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WHEN is the last time anyone heard of a visiting head of state leaving the host country in the middle of the night, and that too without a ceremonial send-off? The contrast with the arrival of Pervez Musharraf – the guard of honour at Rashtrapati Bhawan, the visit to Rajghat and his haveli in the Naharwali gali – could not be more marked. Whatever the spin our external affairs minister may put on the Agra Summit, it is clear that the dialogue ended badly. The final image of the Pakistani president, grim faced, getting into his car at the hotel, is unlikely to be forgotten for a long time.

Many today argue that this was expected, if not inevitable. After all, not only is Musharraf a military dictator even if dressed up as a president, he is by all accounts the person most responsible for Kargil. He has also made no secret of his agenda, to have Kashmir accepted as the core dispute between the two countries. Surely, if the Indian establishment finds this impossible to concede, what was the dialogue all about? Why indeed even extend the invitation?

Negotiations demand flexibility, an ability to give and take. And herein lies the rub, the absence of consensus on what either side is willing to concede. If Kashmir is an inalienable part of India, if the Kashmiri people cannot be part of any Indo-Pak negotiations, if plebiscite is ruled out as is any third party mediation, and if Pakistan remains obdurate about first discussing Kashmir before entertaining any other issue then can we realistically expect any progress?

One could conceivably argue that the objective was not to come to a resolution – in any case unlikely given the complexity of the issue and the deep mistrust between the two countries. Rather, the effort was to break the deadlock, to initiate a dialogue process and, hopefully, to evolve a mechanism to take the process forward. Possibly this is why the Indian prime minister unilaterally announced a series of confidence building measures in the run-up to the Summit – relaxation of visa rules, adding to the number of check posts to cross the border, agreeing to not arrest fishermen who might inadvertently stray into Indian waters and so on. Equally, the Musharraf visit was preceded by an unprecedented media blitz, much of it favourable to the Pakistani president.

It would be churlish to deny some positive fallouts, in particular the increased people to people contact between the two countries. Courtesy the visiting social scientists, journalists, social and cultural activists, the Indians got a deeper understanding of Pakistani society and its diverse concerns. Nevertheless, the disappointment over the failure to even issue a joint declaration is pervasive. Worse, there is apprehension that with the Pakistani delegation having returned empty-handed, conflict in Kashmir may intensify.

It is today being questioned whether the Indian side was adequately prepared for the talks. Normally, summits are the culmination of a process, not the starting point. We are told that the absence of a structured agenda or agreed upon position papers was because of Pakistani insistence, the apprehension that officials, naturally conservative, may tie leaders down to historical positions. Even so, why was there no attempt to take the public into confidence, to prepare them not for the advantages of peace but what might have to be sacrificed for the sake of peace?

Little surprise that the talks fuelled so much speculation, particularly since the two leaders had three one-on-one talks lasting for many hours. And once they failed to reach any resolution, the blame mongers were furious, targeting in turn the bureaucracy, the I&B Minister for indiscreet remarks and purported hardliners out to scuttle the Summit, even the media for creating a hype and indulging in interventionist reporting.

Whatever the real reasons, it does appear that the Indian establishment came through badly in these talks. Be it prior preparation of negotiating positions or media management during the Summit, the mix of silence and knee-jerk reactions showed us up as unprofessional. While President Musharraf was all over the media, even entertaining senior journalists and editors at breakfast, the Indian prime minister was conspicuous by his absence.

It is not often that countries get such a chance for peace. The Pakistani president is under tremendous domestic and international pressure to settle outstanding issues with India. Even at the risk of according him legitimacy, Prime Minister Vajpayee showed initiative in extending him an invitation. He even got unqualified support from the principal opposition party. The public clearly welcomed the move. To have muffed up this opportunity, whatever the reasons, is likely to prove costly for both countries. That is the real tragedy.

Harsh Sethi