THE five state assembly elections of winter 2003 have put a spring in the step of the BJP. In the wake of the results, there was much speculation about an early snap poll, possibly in April. Whether this happens or not, the sea change in the political landscape since five years ago is remarkable. Then, the Congress ousted the BJP from power in two states and held onto Madhya Pradesh against all odds. It prompted the party leadership under Sonia Gandhi to work for the downfall of the second Vajpayee government. The rest is history: it was the Congress that suffered an erosion of strength and the NDA emerged for the first time with a clear majority.

India 2004 is then a very different place in the simplest sense. A non-Congress regime is about to complete a full five-year term in office. After decades of one party rule, uninterrupted for a full thirty years, India will have had a non-Congress PM who will, by September 2004, have been in office for six and a half years. The unruly gaggle of two-dozen odd parties has held together with a few exceptions. More significant, however, are the shifts within the coalition and in the premier party at its core.

The real advantage of the BJP has been its ability to knit and hold together its regional and sub-regional allies. This was a task that was made immeasurably difficult in the phase from 1986-96 when the party put its ideologically charged agenda at the centre of its platform. It was only by stepping back, even if tactically, from critical symbolic issues that it was able to widen its catchment of allies. Such a denouement was never an easy one for a party linked indissolubly to its parent organisation, the RSS. But it was born of necessity. The litmus test came in the forging of post-poll ties with the Telugu Desam Party in 1998 and then with a successful pre-poll pact in 1999. Despite the fact that the two do not and have never shared power, they have stood together to keep the Congress at bay, both in Hyderabad and New Delhi.

This critical ability to share the spoils of office with regional parties on a stable and enduring basis has helped hold the NDA together. This has been far more useful with other players like the Akali Dal and the DMK. As much as residual anti-Congressism deepened by joint struggles against the Emergency in 1975-77, this has helped the BJP especially at times when such regional parties have been voted out of office in their respective states.

 

 

What few had foreseen was the way in which such smaller parties would slowly be marginalized within the NDA by the BJP. From being the majority partner it has steadily moved towards a position of dominance. Nowhere was this as clearly illustrated as in the Gujarat carnage of 2002, when the sound and fury of the pluralist allies fell far short of a complete break. It has been equally clear in the way key portfolios like telecommunications have moved out of the orbit of smaller allies and firmly into the BJP’s own sphere of influence.

The very regional parties that were once central to the creation of the United Front governments of H.D. Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujral have shown few qualms about marching in step with the BJP. In Tamil Nadu, the state with the longest history of popular regional parties, both the key players have had pre-poll alliances and post-poll power sharing arrangements with Vajpayee’s party. An alliance may be too much to play for, but few are now in doubt about a close entente, unlike the one vis-à-vis Congress, between Mulayam Singh Yadav in UP and the BJP-led government at the Centre.

These developments have been facilitated and underpinned by the transformations within the BJP itself. Contrary to what many had forecast after the resounding victory in Gujarat in 2002, the party did not press ahead with a Hindutva-centred platform. Part of this may have arisen from the failure to strike a chord with voters in Himachal Pradesh. An incumbent government led by Prem Kumar Dhumal, only the third ever BJP ministry in any state to complete a full term, was swept out of office. The upshot was that Hindutva, though very much in evidence in specific ways and in key arenas in the assembly polls, never quite became the central poll plank of the party.

This remained so despite the fact that in the four Hindi belt assemblies, the party was not dependent on allies. Further, at least two of the chief ministerial aspirants, Vasundhara Raje Scindia and Uma Bharati, had both been part of the 87 strong batch of Lok Sabha MPs who won in 1989 at a time when the Ram temple issue first figured prominently in a general election campaign. Such flexibility is not new but is still significant, for it points to a willingness to tack with the wind in a manner that neither its critics nor its well wishers usually associate with the party.

 

 

Perhaps the party also studied its past record carefully, for only in Gujarat in 2002 and in Uttar Pradesh in 1991, did Hindutva become the mascot for electoral success in a state election. The BJP first won state level polls only in 1990, and in MP, for instance, the promise of land pattas to the peasantry was a major vote-winner. Similarly, Bhairon Singh Shekhawat in Rajasthan won re-election in 1993 after a truncated term in office (1990-92), partly on the appeal of a better deal for farmers on the pricing of chemical fertiliser.

The 2003 results have gone further than any in the past in vindicating the Vajpayee approach of foregrounding issues of governance over those overtly associated with the core ideology of the party. To be sure, there was never any hesitation about following the advice of the Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani who asked party workers to have the ‘NDA agenda in one hand and the party flag in the other.’ More striking was the way that even Narendra Modi, who addressed over 40 election meetings in the three large states, subtly shifted his emphasis from Hindu pride to the lack of development.

 

 

Any simplistic contrast of a soft and hard line Hindutva would be misplaced. The RSS remained critical to the campaign process in Madhya Pradesh with the sarsanghchalak, K.S. Sudarshan, himself calling on all who believed in national unity to defeat the ‘divisive’ dalit agenda of Chief Minister Digvijay Singh. In Rajasthan, the Sangh was less in evidence, but most if not all of its 120 MLAs were subjected to a session on ideological indoctrination. Chhattisgarh witnessed a more brazen act: repeated and public defence of former Union Minister Dilip Singh Judeo’s acceptance of cash ‘donations’ in the name of re-conversion. So, Hindutva is very much on the agenda, but in a subtle and long-term sense. In all three states, the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashrams played a role in helping the party win as many as 77 of the 99 seats reserved for the Scheduled Tribes.

But the gains in terms of control of the key sectors of education, culture and the police by the BJP should not blind anyone to the wider message in the poll campaign. The issue was governance and the ability of the party to lead India into the new century. Here the Congress fell woefully short: it came across as a force mired in the past. Equally important was the way Vajpayee outlined his own vision for India’s future. He spoke of a country linked by high-speed highways, with mobile phones and giant river linking projects. In an important way, he tipped the scales in his party’s favour by playing on the work done under his own leadership at the Centre.

 

 

It is a fact that too much must not be read into the verdict. The BJP still governs only 7 states out of 28. It failed to return to power in its old citadel of Delhi and suffered a crushing defeat. In the nine assemblies in the Hindi belt, there is a historic pattern of voting out the ruling party since 1972. The sole exception was the assembly elections of 1985. Other than that, Digvijay Singh in 1998 and Sheila Dikshit in 2003 are unusual in being able to retain office after a full term.

The details of electoral outcome can be tedious but some key facts still stand out. In MP, it was the third force parties representing the interests of the dalits, OBCs and adivasis, that ate into the Congress vote. The BSP, SP and Gondwana Ganatantra Parishad between them took around 11% of the popular vote. Similarly in Chhattisgarh, the Nationalist Congress Party did more than poll 7% of the vote and deny Congress victory in a dozen seats. It also highlighted the inability of the once powerful party to hold together, and exposed cracks in its support base in a manner that helped its arch rival, the BJP.

But the historic pattern of ‘voting the rascals out’ and the rise of smaller parties that ate away the Congress vote share are only a small part of the evolving picture. The fact is that under Vajpayee the BJP has built on its earlier, more hesitant attempts to woo newly assertive blocs of voters. This was already evident in the late 1980s in the willingness to project Kalyan Singh, a Lodh, as potential leader in Uttar Pradesh. It was further cemented in the three post poll pacts with the Bahujan Samaj Party in a bid to convince dalits of the reform-minded credentials of the BJP.

But the line up of chief ministers in the seven states it now controls shows how far the party has managed to incorporate a sense of social pluralism into its strategies. Two are women, two are OBCs (Modi and Bharati), two are adivasis (Arjun Munda in Jharkhand and Gegong Apang in Arunachal Pradesh). Two and only two are savarna Hindus: Raman Singh, a Rajput in Chhattisgarh and Manohar Parrikar, a Bhandari in Goa. The omissions are striking: none at the head of government is a bania. Brahmins may be prominent in the Sangh itself but are less so in the party branches in the states.

 

 

Time alone will tell whether the BJP’s fortunes owe to the vagaries of the electoral cycle or are due to its superior tactics and strategy. But there is no denying that it has come to occupy a central place in the political landscape. Two critical advantages accrue to it from such a network.

Its network of allies has helped offset declines in key regions of strength such as UP which were central to its rise into the premier opposition party in 1991 and then as single largest party in the next two Lok Sabha polls. The decline and marginalisation in UP, first in the Lok Sabha and then in the state assembly, has been offset by alliances with regional parties in states where the party had little hope of doing well on its own. It is here that Vajpayee has been a lynchpin of success.

In 1996, Murasoli Maran referred to him as ‘the right man in the wrong party.’ By downplaying the temple agenda, Article 370 and the Uniform Civil Code, Vajpayee managed to give such regional parties the opening they were looking for. He was no doubt helped by the virtual absence of the party in large parts of southern and eastern India. But to have kept the allies together, or better still to have been able to replace one regional party with another, is no mean feat. This has been true of Om Prakash Chautala who displaced Bansi Lal in Haryana and Karunanidhi who filled in the slot vacated the J. Jayalalithaa in Tamil Nadu.

 

 

The second factor working in favour of the BJP is a wider acceptance of coalitions as a fact of life. While such alliances have been a prominent feature of politics in states like West Bengal and Kerala, and more recently of Maharashtra, they have been the exception rather than the norm at the Centre. The 1977 experiment was short-lived and an excellent advertisement for the stability of one party rule. But since 1989, no party has won a majority. Running a minority government proved to be easier for P.V. Narasimha Rao who managed to keep his ministry intact from 1991-93 but not for Vajpayee whose first two governments lasted thirteen days and thirteen months respectively. But the spell in office since 1999 makes mockery of the core Congress argument that it alone can usher in stability.

The latter is crucial for it drives home the isolation of the Congress, now a rare national party that has no experience of coalitions. Even the CPI (M), which kept out of coalitions in 1977, 1989 and then in 1996, has at least been part of the political machinery that keeps them in place. The main role of the Congress has been that of an unsteady and unreliable partner that topples such governments at will. The BSP has had no such experience either but interestingly its only experience of governance in UP has, on all four occasions, been in coalitions or in ministries which depend on the support of a multiplicity of parties. The breakaway group, the Nationalist Congress Party of Sharad Pawar, not only challenged Sonia Gandhi’s authority and right to lead the party but also implicitly favours a coalition of non-BJP parties that leaves the issue of leadership open to negotiation.

 

 

At Shimla in 2003, the Congress opened the door to alliances, but it was firmly shut by its own functionaries who insisted their president alone could lead such a coalition government. After the rout in the assembly polls in December, she called for a secular alliance but the basis in programmatic terms is unclear and the issue of leadership still undecided. The Congress aspires to power but is unable to come to grips with the reality of pre-poll alliances. By coming to terms with these tectonic shifts and holding his government in place, Vajpayee has made this a very difficult pitch for any Congress leader to bat on.

The issue goes well beyond the personality or the background of Sonia Gandhi for it strikes at the heart of a core assumption the Congress clung to in the freedom struggle: its right to represent and speak for all Indians. In the India of the 21st century, no one party can aspire to such a role. Yet, the BJP has not so much displaced the Congress as the dominant political force in the system as has adapted to the changes that permit a large party to wield power only if it falls in line with the inevitability of coalitions.

What then of the future? If India’s recent political past is a guide, Vajpayee has opened up a chance that his party will play an increasingly central role in remaking the polity. Will the cultural and ideological markers of the system be transformed in major and irreversible ways in line with its core ideology? The fact is that though the process was set in motion by the previous Congress regimes, especially in the late Indira and Rajiv periods (1980-89), there is a major difference for the BJP is subject to two kinds of pulls and pressures the former ruling party did not have to contend with. One is the restraint imposed by its allies. Though currently on a roll, a smaller BJP or a more cohesive set of allies might well change things to its disadvantage.

The second is the continuing importance of the larger body of the Sangh’s affiliates. They will continue to grow and gain from government largesse. This synergy of private (civil society) and government (public) resources can enable them to gain a certain role that will not diminish even if the party is voted out of office. This is most clearly so with the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashrams and also with the Sewa Bharati school system. But complimenting such efforts will be shifts in policy as with the history curricula.

 

 

This leads us to the question of questions. Will the democratic system tame the BJP as it has over time the regionally rooted ideological formations? After all, the Dravidian movement today is a far cry from its early platform of secessionist and militant non-Brahman politics. Similarly, the CPI(M) of the 21st century has much that distinguishes it from the United Front days of the late 1960s. Examples can be multiplied. But there is a major contrast between such parties and the BJP.

One is simply the contrast in terms of scale. The latter exists both in the states or at least several of them and as a key player in national politics. This will enable it to draw on its strengths in one arena to reshape the other. This can be seen in a negative sense as with the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 or in a positive sense as in the poll campaign of 2003. The ability of the BJP to put its imprimatur on the polity, its idiom and grammar of politics exceeds that of other ideologically coherent political formations.

 

 

Further, the Vajpayee period has shown that the party can grow at the state level even while holding power at the Centre. In fact, there is a new generation of leaders who wield power in most of the seven states. In contrast to several key ministers and office bearers in New Delhi who are in the glare of media attention but are members of the indirectly elected Rajya Sabha, these chief ministers have a popular mandate. Should any of them succeed in meeting popular aspirations and retaining power, they will emerge as key players in the party of the future. It may not be out of place to mention that all of them have either come through the RSS or have its seal of approval.

Third, the acid test of whether or not the party has evolved beyond its moorings will only come when it has been in power in a state for a long period of time on its own strength. This does not seem feasible in the near future at the Union level. But Gujarat in 2002 was a warning and it is the sole state where the party has won three elections in a row. Was it an ‘aberration’ as L.K. Advani insists or a structural feature of the Hindutva brand of politics? The deputy prime minister’s assertion will convince few outside his own party but the fact is much of the country is still willing to give him and his party the benefit of doubt. Whether the victims in Gujarat get justice and the perpetrators of violence are punished will be the real test. As with the Congress in 1984, it will be its record that will speak, not its leader’s claims.

Fourth, and this is crucial, no ideologically aligned party has hinged so much on the appeal of one individual as the BJP on Vajpayee. Much like Indira Gandhi in her last phase, he has become the talisman of success for his party. His ability to speak in many voices at the same time, his sheer experience and acceptability across the board, makes him a difficult leader to equal. In fact, his personal acceptability has provided a vital umbrella for the ideologically charged actions of his associates and followers. The party will be more vulnerable once he moves on. Whether the anti-BJP parties will utilise such an opportunity will be the key question.

In summary, Vajpayee has put the BJP where it is today. It is less a question of playing from strength than one of adapting a strategy to fit the situation. The Congress has failed to play the role of an effective opposition by allowing the ruling alliance to set the terms of the debate. The Third Front, though potentially strong on paper, is a non-starter in real terms. The regional parties have a place in the NDA universe and though less equal than others, they are for now content to play along. The main barriers in the way of the Sangh in its ideological drive are the institutions that have been built over the last few decades: the courts, the press and public opinion.

India lived for decades with a strong Congress government and a weak opposition. It appears that Vajpayee stands to gain from that legacy. The opposition of today is more divided and rudderless than the anti-Congress groups of yesteryear. The tide will, however, not run this way forever. People’s aspirations have crossed the limits they were once contained in. If his party cannot meet them, there will be challengers waiting in the wings.