SINCE the Lok Sabha elections of May 2014, the political graph of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has risen from strength to strength. Like an adept player in Monopoly – a popular board game – the BJP is swiftly moving across the country, ‘occupying’ states, filling its geographical deficits and driving other political players out of contention. The BJP is aware that controlling states across the country is the key to holding power at the Centre and consolidating its dominance across the country. It also adds meaning to the BJP’s vision of ensuring a ‘pan-Indian’ presence as a national party.

In its political competition with its key ‘national’ rival, the INC, the BJP appears to have taken its election slogan of a ‘Congress free India’ very seriously. In May 2014, while the INC was the ruling party in nine states (UPA ruled 13) the BJP was in power in just five states. Within a short span of three years, by August 2017, the BJP runs the government in 17 states, together accounting for 360 Lok Sabha seats, while the INC is the ruling party in merely six states.

Three years into the term of the present central government, many would have anticipated some degree of visible anti-incumbency. Empirical data appears to indicate that the BJP-led NDA government enjoys high levels of satisfaction across states, even among supporters of other political parties. There exists a similar pattern of voter satisfaction with the prime minister as well. At the same time, the BJP is already working towards retaining power in the 2019 general elections, while other political parties are struggling to develop a counter-strategy.

The BJP’s mammoth Vistarak Yojana aims at increasing its footprint and strengthening the local units of the party across the country. Party workers have been encouraged to go to areas where it had little visible presence to aggressively ‘market’ the achievements’ of the central government. The party president, Amit Shah, is himself on a 110-day tour programme, as part of which he is visiting different states, especially those where the party is seeking to expand its presence.

The high satisfaction levels with the central government, combined with the aggressive outreach programme of the BJP, indicate that the challenges remain formidable for the non-BJP parties. This essay examines the prospects of parties which are in opposition to the BJP, especially state-based political parties.

The year 2014 marks the second phase of the BJP’s rise to ascendance. The first attempt was in 1998-99 when it led a coalition government at the national level. It was able to ensure its return to power in 1999 but was unable to extend its rule beyond a single term. The present second ascendency to power marks a more determined attempt to not only consolidate its numero uno status but to additionally ensure a sustained domination in national politics. While aggressively pushing its case, the party has walked the thin line between legitimate activity and what is often construed as ‘crossing the line’ of what is considered ‘permissible’ political conduct.

There is a marked difference in the strategy adopted by the party between the first and the second phases of ascendency. In the late 1990s, the BJP was content to bide its time, accepting the role of a junior partner in the states where it had little support. Today, it is unwilling to be a mere supporting actor. Though the party still claims to be the party with a difference, it has over the last three years followed the same path that the Congress of the 1970s adopted when dealing with the opposition.

 

We argue that the increased support for the BJP-led NDA government is probably because of the fluidity in partisanship preferences. This essay uses the individual’s vote preference over the last few elections or traditional supporter of a party as a proxy for partisanship and party loyalty. While party membership would have been an ideal measure, empirical data shows that in India people tend to under-report both party loyalty and membership. Under perfect partisanship, one would expect the loyal supporter of a particular political party to be dissatisfied with the record and performance of governments and leaders of other political parties. In other words, a partisan supporter will be satisfied only with her/his party government or party leadership no matter how the government performs.

When partisanship attachments loosen, the chances for other voting cues to occupy the space hitherto held by the party increases. These other cues could include leadership qualities, policy issues, economic factors and general satisfaction with the government or leadership performance. It follows that if respondents claim that they are satisfied with the functioning of the government or are supportive of the leadership qualities displayed by stalwarts from other political parties, then these are indicators of fluidity. Likewise, we have fluidity when respondents are dissatisfied with either their party government or leadership. Under conditions of fluidity, voters are likely to change preferences, and this is likely to be to the benefit of the party/leader they admire or the government they find satisfactory.

We believe that in states and from parties where there is an increased fluidity, there is an advantage for the BJP. On the other hand, in states where a said party continues to be the reference point for voting, the BJP will not find it easy to make deeper inroads.

 

The main indicator to test fluidity is satisfaction with the performance of the BJP-led NDA government at the Centre. The question about satisfaction had four options including fully satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied and fully dissatisfied. To measure satisfaction we use the two options at either end of the spectrum, since they are easily distinguishable from each other and there is little room for confusion.

To test the strength of satisfaction, we subtract fully satisfied from fully dissatisfied. While this permits one to make a distinction, it is also indicative of the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction as the case may be. One should expect the BJP and NDA voters to be satisfied and the supporters of non-NDA opposition parties to be dissatisfied with government performance. The strongest partisans are likely to be at either end of the spectrum. Defectors are those in unexpected positions, as in the case of BJP or NDA voters expressing dissatisfaction or a non-NDA voter expressing satisfaction.

Defections indicate a loosening of party attachment and, therefore, fluidity. The higher the defections of the non-NDA voters as compared to the BJP and NDA voters, the greater the advantage for the BJP. About respondents who do not identify with any particular party, one may not be able to identify defectors but can still see the direction they move. If the non-identifiers express satisfaction, then it is to the advantage of the BJP, whereas the dissatisfied could swing the other way.

In this analysis, we treat state units of political parties as separate parties. This allows us to place the party in the context of the specific party system. We make a distinction between three types of parties – strong, moderate and weak partisans. Parties with strong partisans are those who can hold onto more than 30% of their traditional voters, while moderate partisans are those who hold onto 10% to 29% of their loyal voters and weak partisans hold onto between 1% and 9% of their voters. Since satisfaction with government is the reference point, a positive sign indicates support in favour of the government and a negative sign indicates the opposite.

 

While it is not surprising that the BJP units are mostly the strongest positive partisans, the question to be asked is why all the units of the party have not shown the same level of enthusiasm. When we look more closely at the states, there appears to be a pattern. The states in which the opposition (non-NDA) has been active and visible, the BJP’s rise and consolidation has been stymied. Table 1 outlines the details.

 

For instance, in both Rajasthan and Karnataka, the Congress units have played a visibly combative game. Sachin Pilot, the President of the Rajasthan Pradesh Congress Committee, is leading an energetic campaign against the incumbent BJP government in the state since 2014.¹ Immediately after the Lok Sabha wipeout, the Congress won three out of the four by-elections caused by MLAs vacating their seats on being elected as MPs. According to media reports, Pilot has toured all the districts in the state twice and repeatedly highlighted what the Congress party terms as failures of the BJP state government on issues like the condition of farmers, minorities, atrocities against the Scheduled Tribes and Castes, and shrinking employment opportunities for the youth.

In Karnataka, the Congress campaign has taken up issues around Kannada and ‘Kannadiga’ pride, including a focus on regional identity, use of Hindi in Metro stations, the question of a separate flag, making Kannada mandatory at the school level and an aggressive stand on Mahadayi river water sharing. The party has also supported the demand for separate religion status for Lingayats. All this has pushed the BJP to a tight corner since any visible pro-Kannada stand will dent the BJP’s politywide nationalist position. Consequently, the BJP campaign in Karnataka has not got the traction one would normally expect from a party seeking to establish its dominance.

More recently, the Congress has played the same game that the BJP played in other states. It has attracted support from the JD-S rebels. In a state which is to have an election in less than a year, the Congress strategy appears to be to empower and strengthen its state level leaders and focus on critical local issues and in the process divert attention away from the central government and its leadership.

In Punjab, the BJP is likely to have an uneasy ride. First, the SAD and BJP are weak positive partisans in the state compared to AAP and the Congress who are strong partisans against the NDA. Second, the non-identifiers in Punjab are also not enthusiastic about the NDA. Third, while the AAP, a new entrant to Punjab, has positioned itself to attract support from all sides including the separatists, the Congress has occupied the nationalist space with the chief minister leading from the front.² Given these conditions, the room to manoeuvre for the BJP is limited. At the same time, given the poor organization and spread of the BJP, it will find it difficult to do a Shiv Sena on the SAD.

 

The defectors from the NDA camp are not unexpected. Previous federal coalition experiences show that the choice of allies for a party in power is much wider and old allies need not be an automatic choice. The defection of both the Shiv Sena and the TDP is representative of their frosty relationship with the BJP. First, the old allies appear uncomfortable with the changing equations that the BJP is forging with them and increasingly aiming to call the shots. Especially after the Lok Sabha polls of 2014, the Shiv Sena has openly expressed its unhappiness with the way the BJP has dealt with it as an alliance partner and has been critical of the central and state government on more than one occasion. From the choice of ministers and allocation of portfolios to the sharing of seats, the Shiv Sena and the BJP have not been on the same page.

 

While the leadership of the TDP has repeatedly stressed the importance of an alliance with the BJP, the fact that the party gets minimal benefit from the partnership explains the defection of its supporters. For instance, the demand for special status for Andhra Pradesh and greater financial resources remain unmet. Moreover, the BJP leadership has also hinted at experimenting with the Maharashtra model in Andhra to undercut the role of the TDP. The defection of the TDP in Telangana underlines the unhappiness with the BJP’s aggressive attempt to build an independent base for itself.

Furthermore, unlike in the past, the BJP now also has other options in both states. What the Shiv Sena is to the NDA, the NCP is to the non-NDA camp. Though the NCP has not defected, it shows weak partisanship. The party has often broken ranks with the opposition both at the state level and the Centre, to the benefit of the BJP, on many issues including corruption scandals against the ministers and drought and farmer issues among others. At the same time, the BJP too has used every trick in the book to entice the NCP. For instance, it has selectively charged NCP leaders for various irregularities and acts of corruption. In Andhra, the BJP is keeping a close watch on the ongoing Kapu agitation. Second, it is also looking at the YSRCP as a potential ally. The various cases against its leader, Jagan Mohan Reddy, do not seem to be moving quickly as that of opposition leaders in other parts of the country.

The BJP in its second ‘coming’, is more concerned with building its base and strengthening its organization. Consequently, it may not want to concede the advantage to the Shiv Sena and the TDP. Moreover, what works to the benefit of the BJP is that the non-identifiers in both Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh favour the NDA government.

 

The BJP’s best prospects to expand beyond its traditional North-West base appears to be in Odisha. The positive endorsement of the NDA by the BJD opens up space for the party. The BJP is already making inroads, as indicated by the substantial gains in the panchayat elections held in February 2017. The party has moved from the third to the second position. In recent times, both the prime minister and the party chief have visited the state on more than one occasion. The national executive of the BJP was held in Bhubaneshwar, and the party used the occasion to pitch for change in the state. However, given the organizational weakness of the party in the coastal areas, it is not sure whether it will be able to cash in on the fluidity.

The fluidity in West Bengal should encourage the BJP to give a more concerted push before 2019. One would have expected the state to show a strong negative disapproval of the NDA given that the Congress, the AITC and the left are critical of the BJP. Instead, there is an element of fluidity amongst them. It is only the left which is taking a moderate negative position, while the Congress has defected to favour the NDA, and the AITC has only weak partisans. Given the decline of the left in Bengal, this fluidity will not help the non-NDA position. At the same time, the non-identifiers in Bengal have also been mildly appreciative of the NDA. One would have expected higher levels of partisanship in the AITC, which positions itself as a key leader of the non-NDA camp.

The recent municipal elections show that the BJP has covered much ground and pushed back both the left and the Congress. From a point where it had no presence, it is now the key opposition party. The rise of the BJP and the fact that it controls the central government could pose challenges for the AITC. The Gorkha agitation is a good example of the BJP running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. The BJP manifestos in 2009 and 2014 were sympathetic to the demand for a separate state. However, it has had to press the mute button on this support to consolidate its position in other parts of Bengal. At the same time it is also comfortable with the continuing agitation so that the ruling AITC government could be shown in a bad light.

The AITC on its part, like the Congress in Karnataka, has taken a regionalist line to short circuit the ‘nationalist’ BJP. The decision to oppose the Centre’s order on Hindi, making Bengali compulsory in schools, passing a resolution to change the name of the state to Bengal and criticizing the role of the governor and constantly highlighting continuing discrimination by the central government are all attempts to set a regionalist agenda and reign in the BJP.

 

With strong partisan parties/fronts, both Kerala and Tamil Nadu are probably the only two closed-party systems in the country. The two states dominate the strong partisanship group against the NDA. In Tamil Nadu, one can also see that the BJP’s allies in the 2014 election are unhappy. More importantly, the non-identifiers in the state too are not enthusiastic about the NDA government. On the face of it, therefore, it appears there is very little space for the BJP in these two states.

The BJP has focused on the AIADMK since the demise of its leader J. Jayalalithaa last year. There also appears to be an element of reciprocity on the part of the AIADMK with its moderate partisan position unlike other parties in the state. At the same time, the solid positive partisanship by the non-identifiers in Kerala may give the BJP some hope to remain in the fight.

 

This essay attempts to assess the nature and structure of political competition in the states where the BJP is seeking to make a determined effort to assert its political presence. In most of these states, it either faces stiff competition from a strong state-based party or has to share political space with one of its NDA allies. In states where it is seeking to wrest the advantage from an entrenched state-based party (in some cases its ally), it has faced a challenge when the political formulation opposing it has successfully drummed up a strong regional sentiment for political gains. This has often run counter to the BJP strategy of developing a pan-Indian ‘nationalist’ position.

This contradiction is likely to gain greater visibility as this competition for domination at the state-level gains further momentum. Further, in challenging powerful state-based ruling parties, the BJP has often attempted to push back other ‘national’ parties to emerge as the key opponent of the party in power, thus redefining the structure of the political contest. The BJP is adopting multiple strategies in its attempt to consolidate its all-India footprint and has skilfully manoeuvred its strategy keeping in mind its key opponent in a particular state.

 

Footnotes:

1. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/congress-has-an-alternative-model-in-rajastan-says-sachin-pilot/article18493230.ece (accessed 17 August 2017).

2. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/capt-amarinder-singh-punjab-congress-bjp-hindutva-ideology/1/964184.html (accessed 18 August 2017).