THE ancient scholar and strategist, Kautilya in his Arthashastra, based his mandala theory on the principle that every neighbouring state should be regarded as an enemy and the enemy’s enemy as a friend. Going strictly by his advice, trouble in the neighbour’s land should be seen as good news. If one applies that yardstick to India and its neighbourhood, perhaps, there would be no dearth of such good news.

India is both a continental and maritime nation with a territory of over three million square kilometres. It has a land frontier of 15,000 kms and a coastline of 7,500 kms. It shares land and maritime boundaries with at least nine countries – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. If one keeps aside China, Maldives, and Bhutan – where there is relative peace and calm – six countries in India’s immediate neighbourhood have been on the boil for the past many years.

Recently, Benazir Bhutto’s assassination and the ensuing violence in Pakistan might have led many commentators to describe it as ‘the most dangerous place in the world.’ But Pakistan is hardly a case in isolation. All around India there are countries where regular violence has become the norm rather than an aberration. In Afghanistan, the Hamid Karzai government is engaged in a bloody war with Islamic fundamentalist groups owing allegiance to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The decade’s long ethnic violence in Sri Lanka shows no signs of ending as the Tamil Tigers, demanding a separate state, are in a violent struggle with the Sinhalese army. The Maoists in Nepal have ended their nine-year long insurgency to join an interim government. But violent clashes continue between rival political groups, and they are likely to increase as the country gears up to face the April elections.

On the eastern side, Bangladesh continues to face turbulence as the army-backed caretaker government tries to fight the Islamic fundamentalist groups on one hand and deal with a growing demand for restoring democracy on the other. The bloody crackdown on Buddhist monks by the army generals in Myanmar late last year was yet another reminder of the junta’s capability for violence and its strong resistance to open any space for dissenting voices in the country.

India, thus, is saddled with countries in a neighbourhood seen as one of the most volatile regions in the world. There are fears that if the current trend continues, some of these countries could turn into failed states. Such a prospect is neither good for India nor for the others in the region. But how does India respond to these developments and the challenges they have thrown up? Could it come up with some urgent measures to change the course of events and ensure peace and stability in its neighbourhood?

 

If India wants to maintain stability, peace and progress in its own country, it would have to act, both individually as well as collectively, to improve the situation in the turbulent region. Technological change in a globalized world with its stress on inter-connectivity has now brought countries much closer to each other than ever before. National boundaries no longer enjoy the sanctity they once had. Development in one country has its impact and creates multiple ripples in countries in the farthest corners of the world. No country has the luxury any longer to live in isolation. Globalization has provided the opportunity and benefits to enrich and improve the lives of people. But it has also thrown up new challenges for nations to deal with. Be it the emergence of sub-nationalism, ethnic exclusivity or religious fundamentalism, inter-connectivity has ensured that no country can remain immune to such developments in any part of the world. Many of these problems are also present in good measure in the Indian neighbourhood.

 

Keeping in mind both the opportunities as well as the challenges thrown up by a globalized world, relations between countries in general, and management of the neighbourhood in particular, has become one of the most daunting tasks for practitioners of foreign policy. During a speech on the neighbourhood in 2005 in New Delhi, India’s Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said: ‘Frontiers with neighbours are where domestic concerns intersect with external relationships. This is where domestic and foreign policies become inextricable and demand sensitive handling. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that in defining one’s vital national and security interests, a country’s neighbourhood enjoys a place of unquestioned primacy.’

There are two other important reasons why management of the neighbourhood becomes vitally important for India. First, India’s economy has been growing for the past two decades at over six per cent. Last year it has shown a growth of nine per cent plus. Studies conducted by reputed agencies and institutions in different parts of the world predict India emerging as the third largest economy in the world over the next 10-15 years. To maintain this level of growth for the next decade or so, India would have to ensure political stability within the country and an environment of peace and calm in the neighbourhood. The second has to do with India’s long cherished desire to play a much bigger role in world affairs that goes far beyond South Asia.

From the time India emerged on the world scene as an independent country in August 1947, it saw itself as a leader of the developing world. Being one of the first countries to come out of the colonial yoke, it had encouraged other countries in Asia and Africa to become independent. In the early 1950s when the United States offered India a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in place of China, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had politely declined the offer. But with new ground realities emerging at the end of the Cold War, India has shown interest in finding a place at the highest decision-making table in the world. For the past several years its leaders, diplomats and officials have been actively engaged in mobilizing support around the globe to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

 

Many countries are not averse to the idea of India finding a place in the Security Council, seeing it as a deserving candidate at the high-table. There is now a growing acceptance, both among Indian policy planners and New Delhi’s friends in the outside world, that India needs to manage its neighbourhood better. If it wants to play a wider and more significant role at the world stage, it will have to instil confidence in the international community about its ability to deal with major challenges. Better management of its neighbourhood, therefore, becomes crucial in India’s quest for a role at the international stage. But how does one define India’s neighbourhood? One could be in the context of South Asia. The other, and perhaps better way, would be to include its extended neighbourhood, the entire region where India has a strategic interest.

India is located at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean. This puts it in a vantage position with the countries of West, Central, continental and South East Asia and the littoral states of the Indian Ocean stretching from East Africa to Indonesia. In recent years this entire region has been the hotbed of fundamentalist and terrorist activity and gone through long spells of political instability. In the past decade or so, it has witnessed a series of acts of terrorism stretching through major cities in North and East Africa, the Gulf, and South East Asia. The unrelenting violence in Iraq and Afghanistan has only contributed further to the volatility of the region. Criminal gangs involved in gunrunning, trafficking in humans, drugs and piracy have made some of the vital sea lanes in the region more vulnerable.

 

Being an energy hungry nation, India has vital interests in the Gulf and the Central Asian region which are some of its most important sources for oil and natural gas. The Gulf is also an important trading partner for India and home to over 3.5 million Indians who work there. It also has major stakes in South East Asia. Apart from the ethnic and cultural ties that it has with most countries in the region, South East Asia has, over the years, become one of the most dynamic partners in India’s economic growth. The security and stability of the Indian Ocean is vital for India. It needs to keep the Straits of Malacca, one of the busiest sea routes in the region, and other important sea ports and sea lanes in the Persian Gulf and Bab-el-Mandab, free from trouble.

However, improving the situation in its immediate neighbourhood is also crucial for India. South Asia has traditionally been considered by India as its area of influence although serious doubts have been expressed over the extent of influence India has over its neighbours. Many have also questioned whether India has a neighbourhood policy that is comprehensive, effective and sustainable.

A section of the Indian establishment is in favour of looking at South Asia as a single entity. This is based on the fact that the seven nations share the same geographical space, a common history and have deep-rooted cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic ties. But few deny that the problems of the region are also deep-rooted, many with roots in imperial history. Many are a spill-over of decisions taken by the colonial rulers, particularly the one to partition the subcontinent by redrawing artificial boundaries. Immense trauma was felt over the loss of millions of human lives as well as the traditional communication and commercial links. A large number of people in the subcontinent not only lost their family members and loved ones overnight, but also their land, business, and livelihood.

 

When an independent India emerged in 1947, relations with its immediate neighbours were based on these developments. A part of the problem arose – and to a large extent still does – over the gap that exists between India’s self-image and its perception by neighbours. India always regarded itself as a leader of the developing world or as the ‘first among equals’. The others saw India as a country that took itself ‘too seriously’ but was condescending towards the needs, interests and aspirations of its neighbours. Jawaharlal Nehru’s attempt to introduce Chinese leader Zhuo-en-Lai before the gathering at the Africa-Asian Summit in Bandung in 1955 is well known. Many have interpreted the incident as a turning point in Sino-Indian relations that ended the bonhomie and finally led to a war between the two countries over the boundary dispute, in 1962.

But India’s attitude towards its South Asian neighbours has perhaps been a little more dismissive. India always saw itself as the natural heir of the British Empire in the subcontinent. Having ended up with the largest share of the British pie only strengthened that attitude as most of the neighbours were seen as nothing more than vassal states. Jawaharlal Nehru, who played a major role in formulating India’s foreign policy in the initial days, could build up a personal rapport with many world leaders, but had very few friends in the neighbourhood. ‘It is important to note that he (Nehru) did not find much in common with leaders in the immediate neighbourhood – Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka or Indonesia. The only South East Asian leader with whom he had a personal equation was Thakin Nu of Burma,’ the late J.N. Dixit, India’s former foreign secretary and national security advisor observers in his book, Across Borders.

 

This tradition has been followed by most Indian leaders who succeeded Nehru. The inability to build personal friendships with any of the leaders in the region also led to India’s isolation among its neighbours. Seldom has there been an occasion when India’s neighbours have rallied behind it in support. Bhutan is perhaps the only exception as it is totally dependent on India, both for its security and for its economy. The ‘cold-war’ that followed the partition of the subcontinent and lasted nearly four and half decades, further contributed to the suspicion and hostilities between India and its other neighbours. Pakistan might be an extreme case in pursuing a hostile relationship with India for most part of the last 60 years. But relations between New Delhi and the leadership in the other capitals of South Asia have seldom been cordial. Despite occasional spells of bonhomie they have, for the most part, been marked by longer periods of hostility, distrust, or measured indifference.

India’s intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh, though hailed by most Indians was seen by neighbours with trepidation if not as an act of Indian imperialism. Since it was followed up by actions that led to the ‘annexation’ of Sikkim and a nuclear test, nervousness among the smaller neighbours grew further. Prolonged hostilities between India and Pakistan and twin nuclear tests by the two countries in May 1998 further strengthened fear among the neighbours. Many of them now apprehend being caught in the middle should an India-Pakistan confrontation degenerating into a nuclear war.

 

There is a growing opinion that India’s Pakistan-centric policy has perhaps been one of the major drawbacks in its ability to come up with a more meaningful neighbourhood policy. Pakistan has undoubtedly been one of the most difficult neighbours for India. The two countries have fought four wars in the last 60 years. But they have failed to settle any of their outstanding disputes, including the one over Jammu and Kashmir. In the past four years there has been some improvement in their ties with a ceasefire in place along the border and some level of contact between different sections of people in the two countries. But none would say that these steps have helped to end the hostile relationship.

Pakistan has so far shown an ability not only to hog most of India’s time and energy but also to scuttle any proposal that India has made for better coordination among the neighbours to bring them closer. Many of the neighbours wonder whether they too should start leveraging their ‘nuisance value’ to ensure India’s attention. De-linking Pakistan from the other neighbours has not worked either, as a serious ‘trust deficit’ exists between India and other neighbours.

India has been more comfortable in dealing with its neighbours at the bilateral rather than the regional level. There have been a number of occasions in the past when India has been generous to its neighbours by granting them freer access to its markets and technological and knowledge pool. But most often this has come with implicit conditionalities and an attitude that the neighbours find unacceptable. In terms of its geographical size, population, market, economy, GDP, and knowledge and technological base, India is far larger than the combined resources of other South Asian countries. But it has not succeeded in taking any initiative that could inspire hope and confidence among these countries of a shared destiny for co-progress and prosperity.

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was set up more than 20 years back to encourage closer economic and technological cooperation among the neighbours. But mutual suspicion and hostilities have prevented it from emerging as an effective economic bloc or as a free market to attract large-scale investment from both within and outside the region.

 

India maintains that it does not want to interfere in the ‘internal matters’ of a neighbouring country. But there have been occasions in the past when it has done so. Unfortunately, none of its actions – be it the armed initiative for the creation of Bangladesh, to decision to send peacekeepers in Sri Lanka, or its intervention in Maldives to put down the coup against President Gayoom in the 1980s – have helped in shoring up India’s stock among the neighbours.

It is interesting to note that while most neighbours see India as a ‘regional bully’, the foreign policy establishment in New Delhi feels that the propensity of the neighbouring countries for mischief making against it stems from their perception of India as a ‘weak state’. Irrespective of where the blame lies, the fact remains that India’s policy to deal with the neighbours in a meaningful way has so far remained unsuccessful.

 

A fundamental reason could be an absence of meaningful debate on this crucial issue among the Indian political parties. It is ironic that the need for an effective policy that would strengthen and improve relations with neighbours has never seriously figured in our political discourse barring a national security debate when India went to war with either China or Pakistan. There have also been isolated incidents, like in 1971 during the creation of Bangladesh or the Sri Lankan crisis in the late 1980s that forced Indian peacekeepers to the island, or more recently during street demonstrations against the monarch in Nepal, when it came into national focus in India. But despite the growing coalitional nature of Indian politics, there has been no major debate within the otherwise vibrant Indian political circles for a comprehensive neighbourhood policy.

While India struggles to find the right peg to deal with its neighbours, the other big power of the region, China, has moved to deepen ties with the South Asian nations. Pakistan has all along had strong and deep relations with China. But over the years other countries in South Asia have also started reaching out to China as part of their attempt to counterbalance India’s political, economic and military clout in the region. It has provided them with a viable option.

Trade between China and other countries in the neighbourhood like Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh, has shown a steady growth. Though the balance is tilted in favour of China, it has managed to gain the trust and confidence of the neighbours with investments in key sectors like infrastructure, energy and defence. It has also started outsourcing garment manufacturing to some of neighbouring countries to deliberately play down its competitiveness in sectors which are crucial for them.

 

The growing Chinese influence in its neighbourhood continues to make India nervous. But in a globalized economy, it finds it difficult to put up barriers and discourage the neighbours from trading with China. The fact that India’s trade with China has also shown phenomenal growth in the last few years has muted New Delhi’s criticism. India’s reluctance to allow China a free run in South Asia is based both on history and contemporary ground reality. The scars of defeat of the Indian Army at the hands of the Chinese still run deep. A series of attempts taken by China in recent years to develop and strengthen sea ports in and around India has raised deep suspicion in New Delhi. There is a growing feeling in the Indian establishment that these steps are being taken by China to encircle India.

But India has also been moving into areas that China considers its area of influence. It has deepened ties with the South East Asian nations. An improvement in its ties with the United States and joint naval exercises with the American, Japanese, and Australian navies in the Indian Ocean, has been viewed with suspicion in China. The Chinese also have a feeling of being encircled by countries inimical to its interests.

The management of India’s immediate neighbourhood, therefore, would have to be seen in the context of New Delhi’s growing ties with other world powers. As it takes more responsibility in ensuring the security and safety of a region beyond South Asia, its relations with many key players like the US, European Union, Russia, Japan and Australia would grow.

But it would also have to take steps to reinterpret its relations with China. If China continues to be suspicious of India’s intentions in its neighbourhood, it could encourage mischief in India’s backyard. On the other hand, if the two countries manage to evolve their relations into a partnership, it would benefit both. The two countries have been working closely on some key issues like global warming, WTO and energy security. But would India be prepared to work jointly with China in managing South Asia?

 

Some argue that an absence of democracy in India’s neighbourhood has been an important reasons for the trouble and political instability. There has also been a growing view that India’s future lies in building strong ties with the major democratic powers in the world. They want India to actively promote democracy in the region to ensure a more peaceful and stable neighbourhood. ‘Democracy is the worst of all governments, except for all the others,’ Winston Churchill had once famously said. Though interpreted in the past as a comment in favour of democracy, there are many who highlight the skepticism shown by Churchill for democracy as an effective institution. A raging debate continues in the West and other parts of the world on the effectiveness and efficacy of the model of western liberal democracy.

‘The case for free voting is not that it guarantees rights but that it enables the people (in theory) to get rid of unpopular governments,’ argues Eric Hobsbawm, a leading historian of our times. The model of democracy might have worked well for India in the last 60 years; it may continue to do so for an even longer period of time. But in and around India there are countries which have followed different models of governance and managed to maintain both peace and stability. To give two examples, China’s system has been very different from that followed by India. But there is little to suggest that it has not worked well for its people. Since its emergence in 1949, China has become a key international player with the second largest economy in the world.

The other is Iran, which had its Islamic Revolution in 1979. But despite hostile American and western propaganda and attempts to isolate it both economically and politically, it has survived for nearly 30 years and managed to maintain both stability and peace within its geographical territory.

 

A democratic India must ensure that the maximum number of its people have a stake in the system and get a share of the political and economic pie. Similarly, it must move to make its markets more accessible to its neighbours and make them stakeholders in India’s progress. But at the same time, it would need to be both pragmatic about the changed scenario and confident about its own strength and future role. It can no longer treat South Asia as an exclusive zone, isolating it from wider interaction with the world. It needs to create space for other major players in the world to work together for peace, stability and progress of the neighbourhood and the region as a whole.