THE Green Movement in Iran began in the aftermath of the rigged presidential election of June 2009. Millions of Iranians took to the streets of Tehran and other cities demanding their citizenship rights, which they rightly felt had been stolen by the state. Their main slogan was ‘Where is my vote?’ a clear indication that they had developed an individual sense of self that constitutes the foundation of a rights-bearing citizen. Many analysts believe that what occurred in the Arab world two years later, the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, was inspired by the Green Movement in Iran.

The Green Movement in Iran and the Arab uprising of 2010, however, have little in common. The former drew on decades of struggle for citizenship rights in Iran, which appeared as a reform oriented non-revolutionary undertaking for democratic rights. The Arab uprising was more a movement without specific aims and one mostly against the status quo. Nevertheless, Iran’s Green Movement showed that people in the Middle East were ready for change. What follows is an attempt to analyze its roots.

It is often believed that what is currently happening in Iran, a continuation of what has unfolded there over the past three decades – violation of human rights, systematic discrimination against women, and belligerence toward the West – constitutes a rejection of modernity and its fruits, and there indeed are many reasons to find this view plausible. Soon after the victory of the Islamists in the revolution of 1979, most modernizing initiatives and institutions of the 55 year old Pahlavi dynasty were either abandoned or completely reversed. Some of the more visible of these institutions pertained to women. During the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, the state had taken some positive steps regarding the status and welfare of women. Some of the most flagrant institutionalized forms of discrimination and abuse were curbed, if not abolished, through the curtailing of arbitrary divorce by men, and the institution of more women-friendly custody laws, in particular, the restriction of polygyny.

 

With the establishment of the Islamic Republic, most of the provisions of the Pahlavi era Family Protection Law were abandoned. Personal freedoms, which before the revolution were more or less tolerated, came under severe attack by the revolutionaries. Women were forced to don the hijab and any form of resistance to the closely monitored dress codes for both men and women met with harsh punishment, including public flogging. Ancient retribution laws that entailed the cutting off of thieves’ hands and the stoning of adulterers – which, in fact, had rarely been applied in medieval Iran – were enforced in many parts of the country.

Human rights, including freedom of belief, among the fundamental features of the modern world, received a fatal blow under the Islamic republic. Adherents of the Baha’i faith, for example, came under savage attack by the government and zealots soon after the revolution. Some 200 to 300 Baha’is were killed merely because they were not willing to recant their faith. Many more received long prison sentences. The property of thousands of Baha’is was confiscated and their children denied access to education, especially higher education. Even today, members of the Baha’i faith face gross discrimination and many of their leaders are serving long prison sentences. Following the brutal repression of the Green Movement, many more journalists, lawyers and civil society activists are in jail or under house arrest.

 

There is little doubt that the revolution and the Islamic republic that was established in its wake, militated against, if not negated, some of the most important aspects of modernity. Yet, modernity is complex. Under closer analysis, it is evident that what has been taking place in Iran over the past three decades might well be the initial phase of modernity, whose emergence has often been Janus-faced in other parts of the world. The notion of modernity is a contentious one, given conflicting methods of analysis, value judgments, and sentiments.

More specifically, in the context of Iran there are some intellectual traditions that tend to view modernity in terms of transformations in the human psyche that empower individuals so that they are no longer passive, inactive, docile, compliant, idle, suffering, and resigned. From this point of view – shared in varying ways by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel and Jürgen Habermas – modernity begins when a critical mass in a society abandons the life of passivity and acquires a sense of assertiveness, vigour, volition, resolve, and action. In a nutshell, modern people are not passive; they possess agency and power. They act upon the world. The modernist intervention in and upon nature constitutes the foundation of technology, which has both liberated humans from the vagaries of nature and, at the same time, brought us close to the destruction of both nature and ourselves.

 

Modern people also act upon society and politics as they assert their individual and collective power. This aspect of human agency and empowerment underlies the democratic institutions of modern societies. Democracy in the modern world is not possible without these fundamental transformations in the psyche of the people in a given society. We can install all the institutions of modern democracy, but without a critical mass in society imbued with a sense of agency and empowerment, these institutions are unlikely to survive. This was the case in Iran (as in many other countries) in the early 20th century. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 laid the foundations of a restricted, constitutional monarchy, a parliament, a more or less free press, and free elections. But because a sense of agency and empowerment had not taken root among the bulk of the Iranian people, none of these institutions were able to preserve their democratic character.

The Pahlavi period (1925-1979) witnessed some developments in the economy and education, as well as saw an expansion of the centralized bureaucracy, military and urbanization. All of these helped promote a sense of empowerment and agency among a growing number of Iranians, especially those in the large cities and among the middle and the upper middle classes. Unfortunately, this sense of agency and thereby possessing human and citizenship rights was for the most part restricted to the upper echelons of society. Even among them, it was experienced more as a gift bestowed by the monarch. Little wonder that it was not deeply internalized.

Even though this may at first appear counterintuitive, the experience of Iran in the past three decades has brought a significant sense of agency and empowerment to average Iranians, especially those of the lower and lower middle classes. Ironically, and paradoxically, it is this very development that may ultimately challenge the existence of the Islamic republic as we know it. The revolution of 1979 galvanized and mobilized the ‘masses’ of Iran like no other event in the country’s recent history. The participation of Iranians from all walks of life, especially the lower and lower middle classes, in political rallies, consciousness raising (as well as ideological indoctrination), formation of protest groups, and many other forms of social and political struggle, is what toppled the Pahlavi dynasty. This collective action jolted ordinary Iranians and catapulted them into a form of agency, albeit rudimentary and contradictory.

 

The eight years of war with Iraq in the 1980s further promoted a sense of agency among Iran’s men and, to some extent, its women (female participation in the war effort behind the front was significant). The conflict was devastating: it took a massive human toll, with between a quarter and one million Iranians killed or injured. It also further devastated what remained of the country’s physical infrastructure after the revolution. Yet, despite the massive human and physical damage that the war inflicted on Iran, it served to increase a sense of boldness and agency among its people.

Thus were the foundations for societal modernity among Iranians of average means laid. And when a sense of agency and empowerment takes hold of a critical mass of the population, it can give rise to a dynamic process that not only increases a sense of agency in an individual, but also disseminates it further in society. It is when an individual acquires a sense of agency and empowerment and comes to realize that other individuals in society too should have the same, that the foundations of universal rights are created. This, in turn, can help nurture a democratic ethos among a large number of people. This seems to have taken place in Iran. The reformist movement of the 1990s, a precursor to what followed, gave impetus to the much larger Green Movement that emerged, seemingly spontaneously, in 2009, in response to the rigged presidential election.

 

In fact, the earlier reformist movement too had a prehistory. It owed much to the actions of some of the once downtrodden people of Iran – those who had joined the revolution, participated in the war with Iraq and, as a result, developed a high sense of agency while acknowledging and conceding the same agency for others. In this way a group of Iranians from humble backgrounds gave birth to the ethos of modern agency and its universalization that lies at the foundation of societal modernity and democracy.

And this reformist swell, while large enough to win two presidential elections for Mohammad Khatami, was not quite as large as that produced by the Green Movement that succeeded it in 2009. During Khatami’s presidency, between 1997 and 2005, the newly developed middle classes of Iran were mostly silent, even as they sympathized with reformist policies. With the ‘fraudulent’ presidential election of 2009, this vast group of people shed their last layer of passivity and became fully active, participating in the protests that shook the regime for many months.

Yet, societal modernity also has another face. The popularization of agency among the multitude may not be fully disseminated. The democratic ethos is sustainable only when a sense of empowerment and agency is dispersed in society and people acknowledge the agency of everyone else. But when a group wants agency and power for its members alone, then an anti-democratic ethos too comes to the fore. Modernity, it seems, gives birth to both these types of ethos and social groups that identify with them.

 

The people around Iran’s supreme leader – the Revolutionary Guards and other security forces like the Basij – embody this anti-democratic face of modernity. Their roots are also largely in the lower and lower middle classes who acquired a sense of empowerment and agency in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of the revolution and the war with Iraq. However, unlike those who supported the Green Movement, they wish to keep restrict this agency to their circle and thus monopolize power. They are relatively small groups who feel they benefit from not sharing power. They do not, by any means, constitute a subordinate class, ‘subalterns’, as they are sometimes portrayed. They are ambitious and actively seek favour, position and financial resources from the government, revolutionary guard, and militia leaders. They possess a large appetite for power and for keeping it within their ranks. They also enjoy a monopoly over the means of violence, in addition to control over many sectors of the economy and most of the media.

The conflict between these two strands of modernity in Iran makes the struggle for change a protracted endeavour. Those who wish to monopolize power will not give up easily. They belong to the first generation of downtrodden Iranians who acquired power by means of struggle and violence – or, in the case of the younger Basijis, the first underdog generation to be given a taste of power.

On the other side, the new middle classes of Iran, who have also newly acquired a sense of empowerment and agency but wish to share it in a democratic fashion, are also resilient. Their new status was not conferred on them on a silver platter. They have earned their status and developed a modern democratic ethos through hard experience over the past 36 years. These new middle classes were the force behind the civic movement in Iran that coalesced into the Green Movement. They are unlikely to give up their desire for democracy that has been evolving for over three decades. This is borne out by a number of events indicating that this movement, despite brutal suppression, is alive and glows ember-like under the ashes.

 

After the Iranian regime managed to temporarily suppress the Green Movement by killing dozens of participants and arresting thousands more, some believed that it was the end of the movement. Yet, every time an opening has emerged, the spirit of civic movement has expressed itself in various events. These events include protests against pollution and destruction of the environment because of the regime’s mismanagement, demonstrations in support of animal rights, protests by the bazaaris due to difficult economic conditions, the campaign – One Million Signatures – to support women’s quest for equality, and workers’ protests and demonstrations. The spirit of civic demands was also central in ensuring the election of Hassan Rouhani as President of the Republic. The regime clearly felt the pressure from below to allow Rouhani to be elected.

More recently, the tragic acid attacks against at least eight young women in Isfahan immediately gave rise to protests in that city and Tehran. Another surprising manifestation of the sense of agency among Iranians, especially young people, took place recently when a pop singer died of cancer. Large groups of young people spontaneously took to the streets, not only in Tehran but in cities across the country to mourn the death of Morteza Pashai. The regime, afraid of large gatherings, dispatched the police and militia to suppress it, while at the same time the state attempted to appropriate some of the demonstrations for its own benefit.

Although these large gatherings had no apparent political motive or agenda, their very occurrence demonstrate that a spirit of defiance is alive. Once a sense of agency is internalized by the millions it is very difficult, if not impossible, to efface it. The good news is that many of those involved in the civic movement in Iran believe in nonviolent means to bring about change and democracy in the country. Even though it may take time for them to succeed, they have consciously avoided the sort of violent conflict with the ruling forces that could have led to a devastating conflagration.

 

The nuclear deal between Iran and the West gives a good indication that the will of the civic strata in Iran is very much alive and active. Possibly the leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, has realized that his regime cannot survive without a lifting of western sanctions on Iran. This realization has most definitely been forced upon Khamenei and those around him who wish to deny power to a civic strata that constitutes a vociferous and powerful segment of Iran’s population. It was because of the pressure from this civic strata that Rouhani was allowed to run for President in 2013, and it was the same pressure that gave Rouhani a mandate to negotiate a deal with the West on the nuclear issue.

* Farzin Vahdat is the the author of Islamic Ethos and the Specter of Modernity, Anthem Press, 2015.