Books
INDIA TODAY: Economy, Politics and Society
by Stuart Corbridge, John Harriss and Craig Jeffrey. Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2013.WHAT strikes the reader most about the book, India Today, is its ambition. It encompasses a vast canvas but does not take a broad-brush approach. The authors skilfully and incisively analyze a large amount of qualitative and quantitative data that has been generated by scores of studies on India in different social science disciplines during the past decade and more. The task of exploring the dynamics of the social, political and economic spaces in India in the same book is difficult enough, but to discuss a large variety of issues with both analytical depth and breadth makes the task even more complex. A comprehensive 51-page bibliography, an asset for scholars on India, bears testimony to the ambition of the authors and the sincerity of their effort.
An analysis of the changes in the economy, polity and society is undertaken in the context of the so-called historic transformation that has resulted in the Indian economy traversing a path of high economic growth. A broad understanding of the book’s argument would suggest that during this transformation while the polity more or less retained its democratic traditions, caste/religion based political mobilization continued and the efforts to enhance the political participation of the marginalized groups at the grassroots (lower castes and women) did not succeed in any significant manner. Though society underwent some changes during this period (it is less hierarchical, for example), it has also remained the same – as caste still matters in many ways and civil society movements are yet to mature to meaningfully bring castes and classes together. The book provides some interesting insights to explore the complex relationship between the changes in the economy, polity and society, but falls short of such an exploration. I will return to this later.
The discussion in the book is organized in 13 chapters, each of which seeks to answer a particular question: When and why did India take-off? How have the poor (and others) fared? Is the Indian state delivering on promises of inclusive growth and social justice? How did a weak state promote audacious reform? Is government in India becoming more responsive? Does India have a civil society? Why has Maoism become such a force in India? Has India’s democracy been a success? Does caste still matter? How much have things changed for Indian women? These and other questions are analyzed systematically drawing on insights from recent research. Each of the 13 core chapters of the book can be fruitfully read as independent pieces. But it is the combination of insights across chapters that make the book exciting.
The Economy: On the economy the authors pool together interesting insights from various studies; some of these may not be widely accepted, but are being increasingly recognized. It is argued that the Indian economy had no single take-off as shifts in growth rates in the 1950s were significant enough given the colonial legacy and near stagnation in the first half of the 20th century. Accumulation of institutional advantages, investments in infrastructure, human development and governance structures helped take advantage of the economic reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s.
What made radical reforms in a ‘weak state’ like India possible? The authors provide a variety of interesting pointers. Economic crisis was, of course, the starting point; there was no choice. The nature of rent seeking changed, but the new regime still provided such opportunities for the business elite and bureaucrats through processes of privatization, real estate (e.g., through creation of SEZs) and so on. This was followed by locational tournaments among the Indian states to attract capital by liberalizing their economies more and more, with weaker states often taking the lead in this process. This ‘provincial Darwinism’, according to the authors, got accentuated as different political parties were in power in different states. The authors also point out that the caste basis of many of these political parties was different. Were there differences in the liberalization processes across states that were governed by political parties with different social bases? The book does not provide any insights on this issue which could have helped us link polity, economy and society somewhat more systematically. Overall, while there were rents for bureaucrats, big business and the formal sector workforce, gradualism and the slow speed of reforms made them less threatening to domestic business and made them ‘cumulatively audacious’ at the same time.
The book argues that ‘elite reforms’ have increased the domination of corporate capital; the government has become responsive to the needs of big business, both at the Centre and the states. However, the dynamics of the linkages between domestic and foreign capital is completely missing from the discussion. In fact, the role of internationalization – WTO, entry of multinationals, internationalization of Indian firms – is not explored in the analysis of the economy. This analytical gap is particularly relevant as the authors argue in conclusion that moving forward, a competitive corporate sector will be critical to ‘check excessive market for political influence.’ The implicit assumption about the homogeneity of the interests of capital – domestic and foreign – may not be analytically useful if one is trying to understand the dynamics of the nature of competition in the corporate sector.
It is also argued that reforms were politically feasible as changes in policies relating to trade, industrial licensing and FDI did not directly affect ordinary livelihoods in any significant manner; fiscal and labour reforms were delayed and are yet to be implemented in any real sense to avoid public opposition to the reforms. Moreover, the result of surveys of political attitudes are cited to argue that economic reforms were not relevant for the ordinary Indians and, therefore, not important for political mobilization. While this may indeed be true, it is not entirely clear how one can avoid attributing an increase in relative poverty to economic reforms, which may influence political feasibility. In fact, the authors themselves argue that the continuation of reforms would require tackling group based inequalities.
While there has been a reduction in extreme poverty, the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to economic growth has been low. This is attributed to growing inequality, which in turn is explained through low growth of agriculture and manufacturing while services have grown faster. As a consequence, only a small proportion of the workforce participated in the growth process, which by and large has been ‘jobless’. While the joblessness of growth can be contested, the fact that the employment elasticity of growth is low cannot be disputed.
A dimension that the authors could have explored, especially in the context of the linkages between economic, social and political spaces, is the growth of employment for different social groups during the post-reform period. The differences in rates of growth in employment for different social groups, when combined with the discussion on discrimination in the job market against the Dalits and Muslims, can possibly provide a more balanced perspective on economic mobility of social groups. Just as the authors have highlighted the fact that a slow growing agriculture has increasingly become ‘feminized’ and ‘Dalitized’, it may be a useful exercise to see how the participation of different social groups has changed in other dynamic and non-dynamic sectors of the economy. Informalization of work is another tendency that the authors discuss at some length. In the same vein as the argument above, it would be useful to know if the informalization process is biased in favour of specific social groups. A similar exercise for trends in poverty could have also added useful insights on this issue.
The Polity: The authors argue that economic reforms were a result of ‘elite politics’ and not ‘mass politics’ – a part of ‘elite revolt against the claims of subaltern movements during the 1970s and 1980s.’ Till recently, the implementation of economic reforms did not provoke political confrontation of any significant kind. However, the next phase of reforms will need to deal with more contentious issues involving ‘mass politics’ such as land rights, agriculture, labour laws and health and education.
India’s version of democracy has not resulted in an inclusive economy. The active participation of people in the political process has also not resulted in a more responsive state; the culture of political patronage continues to pervade Indian democracy. It is argued that except in a few states, decentralization has not brought any ‘silent revolution’ in the countryside to deepen democracy and more efficient provisioning of services through an increase in accountability. However, there is some evidence to show that enhancing the agency of women through reservation in local bodies had a positive effect-as local women politicians were more responsive to locally voiced needs.
Why do voters tolerate failures to provide public services? Why is there no political mobilization against rural distress except in the Maoist regions? ‘Ethnic favouritism’ in the presence of ‘information asymmetry’ about who is the right person to vote for, facilitates a status quo. The growing rural distress is yet to become a plank for political mobilization by mainstream political parties. The heterogeneity of the depressed makes organization difficult. Consequently, unorganized labour remains politically unimportant; the few movements of informal workers are against the state for better conditions of work and not against employers. Farmers’ movements have also seen changes; rich farmers focus on resources for themselves and poor farmers (along with agricultural labour) do caste politics. This characterization seems to be a bit odd as one thought that the role of rich farmers in certain caste based political mobilization, for example among OBCs, was quite dominant.
The Maoist movement is the only one that focuses on rural distress but the mobilization is essentially against dislocation and dispossession, even as importance of land as a source of power and livelihood is on the decline. The Maoists started by supporting the rural elite but have mobilized support by addressing the grievances of the people. Maoism is a result of state failure; between the state and the Maoists, the latter have been successful as they were more trustworthy. There is also a suggestion that homogeneity of tribal population has facilitated such mobilization; ‘horizontal solidarity’ of tribals is more conducive to mobilization.
The book argues that even during the nation building phase, though political mobilization was around ethnic identities, voting along caste lines seems to have persisted, especially for the non-forward castes. It is suggested that while evidence is complicated and unclear on whether people vote by caste, the fact remains that caste identity is still a major dimension for political mobilization. Unlike in other spaces, the reader misses a more nuanced discussion of social engineering efforts of various ‘caste based’ parties to create more broad-based electoral configurations. For example, the BSP and SP have a support base among specific castes but both have tried to woo higher castes while Muslims are wooed by virtually everybody. Instead, the discussion in the book of political mobilization is focused more on Dalits, tribals and the rise of Hindu nationalism (which is seen as a part of the ‘elite revolt’ against subaltern movements). The distinctive nature of politics of the rich and the poor is also highlighted; upper middle class mobilize around NGO-like entities while lower classes continue to engage with political representative politics. However, the rise of OBCs across the nation and their emerging role in polity and society has remained under-analyzed. OBCs probably constitute a group that has seen significant increase in participation in all the three spaces – economy, polity and society – even as relative deprivation of other social groups may have continued in one space or the other.
The Society: In their discussion of whether caste still matters, the authors highlight the decline of a hierarchical system founded on pollution and purity. Apparently, castes are getting arranged ‘horizontally’ on the basis of different cultural identities, although certain social relations like marriage remain broadly restricted to caste boundaries. In other words, caste-occupation links are weakening, but interpersonal relations are still strongly built along caste lines.
The failure of the state to improve human development conditions is well known and is reiterated in the book. It also clearly shows the relative deprivation of women but the analyses do not explore patterns of deprivation by social groups – SC, ST, OBC, high caste Hindus, minorities etc. If political mobilization still revolves around such groups and social change is linked to what is happening to these groups, it would have been useful to analyze the changes in their human development and economic conditions.
The discussion on whether civil society exists in India is very interesting. The coexistence of somewhat fragile cross class/caste formations (e.g., student protests against quality of HE and unemployment) along with caste based cultural groupings is highlighted. The porosity between political and civil society is also well brought out. It is further argued that the transition from a social activist to a political one is easy for the elite male, but women and lower classes find it difficult to make such a transition.
In hindsight, the discussion on the Anna Hazare movement seems incomplete. The chapter was probably written at the peak of the movement. The authors argue that most such movements till now have focused not on social transformation but competition among social groups to gain advantage in accessing state resources, rather than on accountability. Now, how should one view the Hazare movement: substantive democracy or elite driven NGO-type movement? Given the authors’ own contention that civil society organizations are not democratic (neither are political parties), the emerging dynamics of the movement does not seem to represent ‘substantive democracy’.
The authors argue that despite the political limitations of the BJP, the saffronization of the society (and state) has become quite pervasive, and hence ‘banal Hinduism’ is here to stay. What are the implications of this social change for political mobilization, which according to the authors has remained caste based? The authors do not dwell on this important issue even as they highlight the increasing importance of the ‘state-temple-corporate complex’.
The Interface: An ambitious endeavour of this kind to explore the dynamics of the Indian economy, polity and society sets up very high expectations. The book has captured the complexity of each of these spaces rather well, using the available scholarship in an incisive and innovative manner. It is in the exploration of the interconnection between these spaces that the reader might feel a bit disappointed. It is not that such an effort is not made, but the energy is somehow missing. There are quite a few micro-insights that could have been combined to explicitly explore the interface among the three spaces.
Although Dalits lag behind OBCs, the authors present evidence to show that education remains empowering as it affects the capacity to compete in the economic space and get salaried jobs. But micro-studies quoted by the authors show that dominant castes have continued to dominate access to secure salaried work even in regions where low castes have achieved new forms of political representation (western UP and Tamil Nadu). Higher castes are able to draw upon local and regional stocks of social and cultural resources, as well as their economic advantage, to counter-resist political assertion. ‘Caste hierarchies are often very persistent even in a political context conducive to change’ (p 251).
The macro implications of such insights can potentially be quite useful. Even if affirmative action in education is able to enhance capabilities to more effectively participate in the economic space, an absence of social capital may still adversely affect this participation, even in areas where political representation of the marginalized group is high. At the macro-level, the linkages between participation in different spaces (political, economic and social) by various social (e.g., based on caste, gender, religion) and economic (using land, incomes, expenditures as proxies) have not been meaningfully explored. The expectation was not to have a detailed analysis but pointers for future work.
With shrinking economic space in the state sector, politicization of group based inequalities and group identities being at the core of political mobilization, the efficacy of various policy options to remove group based inequalities would probably remain a challenge for Indian democracy for a long time. To meet this challenge, the dynamics of participation in different spaces of all social groups will need to be better understood. The book provides a very good starting point for such an analysis.
Rakesh Basant
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
CONTESTED SECESSIONS: Rights, Self-Determination, Democracy and Kashmir by Neera Chandhoke. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2012.
UNTIL fairly recently most political theorists assumed that scarcity of resources and shortage of altruism in human beings were the fundamental problems facing nation states, while taking for granted their territorial borders. In the contemporary era of globalization, however, as old states break up, processes of armed struggle, ethnic cleansing and genocide imperil political values and undermine legitimacy of existing states in the international states system. As trade barriers shrink and smaller states become feasible, the idea of some form of self-government or self-determination for groups presently contained within states has gained ground.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the debate on secession has been acquiring an increasing amount of importance and a great deal of leverage in the context of two developments: the dissolution of states since the 1990s and separatist movements like those in Kashmir, Nagaland, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, West Papua, and so on. Along with the demand for special group rights for minorities, these demands for self-determination raise many fundamental questions for international law, global justice and human rights.
Reacting to this new reality, in her book, Contested Secessions, Neera Chandhoke argues that any group that wishes to redefine itself as a political unit faces enormous constraints set by liberal principles. For Chandhoke, the right of secession, which she distinguishes from a right of self-determination, falls into a distinctive category of rights. It cannot be justified as an offshoot of the right of freedom, or autonomy, or the principles of national self-determination, or even the right to protest. Secession is defined as a right ‘that gains currency in definite contexts; that of institutionalized injustice, particularly in cases of contested secessions’ (p. 43).
Her main claim in this book is that in formal democracies, the right to secede is a weak one, as absence of institutionalized justice cannot be viewed as irrevocable. If a democracy is capable of self-correction, the government can reverse injustice, and the right of secession is on weak grounds (p. 115). Thus the author raises a fundamental question whether secession can exist without some prior commitment to democracy. In this context, the rights of minority groups who live in the territory as well as the role of third parties are discussed. What emerges from the overall study is that while the human aspiration to assert their identities through secession is a recognized phenomenon, it must be viewed on moral considerations, especially minority perceptions about their status in society in the midst of a majoritarian threshold. Finally, the extensive use of violence in secessionist movements is criticized as this distorts the preconditions for any justice. The relation between law, violence and terror and the limits they give rise to for constitution-making are also taken up by the author.
Her arguments, elaborated over four chapters, are in contrast to those made by scholars of secession studies who rely on natural law as also those normative political theorists who wish to decide whether such cases are justified and whether they could be supported on certain grounds. Contemporary liberal theorists in the West, explains the author, take as their conceptual referral what she terms ‘procedural secession’ which assess how the demands are routed and examine whether the demands in a federal unit to secede through popular support could affect other residents of the disputed regions. These debates are supported by major judicial interventions that have over the past two decades set out critical parameters for negotiations on the basis of four principles: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and protection of minorities.
The author draws our attention to those states and separatist movements in the postcolonial world which present cases of contested secessions. In some instances, states try to militarily suppress even the intent to secede, resulting in violence becoming the handmaiden of these movements. Throughout the rest of the book, the author is more concerned with the moral justification of unilateral secession, that is with secession that is undertaken without the consent of the state and without constitutional sanction. Such secessions are definitely more controversial than consensual secession that results from a negotiated settlement or through constitutional processes as, for instance, envisioned by the Supreme Court of Canada for the secession of Quebec.
With this backdrop the book is woven around two characteristics of contested secessions: infliction of major harm and the illiberal nature of the agents who assert the right in the act of removing one’s group and territory from parent states. The question is: how might a liberal political theorist then deal with violence, with harm, and with the clearly illiberal nature of an ethno-nationalist group that asserts a right to a state of its own? Her main response to this question is that whereas the right to self-determination remains a prima facie right, it must be restricted or denied when it is sought to be exercised by groups not just indisposed but even weakly disposed to liberalism.
The empirical referral of this work is Jammu and Kashmir where violence has been widespread since the 1990s, thereby mounting a challenge to political theorists: secession as a basic right, in her view, does not have any grounds as the identity is closely related to religious identity, and because the movement has unleashed a high degree of violence, intolerance and religious fundamentalism in the region. Further, the demand for secession has been made not only by Kashmiri separatist groups but also those located outside the territory or third parties to the conflict. Further, the agenda of separatists does not even mention democracy and minority rights.
Nevertheless, she finds that the outright denial of the right of secession in this case problematic since it overlooks the fact that the people have been subjected to institutionalized injustice by the government and in a formal democracy which is in the main legitimate. Considering that secession is a response to injustice, the demand for a separate state can thus be seen as justified. The political predicament in accepting that institutionalized injustice generates a valid right of secession, however, sits uneasily with the assumption that the group in question will be prepared to accept liberal democratic norms, negotiate boundaries and honour obligations towards minorities within its state.
One of the more important contributions made by this book revolves around the justification of the idea of secession. While a legitimate state may have a deontological right to collective self-determination, both to order its internal affairs as it sees fit and to guard against external intervention, it cannot on the same grounds legitimately deny the same right to groups within its territory. This is because this theory accords a moral value to the right of collective self-determination of political communities and groups – which may or may not include states – which are willing and able to perform the requisite political functions. This includes groups within the territory of any legitimate state. Similarly, the right to self-determination possessed by a legitimate state does not license it to deprive others of that right, because an original stipulation of legitimacy also includes, apart from the protecting the rights of one’s own citizens, respecting the rights of all others.
Thus, based on two central theses of groups’ demands within existing legitimate states, and the irreducible logic of collective self-determination following from it, this book offers some controversial conclusions. In what is clearly a ‘remedial’ approach to secession, the author places a significant constraint on unilateral secession, namely the requirement of a serious and persistent grievance of injustice suffered by the secessionists. More specifically, it gives explanatory value to how the state can come to lose its entitlement to the territory it holds; it does so by failing to do what gives states a moral claim to control territory, i.e., providing justice for all of those within its territorial boundaries.
The problem is that secession is not simply the formation of a new political association among individuals or the repudiation by a group of persons of their obligation to obey the state’s laws. It is the taking away of a part of the territory claimed by an existing state. Accordingly, rival theories of secession must be understood as providing alternative accounts of what it takes for a group to acquire a claim to territory that is at the time included in the territory of an existing state. But Chandhoke’s approach to unilateral secession recognizes at least two ways a group can have the requisite valid claim to territory: by reclaiming territory over which they were sovereign but which was unjustly taken away from them, or by coming to have a claim to sovereignty over the territory as a result of availing themselves of a last resort remedy against serious and persistent violations of basic human rights. A more expansive reading of the latter would include among the injustices that can ground a unilateral right to secede, not only the violation of basic human rights, but also the state’s major violations of, or unilateral revocation of, intrastate autonomy agreements. Such a view, however, overlooks that in most cases it might be nationalism, not grievances of injustice that fuels the quest for self-determination.
Despite these concerns this volume will be of critical interest to anyone studying political philosophy and especially those ready to grapple with current theoretical approaches to this rather vexed area of research.
Vidhu Verma
Professor, Centre for Political Studies, SSS, JNU; Chairperson,
Centre for the Study for Discrimination and Exclusion, SSS, JNU
UNSETTLING THE PAST: Unknown Aspects and Scholarly Assessments of D.D. Kosambi edited by Meera Kosambi. Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2013.
THE title of the book says it all. Damodar Dharmanand Kosambi did unsettle the past by looking at it from a completely different viewpoint and by adopting a startlingly new methodology to study it. It has become a cliché to say that he changed the way in which Indian history was conceptualized and written, but like all clichés, it too carries a lot of substance. The book has been put together by Meera Kosambi, D.D. Kosambi’s daughter, to pay tribute to the genius of her father whose writings have often been admired but whose influence has mostly been resisted by the official academia. Therefore, it is not surprising that his birth centenary year (31 July 2007-31 July 2008) went largely unnoticed. What surprised most people, including the family of D.D. Kosambi that was not informed, was the decision of the Government of India to bring out a stamp in his honour. However, it did revive interest in him and his writings and the Economic and Political Weekly not only came out with a Special D.D. Kosambi Number (26 July 2008) but also carried articles on him in later issues.
For most people, D.D. Kosambi was an internationally renowned mathematician who applied his new statistical methods to the study of coins with great success, a Sanskritist who set new standards of text-criticism by editing Vidyadhar’s Subhashitratnakosh and Bhartrihari’s Epigrams, a historian who induced a paradigm shift in the discipline of history by applying Marxist methods to study the various stages of development of Indian society, and a field archaeologist who showed how archaeology could be successfully combined with the study of history. However, not many people know the kind of a person he was, his views about the development of science and technology in independent India, his passionate nationalism and commitment to peace, and his inability to fall in line with the Indian communists’ dogmas that he dismissed as O.M. (official Marxism). The way he tore into S.A. Dange’s book could hardly have endeared him to the communists. This book is a must read for those interested in the little-known facets of Kosambi’s personality and his contribution.
Unsettling the Past is divided into two sections, further broken up into two sub-sections each. Editor Meera Kosambi’s Introduction, ‘Situating D.D. Kosambi’ offers a fascinating glimpse into the personal history of her father, his personality, his likes and dislikes and much more. D.D.’s father, Dharmanand Kosambi too was a larger-than-life figure – a self-taught Buddhist scholar of Buddhist studies, a fore-most authority on Pali and a committed Gandhian. Hailing from rural Goa, he was invited to Harvard University to edit an important Pali text. This was how Damodar reached Harvard. His scores were so high that he was given admission to Harvard College without the mandatory entrance examination. Though as devoted to pursuing his intellectual interests as to body-building, nevertheless, like his father, he was primarily interested in achieving intellectual distinction. Meera Kosambi narrates a beautiful anecdote that deserves to be quoted here in extenso:
Damodar’s brilliant scores at Harvard were, during one semester, ‘marred’ by one ‘B’ grade among three enviable ‘A’s. This upset Dharmanand into chiding him for wasting his time. As a challenge, Damodar took a summer course in Italian – his regular curriculum had included only Greek, Latin, French and German – and received an ‘A+’ , which, the instructor said, he had felt compelled to award to a student for the first time in his career. Damodar promptly sent the professor’s note to his father without comment; he also undertook to ‘advise’ a senior student who was doing a dissertation on Dante.
The Introduction also tells us how Kosambi developed differences with Homi Bhabha on the issue of nuclear energy while serving on the faculty of Tata Institute of Fundamental Research as he was in favour of harnessing solar energy so abundantly available in India. As a peace activist too, he was not comfortable with the evolving nuclear establishment, more so given the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki only a decade back. It also tells us about the distrust shown by his peers to a person whose intellectual interests were not confined only to his official discipline. Kosambi was on the TIFR faculty by virtue of being an outstanding mathematician. Therefore, his colleagues were not happy with his forays into other disciplines like history, archaeology and Sanskrit text criticism. For them, it was a waste of time. No wonder that Kosambi had to leave the institute.
The first section of the book is devoted to essays, stories (yes, Kosambi wrote a few stories like ‘The Kanpur Road’ and ‘The Hump on Nandi’s Back: A Children’s Story’) and letters of Kosambi. It includes his three essays on solar energy, his insightful article on the decline of Buddhism in India and his magnificent piece on Einstein. It also offers, through his personal letters and correspondence, a glimpse into his relations with people such as Homi Bhabha, Rameshwari Nehru, Robert Graves, Sir Mortimer Wheeler and others.
During Kosambi’s visit to London in 1960, Sir Mortimer Wheeler, a former Director-General of the Archaeological Survey of India and an authority on the Indus civilization, had written to him saying ‘how immensely I enjoyed your brilliant lecture last night’ and ‘looking forward to possibly attending all your lectures.’ He also invited Kosambi to lunch. To this, Kosambi, whose detractors have accused him of having a monumental ego, replied: ‘While I should be honoured to have you attend any of my lectures for which you find time to spare, it seems to me that only one would be worth your while.’ The fact that an archaeologist of Sir Mortimer’s stature found Kosambi’s lecture ‘brilliant’ should suffice to silence all those who do not tire of asserting that Kosambi had hardly any understanding of the discipline of archaeology.
The second section contains personal tributes to Kosambi by eminent historian A.L. Basham and Sanskritist Daniel H.H. Ingalls. They are not the usual uncritical, laudatory tributes but offer well-considered, critical opinions about Kosambi and his work. This is what Basham has to say about him: ‘I am not qualified to pass judgment on his work in mathematics, and have hardly the right to assess his editions of Sanskrit poetical texts, which, according to the specialists, are marvels of their kind. As a historian, he made very important contributions to the study of many aspects of Indian history. His statistical analysis of the punch-marked coins has produced one of the most convincing interpretations of these so far to have been offered. His An Introduction to the Study of Indian History is in many respects an epoch-making work, containing brilliantly original ideas on almost every page; if it contains errors and misinterpretations here and there, if now and again the author attempts to force his data into a rather doctrinaire pattern, this does not appreciably lessen the significance of this very exciting book, which has stimulated the thought of thousands of students throughout the world. In his later publications he continued to point the way to the only means whereby we can reconstruct a convincing picture of the early history of India as whole, rather than of the India of pundits and dynasties – by a judicious combination of the techniques of history, archaeology, and anthropology. In his stature, his intellect and his integrity of spirit, he was indeed a truly great man.’
This section also contains a brilliant essay on Kosambi’s contribution to Indology by Romila Thapar, Basham’s student and one of the most distinguished historians of India, who had originally delivered it as a lecture at the Asiatic Society of Bombay in 1980. She too has not showered uncritical praise on Kosambi but underlined his seminal contribution to the study of Indian history while at the same time pointing out the weaknesses in his method or argument. She draws attention to Kosambi’s inference that ‘the names of many of the established Brahmans in the Vedic literature and the Puranic tradition clearly pointed to their being of non-Aryan origin… His study of gotras led logically to the point that the language of the Vedic texts could not have been pure Aryan and must have had an admixture of non-Aryan elements, reflecting the inclusion of non-Aryans as Brahmans.’ At the same time, Thapar remains sceptical of Kosambi’s reconstruction of Satakani as Indo-Austric as ‘he was evidently less familiar with changes in the linguistic practices of the mid-twentieth century.’
In her essay, ‘Kosambi and the Question of Caste’, Kumkum Roy too takes a look at Kosambi’s understanding of caste. She quotes Kosambi who wrote: ‘India has a unique social division, the (endogamous) caste system. Caste is often class at a primitive level of production, a religious method of forming social consciousness in such a manner that the primary producer is deprived of his surplus with the minimum coercion.’ Roy says that Kosambi established the heterogeneity of the brahmana varna and showed that Brahmans were drawn from various groups – pre-Vedic and non-Vedic. They could also perform a range of functions – and Kosambi made use of the Rajtarangini to highlight the range of secular as well as sacred activities attributed to them, some of whom were government functionaries while others were warriors. This clearly shows a deviation from the sastra-prescribed occupations for them.
While it is generally believed that Kosambi mostly paid attention to the Marxist concepts of the mode of production and ownership of the means of production as the centrepiece of his method, Ranajit Guha in a very perceptive essay looks at his ‘teachings’ on the importance of the superstructure in history. He finds that Kosambi was an opponent of ‘economic determinism’ and could join issue with Marx himself on the question of an unchanging village community in India as also his assertion that ‘Indian society has no history at all’ and ‘what we call its history is but the history of successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging (village) society.’ Kosambi refutes Marx by saying that, ‘The greatest periods of Indian history, Mauryan, Satavahana, Gupta owed nothing to intruders: they mark precisely the formation and spread of the basic village society, or the development of new trade centres.’ Guha discusses in detail Kosambi’s analysis of Gita and the Krishna cult.
B.D. Chattopadhyaya, who has edited a volume of Kosambi’s writings, Combined Methods in Indo-logy and Other Writings, belongs to that rare breed of scholars who silently devote their lives to the quiet pursuit of knowledge. He has contributed a scholarly article on Kosambi and the study of early Indian coins. We must remember that nearly half-a-century has passed since Kosambi died at 59 in 1966. Historical research has advanced by leaps and bounds during this period. Chattopadhyaya offers his well-reasoned critique of Kosambi’s numismatic methods and points towards their shortcomings. However, like a true scholar who respects his predecessors, he concludes: ‘Suggestions of new possibilities and the new estimates only point to the enduring value of the pioneering work: they demonstrate that we need to turn to Kosambi not for the finality of his pronouncements but for pointing out that we need to think differently and prepare a new agenda for examining material from the past, be they coins or relics of a different nature – if necessary by turning our perspective upside down.’
It is not possible to do justice to a volume of this nature in a short review. Meera Kosambi has included many other valuable articles written by Kunal Chakrabarti, Nayanjot Lahiri, R.P. Goldman, Sheldon Pollock, Vivek Monteiro and Ramakrishna Ramaswamy. While Chakrabarti looks at how Kosambi dealt with religion, Lahiri finds in him a ‘foundational historian’, Goldman and Pollock reveal the extent of Kosambi’s Sanskrit scholarship, and Monteiro and Ramaswamy devote their essays on his contributions to science and mathematics. This book is particularly welcome in view of the recent onslaught on Kosambi by the Right.
Kuldeep Kumar
Journalist and commentator
