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MUCH of the debate in the year gone by was dominated by Iraq, or more correctly the US policy on Iraq, the Middle East and, by extension, the global ‘war on terror’. With Saddam Hussein in incarceration, his sons killed, and many of his close associates in prison, dead, or in hiding, will the discourse take a new turn? Now that the Bush administration has ‘got him’, will we witness a clearer unfolding of US design? On this hangs the fate of 2004.
The post-Saddam capture discourse continues to be as deeply divided as the earlier debate on the efficacy of war for ‘regime change’. In part this is because few, barring the radical conservative caucus running Pentagon, can claim coherent understanding of US policy and strategy. Was all this mobilization and destruction only for securing control over Iraq’s oil reserves? Or was the intention to establish a beach-head in the region, a first step towards redrawing the Middle East map? Few believed, despite exertions by the US propaganda machine with ‘able’ assistance from Tony Blair, that Iraq 2003 was about destruction of weapons of mass destruction, ridding the world of a terrible dictator and mass murderer, and bringing freedom and democracy to a long suffering people.
Well, the ‘dictator’ and his associates now seem part of history even though resistance to US ‘occupation’ of Iraq refuses to die out. There is likelihood that it may even intensify. The Shia groups, so far somewhat muted because Saddam was still at large, may now become more restive. So too may the Kurds in the North. After all, the US actions so far – the slow pace of restoring civic infrastructure, the continuing breakdown in law and order, above all the cornering of rebuilding contacts by US firms close to Rumsfeld – do little to inspire faith in US fairness.
On the other hand, the US has shown the determination to hang on despite a substantial loss of lives. Erstwhile critics like Germany and France, seeing the writing on the wall, have now modulated their stance. Gadaffi’s Libya has now agreed to dismantle its WMD programme. Above all, notwithstanding substantial unease about the media portrayal of a captive Saddam, there have been few demonstrations in his favour. Little surprise that Bush’s popularity ratings, which had dipped to an alarming low, are now on the rise.
Much will depend on how the US handles the coming days. Will it seek to mend fences with its erstwhile detractors, permit an expanded role for the United Nations, be less parsimonious in awarding reconstruction contracts and, most important, work at winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Iraqi people? Sceptics will continue to scoff and regurgitate familiar arguments about US arrogance and short sightedness, but few can deny that the capture of Saddam marks a turning point.
Closer home, many have been surprised by India’s guarded response to these events. Not so long back there was furious speculation about India sending troops to Iraq. The Home Minister, L.K. Advani, on a visit to the US, ostensibly even gave an assurance to this effect. And the US interest in getting India on board was hardly secret. Nevertheless, in the end, we stayed away, and today are not joining the western celebrations. The Petroleum Minister, Ram Naik, has even ventured to characterize Saddam’s capture as ‘unfortunate’.
Few, particularly from the left and secular camp, expected such modulated behaviour from the BJP. It is, after all, routinely derided as communal and anti-Muslim, even more an enthusiastic camp follower of the US. So does this present response indicate a cooling off vis-à-vis the US? Or is it, now that the BJP led NDA regime feels more secure about itself, a reassertion of a bi-partisan, national consensus on India’s foreign policy? If only Vajpayee can rein in the Hindutva hotheads and kick-start a process of normalization with Pakistan, India’s status as the world’s second largest Muslim country can enable it to play a constructive role in tempering the obsession with the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis.
It is likely that the coming months will witness substantial churning in international affairs. At one level, all of us will need to come to terms with the centrality of the US in defining the new rules of the game. And if the US policy manages to rescue itself from the clutches of the radical conservatives and display greater generosity and less righteousness, it may win over newer adherents to its view of the world. It could, as easily, remain a prisoner of its hubris and seek to play global cop. If so, we are in for troubled times.
Harsh Sethi
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