DURING the second informal summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in October 2019, both upheld their commitment to override mutual differences and usher in ‘a new era of closer partnership and friendly cooperation’ between China and India. However, five months down the line, the optimism is clearly fizzling out, as China makes repeated attempts to embarrass India by raking up the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

In fact, China’s latest attempt to raise the Kashmir issue in the UNSC on January 15, 2020, the third time since August last year, prompted strong reaction from New Delhi, which, without mincing its words, urged Beijing to ‘refrain’ from acting at Islamabad’s behest. Given the current trends in China-India ties, there is much apprehension within the Indian strategic community about how relations between the two Asian giants will pan out in the third decade of the 21st century. Against this backdrop, an enquiry into the Chinese discourse on the evolving dynamics of China-India relations under Xi-Modi leadership is rather enlightening.

An analysis of Chinese language literature (academic journals, newspaper and other publications in China), revealed that the popular sentiment within the Chinese strategic circles is that the China-India relationship in the last five years has followed a graph of ‘starting high and ending low’. Chinese strategists, while internally debating and discussing China’s India policy, categorized the trajectory of the bilateral ties in the Xi-Modi era into various phases, such as the ‘high-anticipation phase’, ‘the mutual disappointment phase’, ‘the confrontation phase’ and ‘the reasonable expectation phase’.

The 18th CPC National Congress in 2012marked the initiation of the ‘high-anticipation phase’, when the new leadership in Beijing actively sought to improve ties with all the neighbours, particularly India. Newly elected Chinese President Xi Jinping, during his first meeting with former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the fifth BRICS leaders’ summit in Durban, South Africa, upheld China-India relations as being one of the most important bilateral relations for China. The message was reinforced when Chinese Premier Li Keqiang chose India as the destination for his maiden foreign visit, which was followed shortly thereafter by PM Singh’s China visit. The mutual visits at the prime minister level within the same year was interpreted as an unprecedented gesture of warmth in the history of China-India ties. In September 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping made his first visit to India, which was reciprocated by Prime Minister Modi in May 2015. The ‘hometown diplomacy’ marked by due fanfare and personal chemistry added a new momentum to the relationship.

Thereon, the leaders of the two countries maintained close contacts on various multilateral occasions such as the summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, G20, and the East Asia Summit. Various meeting mechanisms at the working level, like the foreign ministers’ meetings, financial dialogues, consultation and coordination mechanism on border affairs, among others, were carried out in full swing. Some dialogue mechanisms which were ‘delayed’ in the past years were revived, while a number of new dialogue mechanisms in the realm of terrorism and maritime security were initiated.

 

The initial years also saw some key decisions being made by both sides like the agreement on the BCIM Economic Corridor, China-India Border Defence Cooperation, the Chinese invitation to India to attend the APEC leader’s informal meeting and to join the SCO, the opening of the Nathu La Pass for Indian pilgrims, the Chinese commitment to invest US$ 20 billion in India, China-India cooperation on Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank, among others.

It is during this phase of high anticipation that a new strategic concept – ‘a new mode of major power relationship between China and India’ made its way into the Chinese strategic universe. While globally all eyes were set on the much publicized Chinese proposal of ‘a new type of great power relations’, otherwise called the G2 (Group of Two) with the United States, a section of the Chinese strategic community was actively debating the efficacy of a similar framework in the China-India context, given India’s ‘changing identity and status’ in China’s strategic planning.

China’s renewed focus on India was based on three factors: (i) the US adjustment of its policy towards India – decoupling India from Pakistan, and linking it with China; (ii) China’s own consciousness of being a ‘large developing country’ ‘similar’ to India, with its interests at the global level converging more with the developing than the developed world; and (iii) The Chinese zeal to prove to the world that it will be a benevolent rather than a hegemonic global power and China-India confrontation was not a given.

The overall consensus in China was that although India was not yet a major power with global influence, nevertheless, its importance in Chinese policymaking was ‘unquestionable’, in the face of China’s quest for a stable neighbourhood and its shared identity with India as a representative of the emerging world. It was argued that the concept of the ‘new-type of major power relationship’, which mainly emphasized two major principles: (i) avoidance of conflict and confrontation and (ii) win-win cooperation, has as much applicability in the China-India case, as in the China-US one. Unfortunately, the turn of events in the subsequent years, led to a new phase of mutual disappointment in China-India ties and the idea of setting up ‘a new mode of major power relationship between China and India’ somewhat lost steam midway.

 

Although the China-India relationship had appeared to be rapidly warming up since 2013, the inherent differences and contradictions were far from subsiding. The ambience of positivity and optimism was often disturbed by repeated incidents of border transgression. Just before Premier Li Keqiang’s India visit in 2013, there was a more than 20-day ‘tent confrontation’ in the western part of the China-India border. Again, prior to President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, a larger confrontation occurred in the western section, and it was only after the visit that the two sides withdrew from the contested territory. The fact that both the high-level visits happened under the shadow of ‘border confrontation’ did expose the limitations of the China-India friendship.

Meanwhile, serious differences cropped up between the two sides over the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) – an ambitious project proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, aimed at connecting Eurasia through various continental and maritime networks. India remained wary of China’s strategic intent behind the ambitious project. It particularly objected to the ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, a flagship project of the BRI, on the grounds that it ignored India’s core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity. Meanwhile, the increased Chinese presence in South Asia under the pretext of the Belt and Road Initiative, rapid debt build-ups among South Asian nations, the Chinese takeover of strategic infrastructure in certain South Asian nations, raised an alarm in India.

Furthermore, India’s ballooning trade deficit against China despite repeated assurances from the top Chinese leadership, the role played by China in scuttling India’s bid for NSG (Nuclear Suppliers’ Group) accession, and China’s antagonistic stance on the issue of terrorism emanating from Pakistan (as was evident by its policy of repeatedly blocking the listing of Massod Azhar at the UN as a global terrorist), caused much disappointment in India.

 

On the other hand, there was growing displeasure in China over issues like India’s reluctance to endorse the BRI despite repeated Chinese requests, her ‘lack of understanding’ of China’s greater role in South Asia, New Delhi’s periodic playing of the Dalai Lama card, hardening stance on the South China Sea row and also, calls for boycott of Chinese goods in India, among others. Furthermore, developments on the India-US and India-Japan fronts, particularly in the realm of security/defence cooperation, high-level visits, these countries’ endorsement of the Indian position on territorial disputes between China and India, particularly in the case of Arunachal Pradesh, made the Chinese side anxious. Many even accused India of attempting to internationalize the China-India border issue, of abandoning its traditional ‘non-aligned’ policy, and embracing a ‘quasi-alliance’ relationship with the United States, targeting China.

The Chinese strategic community was highly critical of what they called ‘Modi’s problematic diplomacy’, or in other words, ‘India’s assertiveness under PM Modi to speak loud on China’s major interests and concerns.’ They complained that unlike earlier times, India under Modi was pursuing a more ‘pragmatic’ China policy, prioritizing swap of interests and linkage of different demands, and was not even shying away from adopting a tougher posture when interests diverged. Coping with this increasingly ‘self-confident’, ‘pragmatic’ and ‘tougher’ India, was seen as one of the biggest challenges to China’s strategic composure and wisdom.

 

The China-India bilateral ties which had entered ‘troubled times’ in early 2016, hit the rock bottom, or as the Chinese scholars categorize, entered the ‘confrontation phase’, during June 2017 with the Doklam (Donglang) crisis. This was interpreted as one of the most serious border confrontations between the two countries in the last 30 years, a watershed moment which forced China to reconsider its India policy. The Chinese side was particularly irked by India’s success in dissuading China to carry out its construction activities in the Doklam area and thereby, accused India of using both military and diplomatic means to pressurize China in making concessions.

The Chinese strategic community was critical of China’s own stance during the border stand-off due to two reasons: (i) China’s ‘lack of confidence’ in dealing with two-front security challenges, that is enduring instability in its periphery while also facing a downward spiral in China-US ties; and (ii) its ‘over-confidence’ that China’s overall strength advantage over India was sufficient to generate enough strategic pressure, compelling it to dare not trample on China’s ‘red line’.

 

Many even questioned China’s ‘over-enthusiastic’ India policy over the past few years, while highlighting that India’s perception of China had always been negative, only to incorporate ‘a stronger attitude and more radical means’ under PM Modi. India, they asserted, had sent a clear confrontational message by indulging in an arms race, building infrastructure in the border areas in competition with China, and by endorsing policies like the ‘Act East policy’ or the US’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ to exclude China from South Asia and at the global stage. It was therefore inferred that no matter how much China tried, it would not be able to ‘win over’ India and secure its participation in a China-led regional (political and economic) order, as India was psychologically attuned to considering China as a strategic competitor.

As a direct fallout of the Doklam crisis, there was wider acceptance in China of South Asia as the secondary strategic direction for China (US-Japan alliance being the primary strategic direction), and India as China’s main challenger in that direction. Chinese strategists paid closer attention to what they called Indian military’s ‘short-term high-intensity war’ approach, which they believe will eventually become India’s main military concept vis-à-vis China on the border issue. It was further highlighted that ‘China’s restraint’ during the Doklam crisis might have been misinterpreted by India as its weakness, leading to a repeat of more such incidents in the future. Therefore, there was much emphasis on China bracing up for an impending adverse situation of ‘double containment’ and preparing for multiple combats and multiple front combats.

 

Following the Wuhan Informal Meeting between President Xi and PM Modi in April 2018, there seemed to be a visible reset/rebound in the China-India ties. The Chinese side appreciated the ‘positive changes’ in India’s China policy from the beginning of 2018, citing developments like the appointment of V.K. Gokhale, a former ambassador to China, as foreign secretary; the Indian government playing down the 60th anniversary event of the establishment of the Tibetan government in exile; PM Modi’s stress on an inclusive Indo-Pacific at the 17th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore; and the Indian military’s refusal to invite Australia to Malabar 2018.

Soon, exchange mechanisms at all levels and in every domain, from direct meetings between the top leaders, to military, economic and humanities exchanges, were resumed or intensified. The post-Doklam pessimism gradually gave way to cautious optimism in Chinese strategic circles, and terms like ‘Dragon-Elephant dance’, ‘China-India Datong’ once again found favour in China’s state media.

According to the Chinese analysis, the gradual warming of China-India relations was a direct outcome of three important developments: (i) The head of the state diplomacy and intensive high-level diplomatic exchanges that pushed China-India relations back on track; (ii) The increasing uncertainties in India-US relations in the backdrop of the ‘trade bulling’ and ‘America First’ policies of the Trump administration, and differences over issues like trade with Iran and the prospective purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system among others; and (iii) Modi government’s urge to score brownie points before the 2019 general election and the Chinese government’s intention to devise a coping strategy against the growing popularity of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) – the four party mechanism between the US, Japan, India and Australia.

However, some sections in the Chinese strategic community warned against overestimating the thaw in ties between China and India as a ‘fundamental strategic shift’ in bilateral relations. They even predicted that for the foreseeable future, until there are fundamental changes in the state of the international system, the overall relationship between India and China will continue to be a mix of ‘strategic competition and tactical cooperation.’

 

India’s abrogation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, and the bifurcation of the state into two union territories on August 5, 2019, further encouraged the naysayers in China. Many called it ‘Modi’s forward policy’, which was undertaken under the impression that China, overwhelmed by various internal and external challenges, would not retaliate militarily. A section of Chinese strategists even argued that China’s low-key resolution of the Doklam crisis, and its subsequent gestures of goodwill, only emboldened India to make such an audacious move on the controversial Kashmir issue. In this context, it was emphasized that while preventing bilateral relations from becoming overly confrontational, China should here after stay away from any more ‘appeasement’ or making concessions to Indian demands.

Interestingly, a section of the Chinese strategic community sought to rationalize the downward trajectory in China and India ties in recent times, arguing that the very foundation for strategic cooperation between the two countries had eroded in recent years. In the past, China and India had developed a ‘relatively mature and stable’ mode of interaction, based on the principle of ‘global cooperation, regional competition, and effective control of bilateral differences.’ However, in recent years the momentum of cooperation between the two sides on global issues like climate change, the global trading system, sovereignty and humanitarian interventions among others, has gradually lost traction, while competition for regional influence has intensified, particularly after the commencement of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As a consequence, they argue, the established mechanisms to control political differences and differences in economic cooperation have begun to fail.

 

In the changed situation Chinese strategists recommended two important modifications in China’s India policy. One, rather than making blind efforts to ‘win over’ India, China should accept and adapt to the uniqueness of the China-India ties, marked by deep differences and inherent competition. It should tone down its expectation from the relationship because China doesn’t have the ‘policy-space’ at the moment to placate India or to prevent an eventual US-India rapprochement. In other words, neither can China afford to decouple India and Pakistan in South Asia, nor can it expect India to fully maintain its non-aligned diplomacy. Just as China cannot stay away from the Indian Ocean region, it cannot but accept India’s growing presence in the South China Sea. Similarly, neither can the power gap between China and India be reversed in the short-term, nor can the border dispute be solved immediately.

Therefore, China should be ready to face more competition and clash of interests in its relations with India. ‘Reasonable’ expectations, together with China’s active participation in India’s economic growth, shelving of disputes and devising better mechanisms to control and manage differences, were advocated as means to stabilize bilateral ties under present circumstances.

The second recommendation was that China should pay more attention to India ‘strategically’. Rather than being guided by short-term developments, China and India should strive for an overarching strategic vision and posture document, somewhat along the lines of the earlier concept of ‘a new mode of major power relationship between China and India’, clarifying their strategic intentions and policies. In this regard, ‘Modi’s problematic diplomacy’ towards China is understood to be as much of a challenge as an opportunity. It is argued that by clarifying the differences, the policy has indeed helped both nations to adapt to each other in their diplomacy, and rationalize expectations from the other side.

 

To summarize, China in the last five years has defined and redefined India’s status and role in its strategic planning. Back in 2013-14, still largely unconvinced about India’s great power potential, China had aspired to ‘win over’ India and secure its support for a China-led regional order in Asia. However, with the passage of time, China is now better convinced of India’s role as its principal challenger in the secondary strategic direction, and has thereby rationalized its expectations from the bilateral relationship. The principle of ‘strategic competition and tactical cooperation’ is most likely to dominate China’s India policy in the coming years. ‘Appeasement’, ‘strategic patience’ and ‘teaching India a lesson’ are all considered viable options, as China awaits the ‘right time for these different means.’