THE situation in Afghanistan today has to be understood in the context of the US-led attack following 9/11. Afghanistan in 2001 was a deeply divided nation onto which the Taliban had imposed a semblance of unity. The Afghans have since long resisted political unification, a characteristic they have in common with ‘people of the mountain’ elsewhere in the world.

The people of the mountain have three predominant characteristics: (i) vertical organization – the family and tribe are the units that command loyalty, not caste or ethnicity or other horizontal affiliations that would be useful in building national unity, as in India or central Europe; (ii) there is no landed nobility, since there is little land to own and owning land is not important for social status; and (iii) a strong democratic egalitarianism – the poor and the rich live in similar houses and at tribal meetings each one expresses views fearlessly. It is often difficult to discern if any hierarchy exists. And honour is prized above all other virtues.

Hence, it is unusually difficult to subjugate them and centralized political systems generally attempt, fail and eventually abandon efforts to bring them within the fold. Pashtunwali and rawaj are more important than the constitution or the laws passed under it.

In Afghan society, the division between Pashtun, who have always been dominant, and non-Pashtun, is added to the social fragmentation among the various Pashtun tribes, as also the different non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Though as early as 1747, Ahmad Khan of the Abdali tribe attempted to bring together the heads of different Pashtun tribes as well as of the other ethnic groups, including the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Baluchis, to form a united Afghanistan, continuing struggle between the two major Pashtun tribes, the Durrani and the Ghilzai, continued over the next couple of centuries. Equally, the non-Pashtun ethnic groups too remain divided.

At the religious level too there is the divide between Sunni and Shia, which, since it broadly corresponds to the ethnic divide between non-Hazara and Hazara, reinforces the latter. There are also divisions among the Sunni, between the Deobandis of the Hanafi sect for instance, and those influenced by the Wahabism of Saudi Arabia. So while successive Afghan rulers have tried to unite the different tribes and ethnic and sectarian groups, the long Afghan tradition of rejecting any kind of subjugation keeps coming in the way.

 

Over the years, however, while mobilization in the name of religion has proved difficult, it has been easier to bring together the disparate ethnic and tribal groups in the name of defending Afghan freedom as a nation. Despite the predominance of ethnic and tribal affinity in the Afghan self-identity, nationalism has invariably trumped religion, though it usually surfaces primarily in opposition to the foreigner as aggressor or hostile neighbour: the British in India from the First Afghan War (1839-42) till 1947; Pakistan from 1947 till 1979; the Soviet Union from then to 1989. And though the US is not quite seen in that light, anti-US sentiment remains strong.

Understandably, then, every neighbour from the British in India and Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union and then Pakistan has consistently followed a policy of sharpening the divisions within Afghan society, in an attempt to weaken Afghan nationalism through socio-political fragmentation.

The British attempt in the Second Afghan War (1879-81) to divide the country into two along the Hindu Kush mountain range failed. From 1979 to 1989 Soviet policy was similar: disperse the Pashtuns into Pakistan, while seeking to co-opt the non-Pashtun through concessions and financial inducements, and by encouraging direct relations with the neighbouring Soviet republics with ethnically similar populations. Incidentally, policies of ethnic assertiveness when the republics became independent in 1991 further sharpened the ethnic divisions in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s policy too reinforced this trend during the 1980s, assisting Mujahidin groups to organize along tribal affiliations. Its basic objective has been to weaken the Afghan state, partly through a systematic policy of socio-political fragmentation. It has stronger compulsions than the other neighbours to do so: it needs strategic depth vis-à-vis India and has to settle its own Pashtun problem. Further, there is little prospect of the former Mujahidin returning to peacetime occupations if Afghanistan remains in an unsettled state, making available a large pool of battle-tested persons for use in Jammu and Kashmir as also elsewhere in India. There remains the prospect of getting gas and oil from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan.

 

To implement this policy Pakistan worked hard to create, train, equip and finance the Taliban to seize power in Kabul. Since the Taliban were originally of Durrani origin, Pakistan had to switch from the Ghilzai to the Durrani. It helped that the Amir-ul-Momineen of the Taliban, Mohammad Omar was a Popalzai, a branch of the Durrani. But this was only one component of the Taliban. There were four other groups: experienced and senior army and air force officers from the Soviet sponsored People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan which ruled till 1992, and who defected in the early 1990s; the foreigners – Chechens, Uzbeks, Arabs, Bangladeshis and Indonesians; the Pakistanis, volunteers as well as those seconded from the armed forces; and last, students from madrasas located in Pakistan. Remembering this can help discard romantic ideas about inspired students from seminaries leading a revolution against old and tired self-centred Mujahidin fighting among themselves for control of Kabul. Actually it was a triple pincer movement led by tanks, APCs and motorized artillery that led to the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in 1996.

 

Once in control the Taliban issued a series of edicts that in their rigid interpretation of the Sharia had the effect of antagonizing the more liberal minded minority ethnic groups, as also many of the Pashtuns. Edicts forbade flying kites; the use of paper bags, playing football or chess; listening to music, dancing or going to the cinema. Insurance, interest and gambling was banned, as was photography of people or animals or reading of foreign books and magazines. All girls’ schools were closed, women were forbidden to work, as also from going out of their houses unless fully veiled and accompanied by a close relative. The men were compelled to grow beards, as shaving or even trimming was not allowed.

In Kabul the ‘Department for the Promotion of Good and the Fighting of Evil’ had dozens of inspectors constantly on the move, alert for violation of the rules for dress or prayer, authorized to mete out punishment on the spot. Even in Iran or among the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, often regarded as the leading representatives of fundamentalist Islam, this rigid interpretation of doctrine was denounced.

The Taliban was, in fact, engaged in executing a carefully prepared plan to destroy the Islam promoted by Amir Habibullah in the early 20th century. This was an Islam that attempted to bring together Shia and Sunni, Tajik and Uzbek, Hazara and Pashtun to form a unified nation state, an Islam promoted and accepted by an urbanized middle class and which brought increased cohesion to the country. Taliban was not only signalling to this class that it was no longer acceptable in the country, they were telling potential modernizers and nationalists who wanted to consolidate state and nation building by incorporating religion into the state, that the process would now be reversed by incorporating the state into religion. This was no blind fanaticism. Knowing that the imposition of rigid rules would lead to social fragmentation, it was more a carefully calibrated policy pursued at the behest of Pakistan.

 

The Taliban had two other projects: Pashtun dominance and ethnic separation. They tried to rouse Pashtun passions by claiming that an unholy gang of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Shiites was trying to grab power that had always remained with the Pashtun. No wonder that in the areas captured by them, which were largely Pashtun, the non-Pashtuns were often driven out. In a process already set in motion in the 1980s, Uzbek minorities moved to Uzbek majority areas, the Tajik to Tajik majority areas, and the Turkmen to the northeast or even to Turkmenistan. In March 1995, after their first attack on Kabul was repulsed, the Taliban not only executed the Hazara leaders with whom they were in alliance but also hundreds of their followers in what seemed to be the beginnings of a process of ethnic cleansing.

So much for the background of Pakistan and the Taliban. At the moment a player of much greater significance is the USA. Aware of the divisions within Afghanistan, the USA was most reluctant to get involved in ground-level operations. Post 9/11, US spokespersons repeatedly explained that they were not in the business of nation building – they were after Al Qaeda. So when the Taliban refused to hand over the Al Qaeda, they had to remove the Taliban, and help install a friendlier regime in Kabul. That is what OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) was all about – to use the capabilities generated by the revolution in military affairs, including remote sensing, smart weapons and unmanned drones to locate and destroy the enemy. Apart from a few hundred special forces for intelligence gathering and liaison, everything was to be done from the air.

 

But it didn’t quite work out that way. Most of Afghanistan was already rubble from a quarter century of war; all one could do from the air was reduce it to finer dust, but not dislodge the Taliban. For this the US had to turn to the Northern Alliance, mainly Panjsheris, Uzbeks and other Tajiks. However, it took months to remove the Taliban from the major cities; Kandahar surrendered only on 9 December 2001. It was not till a year and a half later, in May 2003, that US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld announced the end of major combat operations. ‘The bulk of the country,’ he said at a Kabul press conference with Karzai, ‘was permissive, it’s secure.’ But it quickly became clear that getting hold of the Al Qaeda would take a long time, and it would not be possible to leave Afghanistan even when that was done.

To forestall the emergence of another Taliban and another Al Qaeda, the US willy-nilly got involved in nation building. In this it had partners: the European Union, Japan, India and Pakistan. But nobody doubted that the US was in the driving seat. It steered the agreement among Afghan notables and leaders who met in Bonn under the auspices of the United Nations in December 2001, which eventually led to the adoption of a constitution. Hamid Karzai was elected President in October 2004 and parliamentary elections completed by September 2005.

Now the US (together with its allies) is involved in everything. There is the US-led OEF; an ISAF or International Security Assistance Force created by a UN resolution of December 2001. There is NATO, which took control of ISAF in August 2003. There are the PRTs, or Provincial Reconstruction Teams, a US initiative to establish conclaves or safe areas outside Kabul for international aid workers. Overall, the US has close to 27,000 troops in Afghanistan; its allies another 27,000.

 

In the months after the fall of the Taliban, the US faced a Catch 22 situation. Its main aim was to search for and eliminate Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants; it also wanted to stabilize the Karzai government. The search for Al Qaeda and Taliban meant strengthening the local warlords or strongmen, since the US does not have enough troops for large ground operations. This, however, resulted in less stability for Karzai. At one point he even confessed that the warlords were a bigger problem than the Taliban.

Some of the warlords have gradually been brought under control: Ismail Khan from Herat was brought to Kabul and given a cabinet post in early 2005; Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek strongman was given the job of Karzai’s chief military adviser. Others like Atta Mohammed from Mazar-e-Sharif and Hazrat Ali from Jalalabad were similarly displaced. Nevertheless, most warlords remain ensconced despite schemes to disarm them.

Then there is Karzai. Without external military support his chances of survival are bleak. Initially, he was advised not to keep Afghan security, and instead had an American private security contractor, DynCorp. Though this has now changed, the Afghan National Army is plagued with desertions. It was to be 70,000 strong; after five years it has reached about half that figure and will likely melt into the mountainous countryside if the US and its allies pull out. The police force is even weaker. But without Karzai there is nobody else, no one who would be acceptable to as many people of different tribes and ethnic groups. He is not America’s best chance; he is their only chance.

 

The economy remains in shambles. The growing, processing and export of the poppy and its products contribute a third of the GNP, over three billion dollars a year. 93 per cent of the total illicit opium in world markets is sent out from Afghanistan. More than half the population is below the poverty line; infant mortality is high, as is maternal mortality; life expectancy is low, as is school enrolment, especially female enrolment. Agriculture, once the main occupation of the Afghans, faces devastation since decades of war have destroyed the irrigation channels and the fields are so densely mined that there is no hope of clearing them for years. Poppy cultivation has taken over.

In March 2007 it was announced that Afghanistan could have 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas, but experts dispute the figures. The gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan through to Pakistan remains in limbo. There is little else barring a luxury hotel in Kabul and a Coca Cola bottling plant newly opened in 2006. All this is unlikely to make a dent with the 45 per cent unemployed. Even international aid has remained elusive. In any case, foreign aid workers and consultants use up 80 per cent of that money.

 

Finally, a word about the Taliban today, and Pakistan. The main problem facing the US is that the insurgency led by the Taliban, Al Qaeda and the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has been on the increase, with more US and coalition troops killed with every passing year. When the Taliban was driven out of Afghanistan in 2001 they arrived in Waziristan, part of the federally administered areas of Pakistan where the writ of Islamabad does not really run. Despite US pressure, it is the agreements that Pakistan has signed with the tribal leaders of the area, especially those of 2006 that are more relevant. They provide for a withdrawal of Pakistani forces and a return of seized weapons; the release of foreign fighters (around 2,500 were actually released); and permission for jehadis to stay on in the area, peacefully, of course.

This is not quite the same Taliban as was thrown out in 2001, but it has a close enough resemblance to justify the name. The top leaders like Mullah Omar remain there with their followers, most of them Pashtuns. There is the formidable Jalaluddin Haqqani, who once told an interviewer that with a Taliban government in Kabul, Pakistan has an unbeatable 2,300 kilometres of strategic depth and that the security and stability of Pakistan and Afghanistan are intertwined. There is also a younger generation of fighters, including Haqqani’s son. There are the Chechens, the Uzbeks and the Arabs, though one does not any longer hear about Bangladeshis or Indonesians. There are an increasing number of Pakistanis from the NWFP and from the Punjab. There is, of course, Al Qaeda, their trusted allies. And they have no shortage of recruits. Though US and allied commanders in the field claim that the enemy is being decimated, they continue to face deadly attacks.

In general, the insurgents have learnt and are following similar tactics to those used in Iraq. There is some indication that there have been contacts between the insurgents in the two theatres, meaning that for the US this may become one war instead of two. The operations undertaken by the US revealed, in any case, that the Taliban and their supporters such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Haqqani are no more a rag-tag lot but mobile, well organized and armed and divided into a number of autonomous groups, so that the elimination of one will not make a big difference to the total level of insurgency; in other words, their capacity for making trouble is only increasing. Taliban formations, several hundred strong, have been able to conduct frontal assaults.

 

At one point in 2006 they took control of some parts of Helmand, though not for long. In 2007 they stepped up attacks throughout the country: in the North, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz and Balkh; in the West, Herat and Farah; and of course their stronghold has always been the South and East, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Zabol, Helmand. The Taliban and other insurgents have a safe haven in Pakistan, where the governments in the neighbouring provinces of Baluchistan and NWFP are sympathetic as well as Islamic. Not only is the 2,300 kilometre border impossible to seal, Pakistan has been unable to mount operations on its side due to tribal opposition.

Pakistan which sponsored the original Taliban wants another one in control of Kabul now as an instrument for use in Kashmir, but this time under tighter control so that it does not (and the US is convinced it will not) promote missions of the 9/11 kind. This has on occasion, led to tension with Karzai. Even as the Americans try to keep a wary eye on all this, they have been trying to bring official Afghanistan and Pakistan together.

More relevant, feelers are now being sent to the Taliban, based on the notion that there are moderate Taliban who could be wooed away from those who have links with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Several Taliban such as their Foreign Minister Wakil Muttawakil are already working within the political system. Karzai himself seems to have offered to meet Mullah Omar, and has reportedly met some Taliban representatives. Overall, the current trend suggests that the political dispensation in Afghanistan favours dialogue with the Taliban in search of a honourable settlement.

 

For India there could not have been worse news. The Taliban and Al Qaeda combine have close links with terrorist groups that have been particularly active in India and whose main aim is to integrate Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, like Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri’s Lashkar-e-Toiba, and Masood Azhar’s Jaish-e-Mohammed and, through the Karachi mafia, Dawood Ibrahim. Every step they take towards greater influence or control in Kabul begets danger.

After 1947, successive governments in India have been cautious in dealing with Afghanistan. Afghanistan should have been one of our closest friends in the region, deserving our political, economic, moral and military support to ensure its strength and stability. This means first of all that India should have supported the demand for revision of the Durand Line and for the autonomy or independence of all the Pashtuns of the North West through a process of self-determination, demands that Afghanistan has been making over the years on Pakistan, as a landlocked state. However, we did neither.

So, although relations were friendly with high-level visits, expanding trade, aid projects and facilities for training among other co-operative ventures, there was no support for Afghanistan on the issues it regarded as critical. The Afghans were disappointed, which they showed in particular by taking an even handed position at the time of the Chinese aggression of 1962, as well as during and after Pakistan’s aggression in 1965.

 

Even during the 1960s and 1970s, as rival western and Soviet economic and military aid programmes focused on the southern and northern provinces respectively, India could do little to influence a development that would have been regarded as a direct security threat had it occurred in Nepal or Sri Lanka. And when Soviet forces entered the country in December 1979, India’s response was influenced more by the need for continuing good relations with the Soviet Union than by what the future of Afghanistan would mean for the neighbourhood and our security.

Following the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, our political interaction with the leadership of Afghanistan has been intensive and regular. The focus of our interaction has been to support the Afghan government and the political process in the country as mandated under the Bonn Agreement, and the unity, independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Afghanistan. There have been several high level visits from and to Afghanistan after 2001. This includes official visits by President Hamid Karzai. From the Indian side Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as also, on more than one occasion, the External Affairs Minister, have visited Kabul.

 

In response to President Karzai’s request, India decided to focus its aid programme on: road construction, the Zarang-Delaram road, to reduce the distance to South Afghanistan through Chabahar; irrigation and power, the reconstruction and completion of the Salma Dam Power Project in Herat province and a double circuit transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul; water supply; and similar work on the infrastructure to ensure the foundations for stability and consolidation. Traditional areas in which India has been helping Afghanistan like health, the Indira Gandhi children’s hospital and education, the prestigious Habibia High School in Kabul and culture, also continue. Indeed, India’s assistance covers every aspect of life in the country – agriculture, industry and the private sector, education and health, transport and infrastructure, the media, IT, security, law, banking, urban development. India is one of those recognised for the usefulness of its assistance programmes.

All these developments, though welcome, may well be a case of too little, too late. If at all there is to be some noticeable impact of Indian policy, our involvement has to be stepped up very considerably and soon. Otherwise Afghanistan would be yet another classic case of missed opportunity, with our policy-makers losing influence in a country traditionally well disposed towards India. With Afghanistan showing few signs of settling down, the implications for our regional security can be well imagined.