reliance power project is to be set up. On the other hand, the emergence of small, single-caste parties by MBC groups in eastern UP – the Apna Dal (Kurmis) and the Pragatisheel Manav Samaj Party (Binds) – points to the failure of the larger parties to effectively incorporate these groups which could result in further political fragmentation. With rising political consciousness, the MBCs now ‘wish to be heard’ and are no longer prepared to remain vote banks of larger parties such as the SP, BSP and BJP. With a sizeable presence in some assembly constituencies in eastern UP, they could cut into the vote share of larger parties.

What implications will these new processes have for the coming elections and more generally for state and national politics? Is there a move towards increasing secularization of caste and communal politics and more stable governance patterns alongside a decline of identity-based politics? Or, will caste-based mobilization and fragmentation, together with communalization of politics witnessed since the late 1980s, continue the negative patterns? This scenario cannot be ruled out as not much has changed: an unstable, minority government supported from outside continues to rule; parties have adopted new caste-based strategies; the BJP has not completely eschewed religion-based politics; poor governance is the norm and the financial crisis has not been fully resolved.

On a larger canvas, how much importance does UP – which has fallen behind in most aspects of economic and human development – command in a post-Congress, post-reform competitive polity when the southern and western states have marched ahead and regional parties from these states are aggressive partners in governance at the centre? Regional disparities are increasing and the balance of power within the federal structure is slowly undergoing change with implications for states such as UP. This issue of Seminar explores the emerging patterns likely to be thrown up by the forthcoming elections.

SUDHA PAI

 

Footnotes:

1. G.K. Lieten and Ravi Srivastava, Unequal Partners: Power Relations, Devolution and Development in Uttar Pradesh, Indo-Dutch Studies on Development Alternatives 23, Sage, New Delhi, 1999.

2. Sudha Pai, ‘Deprivation and Development in Uttar Pradesh: The Economic Agenda of the BSP’, Man and Development 25(1), March 2003, 35-54.

3. The Uttar Pradesh Human Development Report (Draft n.d.).

4. Monitoring Poverty in Uttar Pradesh: A Report on the Second Poverty and Social Monitoring Survey (PSMS-II). Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Planning Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh and the World Bank, Joint Report, June 2006: Foreword.

5. The Times of India and The Economic Times, 5 December 2006; also see, The Indian Express, 8 October 2006.

6. The Times of India, 5 December 2006.

7. ‘Crime and Politics in UP’, The Times of India, 2 December 2006.

8. The Hindu, 24 November 2006, New Delhi.

9. Sudha Pai, ‘From Dalit to Savarna: Search for a New Social Constituency by the BSP in Uttar Pradesh’ in Political Process in Uttar Pradesh: Identity, Economic Reform and Governance (ed) Sudha Pai, Pearson, forthcoming.

The state government has not yet released the UP Human Development Report, but was quick to release with much publicity its Joint Report with the World Bank Report.

10. Sudha Pai, ‘Electoral Identity Politics in UP: Hung Assembly Again’, Economic and Political Weekly, 6 April 2002, 1334-1341.

11. ‘Muslim Party Launched in UP’, The Hindu, 16 May 2006, New Delhi.

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