ON the penultimate day of my 15-day stay in Ahmedabad in December 2007, I noticed a non-descript and somewhat disoriented man in his 40s talking to my friend Kakubhai in the central BJP office at Khanpur in Ahmedabad. Kakubhai heard him out, looked him up and down, called one of his helpers and whispered something in his ear. A few minutes later, the helper returned with a shoe box inside a plastic bag. Kakubhai called the nervous visitor, handed over the bag, patted him on the back and showed him out.

What was all that about, I inquired from Kakubhai. ‘The man has come all the way from Gandhinagar. He is not a BJP worker,’ he informed me. ‘His four-year-old son has made life miserable for him. The child insists on possessing a Narendra Modi mask. I gave him one.’

For the average Indian influenced by the media for both information and perception, the power of the Modi cult in Gujarat is astonishing. Routinely berated for being a ‘mass murderer’, undertaking a ‘holocaust’, accused of spreading communal hate, pursuing a dictatorial style and equated with Hitler and Milosevic, Modi’s popularity seems to have been unaffected by the torrent of abuse showered on him. On the contrary, the popularity of the man has risen in direct proportion to the shrillness of his detractors.

 

In 2002, Modi was a controversial politician for his alleged complicity in the riots that broke out all over Gujarat after the arson attack on Hindu karsevaks returning from Ayodhya in February. He was believed to have swept the election on the strength of the resulting communal polarisation. In December 2007, the riots were at a best a sub-text of the election and five years of peace had undermined the communal polarisation. Yet, the overriding theme of the assembly election was Modi.

On December 11 and 16, Gujarat voted in large numbers for the new assembly. The election was held in a peaceful atmosphere. There was no apparent tension and no real fear of large-scale intimidation – although some ‘secular’ visitors from Delhi and Mumbai insisted there was. From all accounts, voter preference was shaped by different factors: some voted along caste lines, some voted blindly for the party of their choice and some were guided by local bread and butter issues such as the availability of water, the price of power and local grievances.

Yet, Modi dominated the election. The agenda was set by the question Modi asked at countless rallies throughout the state: do you want me as chief minister for another five years? With opinion polls showing that he enjoyed a staggering 60 per cent approval rating, Modi made the assembly election a referendum on himself.

It takes a lot of daring to attempt converting an election for a legislature into a presidential contest. In 2004, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance attempted to cash in on Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s personal popularity to secure re-election. Unfortunately for it, the general election became a series of local contests and led to the NDA being voted out and no one in particular being voted in.

 

In Gujarat, a beleaguered Congress quite rightly gauged that its only hope of ousting Modi and the BJP was to convert the assembly into a fragmented election. With Modi’s personal popularity at dizzying heights and no focused anti-incumbency, the Congress sought to conduct a low-key campaign based on an aggregate of local grievances. At one level, it hoped to bolster its traditional support among Kshatriyas, Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims – the KHAM combination forged by Madhavsinh Solanki in the 1980s – with accretion of votes from the Leuva Patels and Kolis. It sought to prey on the caste-based dissidence in the BJP led by former Chief Minister Keshubhai Patel.

To complement a caste campaign, the Congress focused on specific grievances such as the opposition of big farmers to the state government’s draconian insistence on user charges for electricity and the anger of a section of school teachers to a new regime of accountability.

Finally, the Congress was aware of the anger of a section of hard-line Hindu nationalists at Modi’s reluctance to concede political space to them. There was an obvious mismatch between this ‘Hindu’ opposition to Modi and the Congress’ own avowed secularism. It sought to paper over the obvious contradictions by trying to ensure that the alliance remained covert and putting a lid on overtly sectarian issues, particularly those relating to the riots of 2002.

 

To my mind, the state Congress approach was clever but its success depended on the entire secular establishment abandoning its criticism of Modi as a Hindu ogre. It was fine to depict Modi as dictatorial, imperious and insensitive to inner-party sensitivities but the Congress was equally conscious of the need to keep Hindu-Muslim issues out of the campaign.

Thus, when Tehelka and Aaj Tak went to town in November over its Operation Kalank, the full weight of the Congress machinery was used to suppress its dissemination within Gujarat. Local Congress leaders in Gujarat accused Modi of covertly sponsoring the sting operation. Muslim leaders of the Congress were carefully instructed to keep away from Gujarat for the duration of the campaign, lest they say anything that could be construed as anti-Hindu. In the Congress’ calculation, Modi could not be defeated by playing the secular card; he could only be thwarted by guile.

Sonia Gandhi’s maut ke saudagar speech on December 1 at Navsari upset the state Congress’ calculations. The BJP, which was looking for opportunities to raise the level of the campaign, naturally seized upon this remark. Modi expediently interpreted the remark as an insult to Gujarat’s pride and dignity. ‘Do I, a son of Gujarat, look like a maut ka saudagar?’ he asked at his meetings, evoking the inevitable cries of No, no. ‘You must pay Soniaben back for this insult to Gujarat.’

The ‘maut ke saudagar’ remark, plus Digvijay Singh’s casual invocation of ‘Hindu terrorism’ at a press conference, gave Modi the opening to raise the issue of national security and terrorism which he was itching to do. His subsequent references to Afzal Guru and Sohrabuddin Sheikh were aimed at rekindling the ‘Hindu’ Modi. An indignant media played into Modi’s hands by making him the centre piece of the election. The overwhelming feeling in Gujarat (and I presume the whole of India) is that Afzal should swing and that Sohrabuddin got his just desserts. In articulating this feeling, Modi captured the public mood and made terrorism – to which he added his anti-mafia rhetoric and the boast of a curfew-free Gujarat – an election issue. Modi portrayed himself as the doughty crusader willing to take on a namby-pamby liberal establishment fearful of taking on the ‘enemy’.

 

Yet, it is unduly simplistic to perceive Modi as another crass practitioner of Islamophobia. If Modi’s reputation depended solely on his perceived ability to keep Muslims ‘in their place’, he would have lost his appeal once the scars of the 2002 riots started healing and disappearing. In December 2002, Modi definitely preyed on aroused Hindu passions and the sense of grievance at having been targeted by cosmopolitan India. The mandate which he secured five years ago was an articulation of the Hindu rage he epitomised. It was less a vote for him than what the electorate believed he symbolised.

It was different this election. Modi was always at pains to point out that in 2002 he was an unknown commodity – a former RSS pracharak who had just fought one by-election after he was parachuted into the chief minister’s chair in 2001. This time around he was a known factor in Gujarat. For five years the electorate had the opportunity of seeing him at work, gauging his strengths and weaknesses and assessing him on their own terms.

 

Whereas his detractors in the rest of the country kept alive the offensive against Modi for his sins of omission and commission in the 2002 riots – the high points being the US visa denial, the Zaheera Sheikh and Bilkees Bano cases and, finally, the Tehelka expose – the attack in Gujarat centred on his political style and issues of governance. In Gujarat, every detail of Modi’s spat with Keshubhai Patel, his fallout with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s Pravin Togadia and his differences with the top brass of the RSS was scrutinised. Despite its formidable electoral base and its good performance in the 2004 Lok Sabha election, the Congress was a shadowy presence in the anti-Modi moves. It almost seemed that the threat to Modi came from within his own ideological fraternity.

It speaks volumes for Modi’s innate self-confidence (his detractors call it megalomania) that he was unmoved by the intensity of the assaults and the carefully aimed snubs directed at him. He deliberately chose to make himself the centre of the election campaign. A more cautious politician would have taken shelter behind the party or retreated into a shell. Not Modi. He revelled in controversy and wanted more. He put himself directly in the line of fire.

The results were there for everyone, except the wilfully blind, to see. As he crisscrossed his way through all the constituencies, Modi was greeted with the type of response politicians can at best dream of. His election meetings, particularly the late-afternoon and evening rallies, resembled the atmosphere of rock concerts with screaming fans – mainly youth and women – looking at him adoringly. There was very little organizational effort to attract crowds; his mere presence proved a magnetic draw. If the voting figures are anything to go by, a large percentage of them turned up on polling day and voted for him. As many of them told me, they were not voting for the BJP; they were reposing their faith in Modi, the new icon of Gujarat.

 

It is facile to suggest that Modi evoked such a spirited response only on the strength of his communication skills. As a skilled orator, Modi changed his script according to what he perceived would go down well. In some areas it was the invocation of a tanker-free Gujarat, in some it was the Jyotigram scheme that had brought electricity to homes, and in others it was the pride of having achieved a curfew-free Gujarat. The common theme was always Gujarat’s achievements and Gujarati pride. As a representative of a national political party, Modi was hugely successful in linking himself to the Gujarati ethos, a theme that cut across caste barriers. He was simultaneously successful in linking attacks on him and his record of governance to a denigration of Gujarat.

His opponents fell into the trap headlong. Those who tried to deny his obvious achievements like providing domestic power, drinking water and safe streets were perceived as needlessly cussed and, consequently, anti-Gujarati.

Some observers mistakenly saw in Modi’s attacks on the ‘Delhi Sultanate’ and his appeal to Gujarati pride as evidence of separatism. They were mistaken. Modi successfully blended Hindu identity with regional self-esteem. Gujarati pride in its inherently dynamic and entrepreneurial personality has never been couched in separatist logic. For practical reasons, not least of which is the large Gujarati diaspora, Modi’s sense of regional pride has mingled happily with robust Indian nationalism. He complemented it with an understated but wholehearted endorsement of globalization which he presented as a phenomenal opportunity for the state. Modi’s politics is markedly different from that stream of the RSS and BJP stalwarts which is wedded to Fortress India.

 

The image of Modi that came through this election was a cocktail of boundless energy, administrative acumen, unimpeachable integrity and, not least, machismo. Modi’s appeal in Gujarat is in many ways inspirational and has cut across regions, gender, castes and generations. He is perceived as a leader who has overcome fear and is not afraid of doing what he thinks is right, even if it involves treading on the toes of his own party.

He has made enemies inside his own party and in the wider Sangh fraternity because of his stubborn refusal to provide special accommodation to political associates. He has defied the conventional wisdom that good politics involves careful disbursement of patronage and scant concern for efficiency. During the preparation of the election manifesto for the Gujarat election, Modi vetoed the universal suggestion in the party that those charged with the theft of power be given clemency.

Ironically, these attributes have added to his reputation of fanatical selflessness and created a halo around him. Modi would have been most vulnerable if anyone had been able to detect a stain on his integrity. They haven’t and this is why his audacious claim of neither being corrupt nor tolerating corruption has acquired mythical status. The only other chief minister whose appeal depends on selflessness and unimpeachable integrity is Orissa’s Naveen Patnaik.

 

There are certain unwritten rules of politics over which there is a national consensus. To many, these have enhanced the quality of Indian democracy. To others, the consensus is stifling and has prevented India from realising its true potential in the world. Modi is not a corporate CEO as some have made him out to be. He is a consummate politician who has detected a constituency impatient with bullock cart capitalism and a slothful approach to development. He has intruded into Young India’s sense of impatience and the natural Gujarati urge to succeed. Modi, for example, has a 6,500 strong Orkut community backing him and some of them even took out a silent march in Ahmedabad in his support. Modi may be almost friendless in the Old Media, but he has aggressive support among bloggers and netizens.

Modi is the creation of an India that is fed up with sloth, inefficiency and the missed opportunities of the past 50 years. This is an India that found its voice after socialism was junked in 1991 and has steadily grown in confidence with every percentage rise in the growth rate. Gujarat is one of the principal citadels of this explosion of suppressed energy. It is a state which is hungry for more than the 10.6 per cent growth it has achieved over the years. It wants faster growth, more opportunities and more efficiency. It is impatient with the obstacles to the good life – be it bureaucratic bungling, terrorist disruption and liberal carping. It wants to be in the First World. Modi has blended these impulses into raw political energy.

With an image of being uncompromisingly tough, ruthlessly driven, politically innovative, fanatically honest and culturally rooted, Modi has evolved into the leader of the New Gujarat. Through his oratory and resolute leadership, he has captured the restlessness of the intensely nationalist we-can-do-it generation which, as a recent Pew Global Attitudes Survey discovered, believes overwhelmingly that Indian culture is superior to anything else.

 

The India Shining campaign anticipated the phenomenon but was politically derailed because much of India is still subsumed by Bharat. In Gujarat, New India has reached a critical mass to make it politically viable. The Gujarat election was not about secularism and communalism as many would have liked it to be. In essence it was all about Modi trying to overwhelm a deeply entrenched old order with brash daring. His opponents on the ground naturally include all those who are either disconcerted by or feel left out by this rush towards entrepreneurial modernity. They include almost all the symbols of pre-liberalization India: vote banks, caste-based leaders, Gandhians, Leftists and politicians who rely on freebies.

For the moment Modi is a regional leader. But the phenomenon on which his politics is grafted is pan-Indian and steadily growing in importance. Whatever the Gujarat verdict, India is going to be preoccupied with Modi for a long time. Like him or hate him, the Modi phenomenon is going to play a major role in shaping the future politics of India. The rough edges may blunt over time but what matters is the direction of change.

 

* This article has been written in the inter-regnum between the final round of polling and the counting of votes for the election to the Gujarat Assembly. The exit polls indicate that Narendra Modi will win another term.