Books
JAMMU AND KASHMIR: Politics of Identity and Separatism
by Rekha Chowdhary. Routledge, New Delhi, 2016.WHENEVER a new book on the Kashmir imbroglio makes an appearance, it invariably invites the question – what fresh perspective does it provide and what thesis does it posit to resolve India’s internationalized state formation conflict? And, when the author is the well known political scientist from Jammu, Rekha Chowdhary, who has for decades interpreted the state’s internal power politics as emanating from the Jammu factor and complicating the Kashmir conflict, it is hardly surprising that expectations are high.
Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of Identity and Separatism, seeks to unpack the paradox of the swings in Kashmiri perception about India. In 1947, Sheikh Abdullah, with popular backing, rejected the two-nation theory and chose accession to India as satisfying the emerging ethno-national goals of the Kashmiris – regaining political control from ‘foreign’ rulers and importantly, ‘negotiability’ with India’s ruling elite to obtain constitutional guarantees. By 1989, however, anti-Indian sentiment peaked, azadi slogans rang out and defiant masses joined protest marches.
Rekha Chowdhary’s explanatory focus is on the third dimension of the Kashmir conflict, the internal power politics of Kashmir (J&K) with a special focus on the intra-state Jammu factor. Commonly, attention on the power politics of the state viewed through the prism of identity politics and separatism, has been eclipsed by the more dramatic, high risk and politically motivated focus on the external dimension of the Pakistan-India axis of competing nationalisms and ‘proxy war’. Competing for attention with the external factor has been the Delhi-Kashmir factor, i.e. the Indian Union’s anti-democratic incursions, and the undermining of Jammu and Kashmir’s (J&K) constitutionally guaranteed autonomy, propelled by a national security state pathology.
The book seeks to fill the internal power politics gap in the Kashmir story by foregrounding the intra-state politics of J&K. Chowdhary contends that unless the political complexity of the divergent aspirations of the multi-ethnic communities of J&K are factored in, and a consensus within the different regions of the state in which Jammu is recognized as an important stakeholder evolved, conflict resolution will remain elusive.
Locating the roots of Kashmir’s ethno-national consciousness in the political ferment of the 1930s struggle against ‘foreign’ rule, Chowdhary trenchantly argues that Kashmir’s identity politics has to be understood in a ‘context of specificity’ – the discourse of nationalism, self-determination and autonomy does not carry beyond the Valley. It neither incorporates the Muslims of Jammu, nor does it imply homogenous Muslim and Hindu communities.
The divergence in the power politics of the multiple regions and communities of J&K is propped up by the ideological factor of competing identity politics and resentment over power deprivation and unequal development. She unpacks the roots of that political divergence with subtlety. For instance, the fierce sentiment in the Valley against ‘foreign’ Dogra rule, provoked by the system of communally discriminatory practices of the Hindu princely state (Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers: Muslim Subjects, 2004), finds no echo on the other side of the Banihal range.
Also, unlike Kashmir’s political mobilization which was mass based, Jammu’s politics was dominated by the feudal elite. Sheikh Abdullah’s Naya Kashmir land reform agenda dismayed the Jammu feudal landlords, further splintering J&K’s power politics. Religion as a marker lost to Region, as can be seen in the divergent trajectory of the politics of the Muslims of Jammu. Jammu’s politics thus came to be reactively defined, i.e. Indian nationalism pitted against Kashmiri nationalism.
The author moves away from the established groove of explaining Kashmiri separatist politics and armed militancy, which focuses on the proximate catalyst – the 1987 rigged elections and the targeting of the Muslim United Front (MUF) – and instead emphasizes the 1953-75 interregnum. Sheikh Abdullah’s ouster and arrest irrevocably delegitimized democratic space and gave rise to the mainstreaming of resistance politics as Kashmir’s politics shifted from a demand for autonomy to a call for plebiscite. His return in 1975 saw the discourse shift back to autonomy as also the recovery of democratic space with J&K experiencing its first free and fair elections in 1977 under the Janata government.
The author plucks from the recent scholarly literature on Kashmir to run past these milestones, but in making the pieces of the Kashmir story fit together, the gaps in her comprehensive analysis are intriguing. Why does she neglect the Sheikh and his party, the National Conference’s cultural politics of Kashmiriyat? In analyzing the scope of democratic space and the politics of governance, why does she avoid confronting the post-militancy phase of militarization of development and its impact on the civilian politics of governance?
The book provides an arresting analysis of the complexity of factors that determined the Sheikh’s choice of rejecting Pakistan, the Muslim homeland, as incompatible with the goals of Kashmiri political consciousness which were consolidated during the ‘Quit Kashmir’ struggle of 1930s-1940s. One, retaining Kashmiri autonomy and the anxiety over its likely submergence in the homogenizing pan-Islam Punjabi dominated politics of the Pakistan state (the author could have added that the Sheikh had earlier distanced his politics from the Kashmiri Muslim biradari located in Lahore because of that anxiety). Two, the fear that the socio-economic agenda of land reform of the Naya Kashmir programme would be blocked by the entrenched feudal structure of Pakistan. Chowdhary, in exploring the political economy of identity politics, emphasizes that the land reform programme provided an important rationale for J&K autonomy. Drawing upon the writings of P.N. Bazaz, Sheikh’s contemporary, she reinforces his provocative thesis that the educated Kashmiris, in articulating their political demands, though speaking as Muslims, were actually asserting their class rights’ (Inside Kashmir, 1954:165).
Chowdhary argues that the kinship of ideas between the Sheikh and Nehru instilled the necessary confidence in the former to opt for accession. Curiously left unmentioned is Nehru’s insistence on the Sheikh’s release at the time of accession and enabling his political takeover of J&K, something Jinnah would not have done. However, when discussing the moment of critical disjuncture in Kashmir’s power politics, the author takes for granted the reader’s familiarity with the complex reasoning behind the Sheikh’s decision to question the accession and Nehru’s volte face. All we have is a throwaway line about the impact of the Jammu based Praja Parishad’s ‘repeal Article 370’ campaign. Sheikh’s compromised return a decade later too elicits no adequate explanation, thereby losing out on the opportunity to problematize the logic of the belief that for a regional party to rule Kashmir (currently replayed in the PDP-BJP alliance following the 2014 elections), a compact with New Delhi is an imperative.
Chowdhary suggests that the Sheikh, on his return as chief minister (1975-82), continued to enjoy mass popular support. Significantly, even while she points out that it was at this time that the Sheikh introduced the draconian Public Safety Act (PSA), she stops short of arguing that it was prompted by mounting public protests such as government employees agitating for workers’ rights. Elsewhere, she insightfully observes that it was the middle class beneficiaries (of the Centre’s programme of ‘bribing’ alienated Kashmiris) who became the bearers of resistance politics in the 1970s and 1980s. It is thus somewhat disappointing that opportunities for pursuing cross-linkages and past-future analysis are largely lost.
Beyond referring to the Sheikh’s populist but anti-democratic style of politics, evident in the sidelining/ removal of capable peers and competitors, she avoids grappling with the highly contested legacy of Sheikh, although she reiterates that the Sheikh and National Conference hegemonized Kashmir’s political space, both democratic and separatist (Plebiscite Front). Barely a year after his death, the once unchallenged Sheikh had become the symbol of betrayal of Kashmiri aspirations for self-rule and justice, so much so that his grave became target for attacks.
Equally perplexing is Chowdhary’s near silence on the salience of the Sheikh/National Conference’s political strategy of Kashmiriyat, aimed at forging a distinct syncretic cultural ethos that could transcend the otherwise regionally and ethnically divergent peoples of J&K state. Despite the author’s indebtedness to the scholarly work of Mridu Rai (Hindu Rulers: Muslim Subjects, 2004) and familiarity with Nyla Ali Khan’s writings (Islam, Women and Violence in Kashmir, 2009), she ignores the salience of Rai’s analysis of Kashmiriyat as a well crafted theoretical fiction, derived from a selective reading of community histories and by culling cultural fragments from an imagined past that enfolds not only the Pandits and Muslims but also the Dogras and the Ladakhis. In view of Chowdhary’s focus on the challenges for cohesive democratic politics resulting from J&K’s multiple ethno-linguistic and regional communities, it is puzzling that she ignores the NC’s ideological strategy of Kashmiriyat, which continues to resonate in contemporary political discourse.
In contrast, Chowdhary robustly challenges the assumption of the primacy of ‘religion’ in the identity politics of Kashmir, and instead emphasizes ‘region’ as a significant co-marker, as evinced in the disjuncture in the ethno-nationalists politics of the Kashmir Valley and that of the Muslims of Jammu and the border districts of Rajouri and Poonch, and even of the co-ethnic Kashmiri population of Doda district. Chowdhary adroitly mines the rich literature on Kashmir to explain the Sheikh’s early dependence upon mosques and shrines (Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, 2004; P. Chandra, ‘The National Question in Kashmir’, 1985), the only public space available during Dogra rule, and his mobilization around Muslimness to advance a discourse of rights and freedom. However, as public space expanded, the dependence on religious shrines and the ideological framework was found constraining.
Chowdhary contends that the Sheikh shifted the goals of the movement from its religious roots to more secular ones, especially socio-economic, and reached out to other communities as can be seen in the transition of the Muslim Conference into National Conference (thus alienating Jammu Muslims who revived the Muslim Conference, and polarizing Muslim politics on a regional basis).
Chowdhary perspicaciously argues that Kashmir’s self-government/autonomy demand reflects the failure of the idea of pan-Islamic identity as satisfying the urges of the Kashmiri people. This ideological divide was replayed in the public debate between two Hurriyat leaders, Abdul Gani Lone and Syed Ali Shah Geelani in the late 1990s which saw a waning of armed militancy and an opening up of democratic space. Chowdhary deftly unpacks that public dialogue (2001-2) on the nature of the movement, the role of foreign jehadis and the relevance of armed militancy. For Geelani, the movement was part of the Pan-Islamic movement and international jehad; inevitably merger with Pakistan was a logical goal. For Lone, the movement had nothing to do with religion, was indigenous, political and secular, and not linked to any international trends; inevitably, unifying the LoC divided J&K was the logical goal. Lone was killed for holding those views (p. 121).
Chowdhary’s intellectual expertise and original contribution is evident in her plotting of the contours of the expansion of democratic and electoral politics in the context of separatism. Mainstream and separatist politics are shown to coexist and overlap. The extension of democratic space does not necessarily imply a decline in separatist sentiment. (A pity that the logic inviting a comparative analysis of the coexistence of electoral and insurgent politics, with similar political landscapes in the North East, was not pursued). Even with the entry of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) in 1999, and the advent in Kashmir of competitive democratic politics, there was never a question of decline in separatist sentiment.
For instance, the 2008 election was singular in Kashmir’s contemporary politics history for demonstrating the vitality of democratic politics. But the elections were soon followed by vigorous post-militancy street protests in which huge numbers participated. These propelled the youth into the separatist space now delinked from armed militancy and led to the radicalization of separatist politics in 2008-10. Geelani’s consistent anti-India rhetoric resonated with the youth-led politics.
Chowdhary analyzes the PDP’s effectiveness in using democratic space and the Kashmiri people’s appetite for the politics of governance to carve out a distinct role for itself. While acceding to the separatist an autonomous role for pursuing the politics of arriving at an ultimate resolution, the PDP appropriated the human rights agenda and, importantly, advocated the involvement of separatists (and militants) as stakeholders to resolve the conflict.
The book’s strength lies in the author’s assured grasp of the scholarly literature that enables her to map the contours of the internal power politics of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) over a sizeable historical canvas – from the emergence of Kashmiri identity politics in the 1930s to ‘post militancy’ expansion of democratic space and the entry of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). With an impressive capacity to construct the big picture, Chowdhary follows the logic of the internal and intra-state dimension of power politics to make the complex and disparate pieces fit in a comprehensive whole.
In the meta narrative, Chowdhary locates myriad developments such as the minor initiative of the separatists in promoting an Independent Election Commission to counter the challenge of the expansion of democratic politics from the 2002 elections, and the pressure on a divided Hurriyat members to demonstrate their representativeness. Remembered too is Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s proposal of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deflect demands for human rights accountability.
But in striving to be comprehensive, the book risks an overdependence upon the existing rich literature, as it briskly trots through J&K’s contemporary power politics, cursorily pausing to register moments and developments. In the process she pays insufficient attention to complexity and logic. The book presents a high table analysis, except for a brief digression on Kashmiri women’s participation in resistance politics, and the crucial significance of their subsequent alienation as signalling an endgame for armed militancy. Criticism apart this is an important book for students, policy makers, conflict resolution experts and the general reader interested in a comprehensive overview of the internal dimension of the Kashmir story. Also, Chowdhary’s demonstration of the scope and limits of the current revitalization of democratic space in J&K is important as so much of the alienation in Kashmir is rooted in the absence of democratic space. The book would have acquired greater cohesion had the author resisted stringing in the essay mapping the 2003-7 peace process, and another on ‘multiple dimensions of the conflict’, which digresses into a discussion on J&K’s refugees and divided families.
Rita Manchanda
General Secretary, South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Delhi
AFGHANISTAN POST-2014: Power Configurations and Evolving Trajectories edited by Rajen Harshe and Dhananjay Tripathi. Routledge, Delhi, 2016.
‘The Americans have all the watches and we have all the time’, a striking quote attributed to the Taliban leadership (page 93), sets the tone for this collection of essays: a study of the precarious state that Afghanistan finds itself in after the US-led NATO coalition decided to substantially reduce its presence in Afghanistan, starting 2014. Recent events give credence to the Taliban’s long-haul strategy. It now appears that the Taliban has indeed used the abundant time at its disposal to consolidate. The result is a repeated occurrence of some of the deadliest attacks in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s short history. First, the Taliban succeeded in occupying the northern city of Kunduz in September 2015 for fifteen days, in what was the first takeover of a major Afghan city since 2001. And then in April 2016, as part of their latest spring offensive, the Taliban executed a deadly suicide bombing in the heart of the capital Kabul, killing as many as 64 people.
Make no mistake, these instances are unprecedented because they pose a foundational threat to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. A weakened security apparatus in the face of an ascendant Taliban means that it will be tougher than ever before for the young state to maintain its monopoly over violence in the Afghan country. It is thus not surprising that Nicholas Haysom, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan said that for 2016, ‘Survival will be an achievement for the National Unity Government.’ Such fears were reflected internally as well. In a speech made in the Afghanistan Parliament, President Ghani warned that the nation would have six tough months of war and killing ahead of it and asked everyone to be united and support the security forces.
Given the critical juncture that Afghanistan finds itself at, a collection of essays ‘concerned with the trajectories of the course of developments in Afghanistan after ceasing of combat operations by US-led NATO forces’ merits special attention. Afghanistan Post-2014 is one such work that attempts to answer the following questions: Will the drawdown of troops push Afghanistan into the throes of political instability? What will be the nature of a state which is based on reconciliation with Taliban? And finally, what role do the international actors involved in Afghanistan play in the current scenario?
Though the book is essentially an academic exercise in understanding the ongoing developments in Afghanistan, the crisp editing makes it attractive even for a general reader who is curious about the political struggle playing out in Afghanistan. The language is accessible and wherever political science frameworks or International Relations (IR) theory is used, the reader is gently introduced to the concepts.
Editors Rajen Harshe and Dhananjay Tripathi are academics at the South Asian University’s Department of International Relations. They have brought together an extremely diverse range of views on Afghanistan with contributors from Germany to Russia to India in an effort to search and delineate pathways of the likely course of development in post-2014 Afghanistan. A word of caution for the readers: though the book was published only recently, most chapters appear to have been written much earlier in 2014 or 2015 and have not been updated since. Thus, many readers (and this reviewer), with the benefit of hindsight, may find themselves genuinely disappointed with a few predictions in the book that have subsequently been falsified.
In the introduction, the editors hail the ‘resilience’ of Afghanistan. At the same time, they concede that even as Afghanistan has steadfastly hung on to its freedom and independence over the last two centuries, the people of Afghanistan have had to pay a high price in terms of loss of lives and property. This paradox highlights that self-determination has not translated to better life outcomes for the people in Afghanistan. In fact, what we witness is basically fragmented self-rule combined with periods of illiberal authoritarianism. Tracing Afghanistan’s history from 1979 to 2001, the editors posit that Afghanistan was transformed into an epicentre of terrorism due to a triangular association between the Taliban regime, Pakistan and terrorist outfits such as Al-Qaeda.
In the first chapter, Rajan Harshe locates the country’s various vexing problems to legacy issues such as the Durand Line dispute, Soviet and US interventions, and finally the advent of global terror on globalization. He believes that organizations like Al-Qaeda are an inevitable ‘antithesis’ of the role of US-led imperialism in the form of globalization. This reviewer is, however, of the opinion that the causality for such claims remains weak – proposing globalization as a cause of terrorism needs much stronger evidence than is provided in the chapter.
Siddharth Mallavarapu’s chapter, ‘The Many Lives of Afghanistan’, makes an important point: one needs to dispel stereotypes about Afghanistan that represent the country as a combustible grouping of warmongering tribes. To do so, the author advocates bringing together three important disciplines: IR history, endogenous IR theory, and fiction writing based out of Afghanistan, such as the works of Khaled Hosseini and Atiq Rahimi. Mallavarapu masterfully breaks down what each of these fields has to contribute to the understanding of Afghanistan, making it the most interesting chapter in this collection.
Omar Sadr’s chapter makes the point that none of the conventional approaches for international conflict resolution have proven useful in Afghanistan. Mechanisms such as hegemonic stability, balance of power and managerial role of the Great Powers have all failed in Afghanistan. The author instead advocates that peace can be brought about only when all the states involved institutionalize nonviolent methods of dispute settlement. This approach has gained currency: processes such as Heart of Asia and the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) tried exactly this, but have thus far been unable in making both the Taliban and Pakistan shun violence. Sadr also highlights the importance of trade routes in enmeshing states with each other, leading to a decline in violence. However, Afghanistan’s problem is that it remains overly enmeshed with Pakistan for trade and sea access. Attempts to link Afghanistan to the Silk Route through Central Asia and to the Persian Gulf through Chabahar are initiatives that will go a long way in reducing Afghanistan’s coupling with Pakistan while enmeshing it with the other states in the region.
While the first section of the book dwells on theoretical aspects, the second deals with instrumental issues directly related to the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. This section is of particular importance in the current situation – the hope of a peaceful resolution through talks has died and the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) will now be responsible for keeping together the flailing republic.
Jayant Singh reviews the role of ANDSF, once a lynchpin of the US and NATO strategy for a successful political outcome post-2014. Mirwais Balkhi lists the negative externalities that the fall of Afghanistan will have on the NATO countries, arguing for a closer NATO-Afghan partnership, eventually leading to Afghanistan becoming a member. Though an interesting viewpoint, such a scenario remains highly unlikely given that the US is now convinced about reducing its role in Afghanistan.
The last section of the book throws up an interesting question: Without the military presence which underwrote the non-military involvement of many countries such as India and Iran, how will the various international actors in Afghanistan react? Sandra Destradi’s chapter throws light on one such actor who rarely finds a mention while discussing Afghanistan – Germany, one of the main players of the international coalition in Afghanistan, whose decision about continuing its support to ANDSF can be crucial. The author, however, feels that Germany will mirror the trajectory of US involvement and is unlikely to take an independent initiative on security matters in Afghanistan because of its pacifist foreign policy tradition.
Russia’s viewpoint is important for the current situation in Afghanistan. Russia is concerned that a return of the Taliban will further fuel narcotics trafficking, which kills 50,000 Russians every year. It is also worried that Islamic fundamentalism could spill over and create tensions in Central Asia. Nikolay Gudalov, in his chapter on the Russian perspective, reckons that Russia is open to a partnership with other countries in order to stall the return of Taliban. There is possibly a window of opportunity for reinvigorating the resistance alliance between India, Russia and the other Central Asian countries that opposed Taliban in the period 1996-2001.
Shaji S. analyzes the Indian position in the backdrop of NATO withdrawal. He believes that Pakistan’s national interests in Afghanistan will be best served with a Taliban takeover of Kabul. Such a situation will in turn be the worst case scenario for India. This claim needs further analysis. There are indications that Pakistan might prefer Taliban control only along the Durand Line, allowing it to keep the Taliban in check this time around. At the same time, India should consider talking with other players apart from the National Unity Government (NUG) to secure its interests. In his conclusion, the author makes a judicious recommendation: India needs to balance both soft power and hard power elements in its approach towards Afghanistan in the near future while aligning with countries which have a convergence of interest with India. One way to implement this would be for India to participate in every forum that discusses the future of Afghanistan. With the Obama presidency in its last year, the US is likely to be more conservative in its Afghan policy. To compensate for this, India should consider the possibility of bolstering Afghan air power by transferring some of our ‘obsolete’ assets in the Indian inventory like the MiG 21s and bombers.
Finally, Stephen Kingah and Arpita Basu are optimistic that SAARC could prove to be the appropriate platform to deal with the security problems in Afghanistan. However, this reviewer is of the opinion that SAARC is a weak institution, inadequately empowered to deal with problems as complex as Afghanistan. Rather, a better approach would be to bring together countries that think alike on Afghanistan.
Overall, the book does a good job of covering the post-2014 scenarios in Afghanistan. The strength of the book is its simple writing and excellent editing. Some critical issues, however, remain unexplored. For instance, what made dissatisfied groups in Nangarhar raise the flag of Islamic State (IS)? What was the relationship of that group with Pakistan and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)? Answers to such questions would have provided crucial insight into the power equations between warring groups. A chapter each elucidating the US and Pakistan’s perspective on a post-2014 Afghanistan would have also been immensely useful.
Unfortunately, the prospect of warlordism returning to Afghanistan can no longer be dismissed. With a decline in the authority of the state, and with groups such as the Haqqani network and the Taliban combining forces, Afghanistan is truly fighting for survival. In the worst case, it might once again end up in the hands of warlords, like we saw happen after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. After all, Afghanistan has time and again proved the aphorism: ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’
Pranay Kotasthane
Research Fellow, Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru
ARTEFACTS OF HISTORY: Archaeology, Historiography and Indian Pasts by Sudeshna Guha. Sage, New Delhi, 2015.
EVER since the discipline of modern archaeology was conceptualized it has claimed an uncertain terrain between anthropology and history. Thus an exploration of shared theories and the debates that are germane to them should have been the norm rather than an exception. However, despite notable exceptions, in the Indian context such dialogues between archaeologists and historians are a rarity within the academia, either on a structured institutional basis or as an organic engagement in an academic discourse. This is surprising as both draw from the same set of social theories and both explore the past in conversation with the perennial present.
Another reason for an absence of such an engagement perhaps lies in the nature of the emergence of discourse of archaeology in the South Asian context and the continuity it preserved with its roots in the post-independent phase. Here the continuities are fascinating: from Sir William Jones to Sir Robert Eric Mortimer Wheeler we do see a gradual trend of conditioning the context in a manner where the grand project of nation as it imagines itself finally took centre stage. Wheeler, of course, was explicit on this whereas the others prior to him were more reticent. Such a phenomenon can be identified on the side of the historians as well as they grappled with the colonial notions of the past and attempted a more nationalistic stance.
Thus that critical need of the three to converse, examine the shared concepts and look back at its genesis – in other words examine the historiography – has been a rarity if we consider the discipline of archaeology in the Indian context, especially in the post-independence phase where notionally the space for critical thinking was being shaped now by an independent nation state. Surendranath Roy in the early fifties was the first to attempt a history of Indian archaeology. His Indian Archaeology from Jones to Marshall (1784-1947), was put together as a narrative of events concerning the leading figures of the era. However, the need for ‘noting the manner in which we recall and historicize’ remained, as well as the need for the long awaited dialogue between archaeologists, historians and anthropologists. That such a dialogue is still to materialize is a testimony to the state of the discipline of archaeology in India as it struggles to negotiate the very contested space it occupies.
Disciplines require a certain gravitas and a distance if they have to examine the epistemological premises on which a critical thinking constructs knowledge. Sudeshna Guha’s work should be located in that framework of critical exploration as it seeks to precisely attempt the scrutiny of the episteme of discourse of historiography of archaeology itself in the South Asian/Indian context.
Artefacts of History: Archaeology, Historiography and Indian Pasts is about ‘issues of methodology and historiography’ as it seeks to create archaeological knowledge and the manner of endowing historicity to it. The purpose of the book is to critically look at the way archaeological knowledge is configured, created and disseminated in Indian archaeology. The manner in which the craft of archaeology is practised in the field, the traditions of its historiography and the manner in which it converses with the past and claims it as well are, for Sudeshna Guha, the issues of history, the artefacts of history as it were. As she explicates in ‘Histories, Historiography, and Archaeology: An Introduction’, the archaeological traditions of historiography and claims about the pasts are to be looked at from the historiographical framework. Such an approach allows her to move away from the rigid disciplinary boundaries that embody archaeology in India and open up the arena for a far more meaningful engagement with issues of the creation of discourse itself. It also allows her to question the generation of knowledge of a kind that happens in South Asia from ‘discipline seeking, region-specific existing histories of archaeology.’ This kind of archaeology depends on the trait list method of field discoveries and, therefore, ‘there is a need to attend to the historical relationships between inferences, field practices, theoretical methods and subjects of enquiry.’ It thus seeks a critical engagement with the past that moves away from what the author calls celebrations of discoveries to adopting critical approaches towards the review of the archaeological pasts. The introduction thus forms the fulcrum of questions that follow as it sets the context in which these questions become relevant.
The subsequent chapter deals with the vexed issues of antiquarianism in relation to South Asia in the context of the questions of origins. The chapter on ‘Nineveh in Bombay: The Curation of Foreign Antiquities and Histories of India’, where we are treated to a glimpse of the social milieu of the colonial state in Mumbai as well as of its notions of Nineveh, is indeed fascinatingly crafted. ‘The Connected Histories’ deals with philology and archaeology, followed by an exegesis on the Indus civilization by drawing upon the impressions of Gordon Child over the nature of discourse that followed on it. Those imprints are still clearly visible in the scholarship that has followed on the Indus civilization. As the author points out, issues of civilization, heritage and archaeological scholarship form the other related subjects that complete the broad historiographical sweep of ontological nature into the histories of archaeology.
So how does one now deal with such a work in relation to where the disciplines stand and in that context what is the relevance of this work? To my mind this work opens up the field for a meaningful dialogue that is waiting to happen for archaeology to claim its legitimate space as it negotiates with history and anthropology particularly in India. In the Indian context it also fundamentally questions the ‘so-called’ definitive positivist scientific posturing that has dominated the discourse of institutions which have engaged with archaeology as their primary endeavour as well as the forays of the post-processual nature that the avant-garde has attempted. ‘No discipline today is an island’, to paraphrase John Donne and ‘every death diminishes’ as Whitman so evocatively wrote. This work attempts that bridge between uneasy spaces so that death would not diminish the human and the nature of enquiry and by extension the discipline itself.
Ajay Dandekar
Faculty, Department of History, Shiv Nadar University, Noida
