The problem

FIVE years back, waves of popular protest and revolutionary turmoil began to spread, spontaneously and unexpectedly, across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). What was at the time called by the ambiguous and romantic term the ‘Arab Spring’ created great hope all around the region and the world about the establishment of long awaited democracy in authoritarian Arab societies. The fall of long time dictators like Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi, accompanied by the rise of new civic actors and new social movements around the MENA region, represented a series of encouraging signs that a process of democratization had began and ideas of popular sovereignty and the rule of law were taking hold.

Today, five years on , the initial hope and wishful thinking about the Arab Spring have faded, even as the political, social and economic causes that led to the uprisings of 2011 around the Middle East and North Africa have for most part remained unchanged. The Middle East is in tatters and the short period of hope and revolutionary ideals has been followed by new forms of authoritarianism and denial of civil liberties. Five years later it is clear that the result of the popular protests has been nothing but chaos, leading either to long-term wars (as in Syria), sectarian conflicts ( as in Yemen) or increased repression (as in Egypt). As for Libya, four years after the capture and execution of Muammar al- Gaddafi, the country resembles a failed state that has plunged into a dangerous unrest.

Arguably, Tunisia is the only country where the Arab Spring appears to have succeeded, principally through the establishment of a landmark pluralist constitution crafted as a result of a close dialogue and collaboration among the secularists and Islamists and without the interference of the West. But despite the experience of democratic transition in Tunisia, there appears little hope of democracy in the Middle East. In part, democracy needs certain conditions to flourish, notably the rule of law, civil liberties and economic freedom, most of which are absent across the Arab world. We should add to this list a belief in social equality and ethnic diversity, which is now also missing in the political narrative and actions including of the once ‘admired and landed’ AKP government in Turkey.

More importantly, since 2013, the Middle East finds itself facing the eruption of an Islamic State, the radical Sunni jihadist group which has formally declared the establishment of a ‘caliphate’. As one of the major consequences of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Islamic State has become a central concern of governments across the world today. A mixture of religious fanaticism and organizational hierarchy, the violence practised by the militants of the Islamic State is neither Islamic nor sectarian, but anti-civilizational. The horrors perpetuated by members of this group, such as massacre of civilians, enslavement of women – destruction of entire religious communities and annihilation of old civilizations – represent a manifest rejection of the basic concepts of human heritage and shared values. Nevertheless, the Islamic State group is a more complex phenomenon than we think, because it links the two elements of the ideological and the geopolitical in the Middle East.

In effect, what has helped ISIS to stay alive is mainly the sectarian tensions which exist among the Shias and Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, but more broadly between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The execution by Saudi Arabia of the Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr, followed by attacks by a mob of ultra-hardliners on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and the consulate in Mashhad, were the last drops that made the cup of Iranian-Arab relations in the Persian Gulf region overflow. The truth is that Iran has little interest in challenging the Saudis, for the simple reason that Tehran doesn’t see Riyadh as an important threat to its security. Iran’s support for Iraq’s Shias and Syria’s Alawites, or its aid to Lebanon’s Hezbollah, is less about sectarianism and more about political realism.

Notwithstanding these tensions, Iran appears to be moving towards greater accommodation with regional states. The proof is Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s letter to the Lebanese daily al-Safir, addressing the Arab world about security threats that confront all Middle Eastern states alike. Zarif suggested regional cooperation for a peaceful resolution to violent conflicts, signalling Iran’s goodwill. This new effort at partnership, following the nuclear deal between Iran and the US in Vienna, is transformative, reflecting changes in Iran from an insular security state to a regional power. If that’s indeed the case, one should be prepared to witness a heightened economic partnership between Iran and Europe, and also with some Arab states and India.

Some analysts still believe that there will be an escalation in Arab hostility towards Iran to weaken Tehran’s hand, since the Gulf states have an innate fear of Iran’s re-emergence as a new regional policeman. In addition, the question to ask now is what the nuclear deal means for Iran’s future economic and political role in the region and the world, especially after the withdrawal of economic and financial sanctions by the US and the Europeans.

Two strong and conflicting arguments have emerged from the hawks and doves in Tehran and Washington. Opponents of the deal in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the US continue to argue that Iran is the root cause of many problems in the Middle East and the only correct policy is economic and political containment or military invasion. Supporters of the deal have a more nuanced understanding of Iran’s regional role and intentions. Add to this a permanent disagreement between two competing visions within Iran. One group – represented by President Hassan Rouhani, the moderates and reformists – believes that Iran must collaborate with Russia, Turkey, Iraq and the West to re-establish security and stability in the Middle East. Within this perspective, Iran cannot remain an island of stability unless there is an end to the ongoing regional conflicts. Proponents of the second view – represented by the conservatives and ultra-conservatives close to the Supreme Leader and the erstwhile government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – argue that collaboration with the West and non-ideological engagements in the region should be reduced to a minimum. For them, the war against the Islamic State is not Iran’s fight. They also believe Iran’s regional interests can be best served by defending only core Shia interests in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, among others.

This debate comes at a sensitive moment. In the next 18 months, three important elections are scheduled. In February 2016, Iran will both hold parliamentary elections as also elect the Assembly of Experts whose key mandate is to choose the next Supreme Leader. In June 2017, Iranians will choose their next president. With Ayatollah Khamenei ageing and probably ill, many worry if the assembly will be able choose his successor, and hopefully one who would reshape the constitution. Moderate forces advocate greater power for elected bodies, while supporting the candidacy of the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s reformist grandson, Hassan Khomeini, for the assembly. Khamenei himself supported Rouhani’s push for the nuclear deal, but showed serious doubts about its implementation and consequences vis-a-vis relations with the US.

Despite successfully resuscitating Iran’s economy with prudent diplomacy, Rouhani will face many difficulties in following up on his social and political liberalization. As a result, Rouhani and his cabinet are under constant pressure from the ultra-conservatives. Yet, everyone in Tehran seems to be looking for some progress towards a regional security architecture.

So the burning question remains: What future awaits the Middle East? This issue of Seminar aims to explore this question by gathering contributions from different analysts in the field which focus on the emerging issues of this region of the world. Taken together these papers provide not only a cross-national look at the multiple challenges in the Middle East but also place the cross-cultural perspective into wider political, social and historical context. This effort to cover and understand the Middle East might just reveal the tip of the iceberg regarding the conflicts, complexities and instabilities which continue to shatter and destroy the lives of millions in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere in the region. How will these issues impact Israel, Iran, American foreign policy, and the development of international politics remains to be seen.

RAMIN JAHANBEGLOO