WHERE is India’s foreign policy one and a half years into Narendra Modi’s term as prime minister? The answer is that Modi has largely built on Manmohan Singh and Atal Behari Vajpayee’s policies. He has made some changes in direction, some symbolic, some more material. He has brought energy and activism to Indian foreign policy but not decisive change.

Is India safer and more secure as a result of his policies? It is no worse off, on the whole, but it would be hard to say that we as a society are better off despite the effort Modi has made. Deep foreign policy changes don’t happen easily – there are domestic and international impediments. Understandably enough then, India’s policies can be understood more as continuity with the past than a break from earlier policy directions. A driving personality can only take you so far.

As Modi promised when he came to office, he has focused primarily on the immediate and extended neighbourhood. In Indian foreign policy parlance, the former means South Asia or the SAARC region, and the latter means the rest of Asia including the Gulf and the Indian Ocean region (especially the Indic states of Mauritius and Seychelles). Most of his frenetic travelling has been in these two regions. In addition, Modi has been to the West – to the major European countries and North America (the US and Canada, though not Mexico).

On the other hand, Modi has not been to the Gulf, except the UAE, nor to West Asia, and he has not been to Africa and Latin America. And, of course, he has not been to Pakistan. It is not hard to see where he might go in the coming year: apart from the standard ‘minilateral’ and multilateral summits (BRICS, IBSA, SCO, East Asia Summit, G-20, UN General Assembly), we can expect him to make forays to those areas he has so far missed including a much-advertised visit to Israel. As things stand, he is slated to go to Pakistan for the SAARC summit to be held there in November 2016.

What can we say about his foreign policy? As I noted last year, he continues to bring a huge amount of energy to foreign policy, travelling roughly once a month. During the visits he is indefatigable, addressing legislatures and gatherings of the diaspora, visiting sites of local cultural and social importance, and of course attending the usual round of official meetings.

In addition, Modi continues to project his personality as integral to the future of India and of its foreign policy in a way that no Indian prime minister has done, dressing carefully, choosing symbolic gestures with great attention (e.g. the kind of gifts he brings), and turning on the charm in his personal and public interactions. Modi evidently enjoys foreign policy in a way that Manmohan never seemed to do.

 

A particular feature of his trips is the use of Hindi, for speeches and even for smaller official meetings: clearly, Modi is trying to convey that he represents the ‘authentic’ India and that he is proud of his native heritage. There is a not-so-subtle message here about Indian culture and identity.

This brings me to some of the basic precepts and principles that Modi claims to be at the core of his international and strategic thought. The most important of these is the idea that in dealing with other countries one needs to strike a balance between shanti and shakti, peace and power, concession and assertion, cooperation and force. In a speech he gave in 2013, before he became prime minister, he insisted that this should be a deep principle of Indian policy. Indian leaders after independence, he argued, had been ‘insensitive when they should have been sensitive, weak when they should have been strong’ or words to that effect. As a result, they had made a mess of regional policy and allowed China in particular to dominate India. Only Vajpayee had got the balance between shanti and shakti correct. The roots of the balance, Modi would claim, go deep in Indian culture and can be traced back to the traditional idea of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is a family) which he invokes frequently in his speeches.

 

A second principle that Modi invokes is that of India as vishwaguru or world teacher. Here he invokes Swami Vivekananda and Aurobindo Ghose. Taken literally, the notion of India as a vishwaguru is a rather patronizing and grandiose one and could easily be the object of both mirth and dismay: there are enough bossy and self-righteous countries around, who needs another?

Modi probably means something other than the literal meaning of vishwaguru; possibly something closer to Robert Zoellick’s notion of ‘responsible stakeholder’. Zoellick, a US official, quite a number of years ago, had said that the rising powers should step up and take on more responsibility for international order. Modi seems to be affirming Zoellick’s idea and saying in effect that India must indeed step forward to do more for others, that India cannot simply be a beneficiary of international order, that it must also be a net donor and provider – of aid, security, ideas and institutions.

A third principle is the importance of economics. Modi and his National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval, have both said a lot about the importance of economics in foreign policy and security. In effect, they argue for a virtuous circle between economic growth and development, on the one hand, and regional and international order, on the other. Economic development and growth spread well-being to others and give them a stake in India’s economy and therefore are the conditions of stability and peace; and stability and peace in and around India as well as in the international system more broadly are the conditions for economic growth and development at home. The two together will propel India forward and make it a great power. Economic policies at home and abroad therefore count for a lot.

So much for Modi (and Doval’s) international thought. What about his (and Doval’s) strategic thought? Eighteen months into Modi’s term, it is fairly clear how the two see some key challenges to India’s security, particularly in the immediate and extended neighbourhood. Here Doval has probably been the more explicit, but I shall continue to refer to them as Modi’s policies since he is the prime minister and ultimately responsible for the government’s list of priorities and decisions.

 

Modi identifies three key challenges: China, asymmetric and unconventional conflict, and border management. The prime minister himself has been careful not to mention China as a threat: that would be too provocative. Doval on the other hand has not been shy in talking about China as a threat. China is a challenge not just because the border quarrel remains unresolved, but also because it is a formidable power and its influence is everywhere, especially in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood. Second, Modi has made it clear that he regards terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of unconventional war (including cyber war) as being the future of conflict. Beyond China and unconventional conflict, India must deal with the problem of vulnerable borders: in relation to Pakistan (and Kashmir), Myanmar (insurgents to and from India’s eastern neighbour), and Bangladesh (illegal migration).

What should India do about these three problems? Let me focus on the China problem since this is undoubtedly the greatest concern. Modi’s aphorism for dealing with China is that India will not ‘lower its eyes’ before China, but it will not stare China down either. It will look China straight in the eye. In Singapore, Modi did not mention China when he repeated this aphorism, but it was reasonably clear that he was referring to how India will deal with China. This shanty-shakti way of dealing with China is evident too in Doval’s various remarks on security. Doval has noted that India and China have much in common, that they can cooperate on common challenges, that they have a 5000-year history of peace, and that conflicts between them will be settled through negotiations.

 

In terms of actual policy, Modi has given expression to shanti and shakti in a number of ways. On the shanti side, he has made clear that he wants to deepen the economic relationship, including encouraging Chinese investments and manufacturing in India. When Xi visited India, the Chinese promised up to $20 billion in investment funds and Modi in return promised to build two industrial parks for Chinese companies. Also on the shanti side, India has gone along with China on the BRICS Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Modi has also made it a point to meet Xi on almost every minilateral occasion that he can.

On the shakti side, Modi has taken a number of steps as well, to balance things out. During his trip to Japan in late 2014, just days before Xi came to India on his first official visit as President, Modi went out of his way to deride China, saying that some powers in their expansionism and aggressiveness were behaving like 17th or 18th century powers in Europe. When Xi came calling, he told the Chinese leader that progress on the border was essential if relations were to deepen. Also on the shakti side, India has so far refused to join China’s One Belt, One Route (OBOR) initiative, arguing that Beijing was not inclusive and transparent in shaping the idea and that New Delhi could not therefore participate in it.

More importantly, Modi has taken a number of steps, some symbolic and some more material, to signal that India will be more assertive vis-a-vis China. First, Modi’s entire outreach internationally is in part about projecting India in relation to China. It seems clear enough that New Delhi does not want to allow the international diplomatic space to go uncontested in China’s favour. His message is simple: a democratic, economically surging, demographically attractive, and non-aggressive India, at peace with those around it, is an alternative to China.

 

Second, Modi has made a fairly clear shift in alignment towards the US. Inviting President Barack Obama to be India’s guest at the Republic Day Parade in January 2015 was the signal of the shift, though there had been precursors. The precursors included his own visit to the US and to the successful negotiations with Washington on a post-Doha trade deal. More importantly, there was the deal on nuclear liability with the common pool insurance solution providing the way out of the corner into which India had painted itself with the Nuclear Liability Bill.

While there continue to be differences with the US – over Pakistan, Afghanistan, conventional weapons sales, Ukraine, Russia, intervention, and climate change – Modi has reached out to the US as perhaps no Indian prime minister. Dealing with China is a common concern. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, made public during Obama’s visit, was clearly aimed at China. The statement opposed any hindrance to free movement on the high seas and in the air including in the South China Sea. This was the first time that India and the US jointly made such a statement. Beyond this, the joint statement issued at the end of the visit made clear that the two sides were in agreement on India’s going beyond ‘Look East’ to Act East, and that New Delhi and Washington would increase their cooperation in the region.

 

Third, Modi’s focus on visiting the immediate and extended neighbourhood with such regularity is intended to remind those closer to home that India can be a friend and partner and that China is not the only economic or security game in town. In South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean states of Mauritius and Seychelles, in dealing with the economically more needy states, Modi has come with a package of development and technical aid, lines of credit, infrastructure and connectivity initiatives, and has talked the talk on trade and investment. Virtually everywhere, even in more advanced Southeast Asia, he has tried to sell Indian technological competencies – in space, cyber, and information technology in particular. It is not that this is the first time that India is putting together these kinds of packages, but Modi’s visits and his speeches have advertised them in a way that India did not do earlier.

Arguably too, Modi has been far more aggressive in presenting India as a security provider than his predecessors. While he did not emphasize this in his South Asian visits (in order not to reinforce fears of a hegemonic India), in the extended neighbourhood he has been fairly forthright. Again, it is not that Modi has invented these initiatives de novo. India has had defence agreements with all the major states of Southeast Asia going back at least to the 1990s and in some cases earlier. Likewise, India has been the mainstay of security in Mauritius and Seychelles since the 1980s. Indian security involvement in Central Asia is also not new and can be traced back to Taliban days in Afghanistan. The UPA government had worked to build links between the armed forces and security bureaucracies in Central Asia to deal with the issue of terrorism and to balance Chinese influence.

 

However, Modi with his far more public utterances on the subject has underlined India’s desire to be involved in providing security. Everywhere he has been in the extended neighbourhood, including Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam, he has shown India’s defence manufacturing flag. India, he has suggested, is interested in building its own defence industry through collaboration, in co-producing specific systems, and in exporting its own existing weapon systems. For instance, New Delhi has repeated its interest in buying and possibly co-producing Japan’s Soryu submarine and US-2 amphibious aircraft. India also seems to be edging closer to promising the BrahMos cruise missile system to Vietnam, if Moscow agrees to go along (the missile is being developed with Russia). Everywhere, too, he has renewed or signed new defence cooperation agreements to institutionalize high-level political and bureaucratic interactions, military exercises, military exchanges, and training of personnel, among other things.

Even more importantly, Modi has made a number of changes in Indian foreign policy with a clear security focus aimed at China. These have arisen in part from the new Act East policy. The first is expanding India’s naval exercises. After some initial hesitation, Modi invited Japan to join the Malabar naval exercises as a permanent member. India usually holds these with the US. Japan has participated from time to time. After Modi’s visit to China, he ordered that Japan be invited as a permanent member of the exercises. The US urged him to also invite Australia. This he did not do, but he did start a bilateral India-Australia naval exercise for the first time, held in the same month as the Malabar.

The second change that Modi has brought about is to forge a defence agreement with Australia. New Delhi has traditionally held Canberra at arm’s length, for a variety of reasons. Modi has overturned this approach and is keen to tie together India, Japan, and Australia. As a result of the new India-Australia engagement, for the first time a trilateral India-Japan-Australia security dialogue will be held.

 

The third change is to increase India’s role in the Indian Ocean. Modi has built on earlier policies, but there are signs of a possible deepening of Indian involvement. The government is trying to put in place the Coastal Radar Surveillance system involving Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles that was begun by the previous government. Further, Ajit Doval has referred approvingly to the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, an idea which India had more or less abandoned in the 1970s. In addition, the increase in cooperation with Australia, including in the Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA), presages a new coalition to deal with Indian Ocean security even as the US Navy retreats. Finally, Modi has undertaken a review of maritime capabilities and policies and is attempting to launch a single point maritime agency in India.

Modi’s coming to power has made a difference to foreign policy with his energy, activism, and personalization of diplomacy. His approach is notable for using a somewhat different idiom – the idiom of shanti and shakti, of vishwaguru and vasudhaiva kutumbakam, of economy and order building. He and his team have also made clear where they see the threats to India’s security, most importantly from China, unconventional conflict, and vulnerable borders. They have made changes in actual policies, in dealing with growing Chinese power in particular, trying to expanding economic ties while at the same time challenging China diplomatically and to some extent militarily through a more active foreign policy. Key changes in a more assertive foreign and security policy include Acting East, aligning more openly with the US, cooperating more with key military powers in the region (Australia, Japan, and Vietnam), fostering defence sales and partnerships, and revisiting India’s Indian Ocean policy.

 

Has all this made India more secure? It is obviously too early to tell. Not everything though is going according to plan. Modi is finding out that foreign policy is difficult terrain. It is not enough to travel the world, bear gifts, and make attractive speeches to legislatures and NRIs. There are difficulties ahead that require patient and above all quiet handling – not an especial Modi strength.

Over the past 18 months, the relationship with Pakistan, after a brief promising beginning, has soured. Likewise, in spite of the economic card that Modi played with China and his personal bonhomie with Xi, border troubles continue, and Beijing conferred a $46 billion investment package on Pakistan aimed primarily at improving its infrastructure.

There are limits to the India-Japan relationship too. The nuclear deal with Tokyo still has not been completed, nor have the two countries come through on the Soryu and US-2 deals. New Delhi must be aware, too, that Japan still causes resentment in East and Southeast Asia, and so this is a relationship that must be carefully deployed lest it cause more harm than good.

Modi must be sensitive to the fact also that Vietnam and Australia have strong economic partnerships with China and have their own long-term strategies for handling the giant. Geography limits how much influence India can have in Central Asia, and India does not have the means to play a huge role here. The Indian Ocean states are adept at playing China against India and vice versa, and it would be foolish for New Delhi to romanticize the relationships with the Indic islands. Closer to home, the much-vaunted new relationship between India and Nepal, in the wake of two Modi trips there, is shaky to say the least. Finally, fundamentalism and violence in Bangladesh could pose a serious threat to India even if the spate of recent agreements has improved India-Bangladesh relations.

Modi has more than three years ahead of him. He has a strong mandate behind him and an experienced foreign policy and security team. As he looks ahead, his effectiveness abroad will depend not just on the good sense and creativity behind his external policies, but also on domestic stability and economic growth. His government has so far been lucky on the economy, principally because of reduced oil prices and the faltering of other major markets. On domestic stability, there has unfortunately been a steady deterioration, a function of right wing Hindu extremists repeatedly attacking minorities and liberals. The prime minister’s honeymoon at home is over. It could be over abroad as well if he does not send a consistent message: shanti in India and shakti against extremists at home, and shanti and shakti in balance abroad.