Ecological conflicts and LFFU
THE concept of ‘circular economy’ implies that material resources could be increasingly sourced from within the economy, reducing environmental impact by increasing the reuse and recycling of materials. The aim would be to minimize waste and move towards a closed loop economy. However, this socio-technical ‘imaginary’ has no relation to reality as revealed by biophysical, metabolic analysis. The industrial economy is not circular, it is entropic,1 therefore it produces polluting waste, and it requires new supplies of energy and materials extracted from ‘commodity frontiers’.2 Therefore, environmental conflicts arise. The resistance movements born from such conflicts may help to move the economy into a less unsustainable direction.3
At a time in which despite the evidence to the contrary there is enthusiasm about the possibilities of an industrial circular economy, we recall the two senses in which authors write about the ‘circular economy’, a term that comes from introductory microeconomics and more recently also from chemical engineering and industrial ecology. Introductory micro-economics is often taught in terms of what Georgescu-Rogen called ‘the merry-go-round’ between consumers and producers,4 a circular scheme in which producers put goods and services in the market at prices which consumers pay; meanwhile, consumers (as providers of labour, land or other inputs or ‘factors of production’) get money from producers in the form of salaries, rents etc. and they buy, as consumers, the products or services that have been produced.
The ‘merry-go-round’ needs energy for running (energy which gets dissipated), and it produces material waste which is not recycled. For instance, coal and oil are not really produced (contrary to textbook economics), they are merely extracted, and their energy is dissipated by burning. This is left aside in introductory mainstream economics, or it is introduced much later, in the analysis of the ‘inter-generational allocation of exhaustible resources’ and in the treatment of externalities which are ‘internalized into the price system’.
As ecological critics of mainstream economics since the 1970s and 1980s, we thought that we were convincing the public, if not the professional economists, that the ‘merry-go-round’ representation of the economy was wrong. The economy is embedded in physical realities. However, the novelty is that from industrial ecology and not only from economics, a circular vision of the economy is also preached.
The biochemical circles of carbon and other elements, the great water cycle driven by sun energy, and the geologically produced fossil fuels and materials entering the economy are here taken into account, and the waste is very much present, but it is assumed that technical change may close the economic circle. The waste becomes inputs. The energy (dissipated, of course, because of the Second Law of Thermodynamics) is not a problem because it will come from current sun energy (not fossil fuels, which are stocks of photosynthesis from the past). The circular supply chain is supposed to rule physically in the economy. We know however that the actual degree of the circularity of the industrial economy is very low, and probably decreasing as biomass-based economies complete a transition to a fossil fuels industrial economy in India and Africa.5
There is a huge ‘circularity gap’ between the ‘fresh’ material input and the recycled material input into the economy. At the world level, the first is about 92 Gt per year and the second about 8 Gt. If less than 10 per cent of materials (including the energy carriers) are recycled, where do the other 90 per cent come from? The answer is: from the new commodity extraction frontiers and also to some extent from customary sources. Thus, aluminium may come to some extent from recycling, it may come from bauxite from old mines used more intensively, or it may very likely come from new bauxite mines. The EJAtlas records 50 conflict cases on bauxite/aluminium some of them, of course, from Odisha in India where the Kashipur and Niyamgiri Hill conflicts became well known.
There is a new collective initiative and a new journal for the historical study of ‘commodity frontiers’ (https://commodityfrontiers.com/journal/). This concept6 is becoming ever more relevant. The industrial economy marches all the time to the extraction frontiers in search of materials and it also travels to the waste disposal frontiers. The waste is deposited anywhere (solid or liquid waste, or greenhouse gases). Both the frontiers of commodity extraction and waste disposal are often inhabited by humans and certainly by other species.
Two processes of growth and changes in the socio-metabolism are associated with the widening and the deepening of commodity extraction frontiers.7 The first implies the spatial extension of nature appropriation, via territorial claims to the control and use of natural resources and associated acts of dispossession. The second implies the intensification of exploitation at existing sites, through socio-technical innovation and new investments in the same location (commodity-deepening) as for instance the mining of metal ores or coal by open-cast techniques discarding previous subterranean mining, gas or oil fracking, or energy-intensive fishing or plantations.
The EJAtlas (www.ejatlas.org) is basically an archive of EDCs that took place or are taking place now at the frontiers of commodity extraction and waste disposal.8 It is a database of environmental justice conflicts made available for research, teaching, networking, and advocacy, housed at the ICTA of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Since 2012, academics and activists collaborate to write the entries, reaching 3,500 by July 2021. The number of conflicts recorded for India is so far 350, which must be seen as a sample from a much larger unknown number of conflicts.
The EJAtlas is a product of the global grassroots counter-movement for environmental justice,9 and at the same time a tool for researching its recent history and reinforcing its presence across world regions and cultures. The industrial economy was still growing until 2020. There is a trans-national expansion of the agribusiness frontiers, otherwise known as ‘land-grabbing’ in the search for new forms of biomass as for instance cattle pasture, soybeans, sugar cane, palm oil, wood and paper pulp. Resistance in such places is often expressed as a defence of the commons.10
There is also a search for fossil fuels. Even a stagnant economy would cause conflicts. For instance, if the world economy is extracting and eventually burning today 100 million barrels of oil, tomorrow it will do the same or a little bit more or less at the commodity frontiers for oil. If ‘peak oil’ is reached (as it happens in particular locations and might soon happen at world level), then some oil is substituted by natural gas or by coal. This is why there are so many EDCs (in extraction, transport and waste disposal – including those caused by the excessive amounts of CO2), and hence also so many movements of resistance. Substitution of fossil fuels by hydropower or biomass fuels, or wind-mills and solar panels also causes conflicts because of the land and minerals requirement.11
Sometimes, the attempts to ‘valorize’ waste also cause new types of conflicts – as for instance the breaking up of old ships in Alang (India), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Gadani (Pakistan), or burning industrial or domestic waste in urban incinerators or in cement kilns, or controversial REDD schemes for ‘capturing’ carbon dioxide.12
The term Ecological Distribution Conflicts (EDCs) was coined and introduced in ecological economics by Martinez-Alier and Martin O’Connor13 to describe social conflicts born from the unfair access to natural resources and the unjust burdens of pollution. Environmental benefits and costs are distributed in a way that causes conflicts along the commodity chains, accompanied by different forms of violence against environmental defenders.14 The terms socio-environmental conflict, environmental conflict or EDC are interchangeable. The term EDC stresses instead the idea that the unequal or unfair distribution of environmental goods and damages is not always coterminous with ‘economic distribution’ as, for instance, rents paid for by tenant farmers to landlords or the international terms of trade or claims for higher wages from mining unions opposing company owners.
In the EJAtlas as in real life we find many examples of valuation struggles.15 The plural values displayed by participants in such conflicts often cannot be reduced to a single unit (contrary to doctrines of economic compensation for negative ‘externalities’). ‘Plural values’ as a foundation of ecological economics links well with the notion of ‘multidimensional poverty’.
EDCs then is a term for collective grievances and claims against environmental injustices. For instance, climate change is causing perhaps perceptible sea level rise in some Pacific islands or in the Kuna islands in Panama or in Kivalina or Shishmaref in Alaska, or causing glacier melting in the Andes and Himalayas. Yet those impacted are not compensated. Unfair ecological distribution is inherent to capitalism, defined by Kapp16 as a system of cost-shifting.
In environmental neoclassical economics, the preferred terms are ‘market failure’ and ‘externalities’, a terminology that implies that such externalities could be valued in monetary terms and internalized into the price system. If we accept economic commensuration and reject incommensurability of values,17 then ‘equivalent’ eco-compensation mechanisms could be introduced. Instead, we advocate the acceptance of different valuation languages to understand such conflicts and the need to take them into account through genuine participatory processes which are difficult to implement because of social barriers and unequal power.
If damaged, for instance by industrial pollution from lead or asbestos or by coal dust, the local populations will perhaps first claim that children’s health has no price, that the pollution should stop forthwith, and the guilty business executives should be punished by prison. But after a few years, once the social and legal battles have been lost, the local people, relatively poor and powerless, will perhaps meekly ask for and accept a monetary compensation. This also applies to people displaced by dams: they may argue in terms of livelihood and ecological values against the dam, they might claim indigenous rights over the river and also declare it as sacred. Once the battle is lost, once some leaders have been killed, what other alternative remains for them but to accept some money?
Political ecology and ecological economics nevertheless advocate the acceptance of different valuation languages to understand such conflicts. Who has the power to reject valuation languages such as sacredness, livelihood, rights of nature, indigenous territorial rights, archaeological values, and ecological or aesthetic values in their own units of account? Who gives to the language of economics and to mainstream economists the power they have?18
There is a need to reduce the extraction and burning of fossil fuels as soon as possible. The reduction required is about half, if the Keeling curve is to be flattened. So far, the Keeling curve (fig 1) continues its imperturbable march towards 450 ppm before the year 2050, and towards 500 ppm before the end of the century.
The Keeling Curve by 24 May 2021.
There is a world movement for environmental justice,19 a bottom-up countermovement against the exploitation of raw materials and the disposal of waste based on local instances of resistance. In the rest of the paper, I shall focus on the local opposition to fossil fuels extraction, transport and burning to which climate change arguments are added. LFFU is promoted by local communities confronted by national or foreign extractive or polluting industries. Sometimes it is supported by external environmental organizations, religious groups, scientists and professionals.
Meanwhile, ‘just energy transitions’ are often discussed in terms of compensation to be given in exchange for keeping fossil fuels in the ground to miners and other workers in the fossil fuel industries, or to relatively poor consumers, or to countries and companies that will suffer losses from such ‘stranded assets’. Here I take a different perspective: there is a top-down, public policy view of climate justice, and a bottom-up view.20
The discourse of climate justice was first put forward from the South in 1991 from Delhi, India, even before the Rio de Janeiro conference of 1992. Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain from the CSE published a powerful pamphlet on climate injustice titled ‘Global warming in an unequal world: a case of environmental colonialism’. They calculated the per capita emissions showing an obvious fact: if the carbon dioxide emissions by impoverished countries (in history and at present) would have been the universal norm, there would be no enhanced greenhouse effect. The oceans and the new photosynthesis would absorb all the carbondioxide emissions caused by humans. The increasing concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is caused by the ‘luxury’ emissions of the rich, and not by the ‘survival’ emissions of the poor.
It would not be right to ask poor people to decrease their emissions, which they could only do by giving up meagre meals cooked with fuel wood or dung, or by breathing more slowly or not at all. The reduction effort should be made by the rich. There are great differences in the use of energy between people. We all need a minimum of energy as food energy (‘endosomatic’ use energy, as Alfred Lotka said, or ‘vital energy’ as Frederick Soddy, the Nobel Prize in chemistry, wrote in his books on energy and the economy in the 1920s).21 We all need also some ‘exosomatic’ energy. Many people in the world must and will increase further their energy use.
Excessive emissions of GHG imply a unilateral appropriation of sinks, whether they are new vegetation, the oceans or the atmosphere as a temporary deposit. Bottom-up activism could take the form of court cases and demands from the South for repayment of the ecological debt and/or the climate debt since 1992 until today (including payments for ‘loss and damage’, in the official parlance of the COPs). Pressure on rich countries because of their climate debt could have been a contribution from the South for reduction of emissions. Bottom-up LFFU activism by direct actions might also be effective.
Naomi Klein’s book, This Changes Everything,22 was a powerful call for reinforcing the global grassroots movement. Klein learnt about the climate debt in 2009 from the young Bolivian ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Angelica Navarro. She also quotes Sunita Narain saying, ‘I am always being told – especially by my friends in America – that… issues of historical responsibility are something we should not talk about.’ Klein’s book was written with the methodology of action-research. She explains her forays up to the barricades and blockades against shale gas fracking in Romania by Chevron, oil pipelines in Canada and the marshes of Louisiana to inspect the damage from the BP spill.
Drawing on EJOLT reports and other sources,23 Klein reconstructed the story of the proposal to leave oil in the soil in Ogonil and in the Niger Delta and in the Amazon of Ecuador, and the founding of Oil Watch in 1995 which combined local resistance to the fossil fuels with emphasis on the ‘unburnable fuels’ that should be left untouched if increased concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is to be avoided. The idea of ‘keeping it underground’ (‘leave oil in the soil, leave coal in the hole’, LFFU, leave fossil fuels underground) was built from community resistance movements and non-governmental and non-academic research and advocacy.
Extreme violence by the military in collaboration with the Shell corporation caused many victims in the Niger Delta while the Texaco-Chevron disaster in the northern Amazon region of Ecuador was well documented. From the mid-1990s Oil Watch explicitly added the argument of climate change to the reasons to leave oil in the soil.24 In the EJOLT project (2011-15) we used the words Yasunization and Ogonization to acknowledge that LFFU proposals came from Nigeria and Ecuador.25
Naomi Klein’s book included travel to the Alberta oil sands devastation and participation in the resistance to the Keystone XL and other pipelines. It shows the resistance movements against fracking in France and elsewhere (because of methane emissions, and local harm to water and landscapes), and also the resistance to mountaintop coal removal in Appalachia. She adopted the word ‘Blockadia’ for the instances on grassroots opposition to the extraction and transport of fossil fuels that she picked up in her travels.
As so often happens, terms of the environmental justice movement are introduced by activists, not by academics. ‘Blockadia’ is a grassroots word. Klein called for a movement to place climate change at the centre of politics, ‘the thing that changes everything’. According to her, and I agree, the historical and urgent task of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions falls on the many grassroots movements that form networks drawing their strength from the battles on the ground against the private or public fossil fuel companies, against coal mines, oil wells, pipelines and sea carriers, refineries and thermal power stations.26
One year after Naomi Klein’s book was published as a call for climate justice, the Paris international agreement of December 2015 explicitly excluded the notion of liability. Literally the agreement ‘does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.’ Otherwise the governments of the rich countries would not sign any agreement. Some voices were heard in favour of applying ‘strict liability’ as in domestic environmental legislation in the US (CERCLA)27 but it was argued28 that insistence on the ecological debt was counter-productive because it might lead to a failure in getting any international agreement.
In Paris, this travesty of justice (i.e. the leaving aside of the Ecological Debt) won the acquiescence of all the world governments after Pablo Solón (Bolivia’s ambassador at the COPs on climate change in Copenhagen, 2009, and Cancun, 2010) and a few recalcitrant representatives of other governments were forced into colonial submission. In some cases officials from countries of the South were allegedly bribed into acquiescence.
Not everybody is convinced. Some competent academic voices29 continue to calculate the ‘sinks appropriations’, i.e. the disproportionate use by rich people of the atmosphere, the oceans, and new vegetation to freely dump excessive emissions of carbon dioxide. Warlenius argues strongly in favour of assigning payments in proportion to historical responsibility. After all the international environmental rhetoric includes the polluter pays principle. However, fines would be more appropriate than payments (or taxes) because fines imply that you should not do the wrong action again. There are also non-academic voices pointing to the ecological debt from North to South as stated explicitly in paragraph 51 of the Encyclical ‘Laudatosi’ of 2015.
‘A true "ecological debt" exists, particularly between the global north and south, connected to commercial imbalances with effects on the environment, and the disproportionate use of natural resources by certain countries over long periods of time. The export of raw materials to satisfy markets in the industrialized north has caused harm locally, as for example in mercury pollution in gold mining or sulphur dioxide pollution in copper mining. There is a pressing need to calculate the use of environmental space throughout the world for depositing gas residues which have been accumulating for two centuries and have created a situation which currently affects all the countries of the world. The warming caused by huge consumption on the part of some rich countries has repercussions on the poorest areas of the world…’
The bottom-up position for climate justice is strongest when local arguments for LFFU come together with a global perspective of the need to decrease GHG emissions. This confluence between local grievances and environmental issues happened in India in the youth movement Fridays for Future, within which there was a debate on whether to join other human rights movements and economic grievances or stick to climate change only. The Farmers’ movement in Punjab in 2020 decided the issue (with the collaboration of the Indian police that arrested Disha Ravi and other activists from Fridays for Future, for supporting the Farmers’ movement). The slogan ‘fund farmers, defund coal’ was raised on cardboard, a defiant performative symbol. https://www.thenews minute.com/article/fridays-future-was-govt-radar-long-disha-ravis-arrest-inside-view-143502
Grassroots opposition to oil extraction started before the general awareness of climate change. In 1997, the network Oil Watch proposed in the parallel COP meeting in Kyoto a moratorium on oil exploration and extraction in socially and ecologically sensitive locations. Little happened for ten years in public policy in Ecuador until some ministers of President Correa’s new government in 2007 in Ecuador took the initiative (coming from civil society organizations) to leave in the ground the oil from the Yasuní ITT fields, deep into the Amazon.30 This inspired other LFFU movements. Although the government was divided, the proposal was alive for six years, until President Correa (who never was favourable to it) dropped it in August 2013 refusing to become a leader from the South on climate change as also Evo Morales of Bolivia had refused to take up this leadership.
The leadership of the grassroots movements passed to other hands. Some belong to the young people’s movements for Climate Justice coming from the North represented by Greta Thunberg, speaking for the next generations. Meanwhile, the local opposition to fossil fuels extraction to which climate change arguments are added, continues to grow with some success in the South but also in the North. There are many LFFU examples, also from India including many against coal-fired power plants, fully referenced in the EJAtlas.31
Fifty years ago Georgescu-Roegen published The Entropy Law and the Economic Process (1971). He coincided with other authors before and after him32 when insisting at length on the fact that the industrial economy is not circular but entropic. This explains the growth of conflicts at the extraction, transport and waste disposal frontiers because energy is dissipated and only some materials are recycled. This is lesson number one in a course of ecological economics and political ecology.
Hunter-gatherers and agriculturalists had indeed lived by current photosynthesis. Ecological anthropologists33 calculated the sustainable energy return to human energy input. Pre-industrial agriculture had a favourable EROI (energy return on energy input) compared to modern industrial agriculture. With industrialization and fossil fuels, the world economy became more and more entropic. At world level, of all the materials entering the economy (fossil fuels, building materials, metal ores, biomass), by 2005 only about 6% were recycled.34 The low degree of circularity has two main reasons. First, 44% of processed materials were used to provide energy and are thus not available for recycling. Second, socioeconomic stocks (building, transport infrastructure) were growing at a high rate with net additions of 17 Gt/yr. The growth of the ‘built environment’ requires materials and energy; and once in place, a persistent input of materials and energy for maintenance and operation.35
The economy is becoming less and less circular. The industrial economy dissipates fossil fuels energy and discards materials, it is entropic and therefore it goes to the frontiers of commodity extraction and also the frontiers of waste disposal causing damages and conflicts. The extraction of fossil fuels continues and even grows, as also excessive carbon dioxide emissions. Coal, oil or natural gas burned today are no longer available; tomorrow the industry will reach a new extraction frontier. Could be Alaska or Yamal peninsula in the Arctic, could be Cabo Delgado in Mozambique or Vaca Muerta in Argentina.
Solar and wind energy are added to other sources (coal, oil, gas, also hydropower, biomass and nuclear), they do not yet substitute for them. The new sources produce their own conflicts because of land and minerals requirements.36 The geo-engineering experiments37 give hope to ‘eco-modernists’ but they might cause new conflicts.
The industrial metabolism based on coal, gas and oil extraction, the digging of sand and gravel for the cement industry,38 the mining of iron ores, copper, bauxite, nickel, titanium ores; the sprawling eucalyptus, sugar cane and oil palm plantations, and the CAFOs (concentrated animal feeding operations) continues to grow. It causes EDCs concomitantly to the growth and changes in the current social metabolism.39
Other EDCs arise by attempts to narrow down the ‘circularity gap’ by getting energy not from the fossil fuels but from hydropower, ‘biofuels’, nuclear, windmills, photovoltaic. Or when new or old metals are mined at the commodity extraction frontiers for the electricity transition (lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper), or light balsa wood is plundered from the Amazon of Ecuador or when local recycling of metals such as lead damages human health.
There are also many EDCs arising from the materiality of the communications industry – not only the old search for paper pulp but the reliance of the media technologies on the extraction of minerals such as coltan and others, the dumping of electronic waste (which is only in part recycled), and the use of great amounts of electricity.40
Amovement from the South claiming an ecological debt for climate change, and putting forward proposals for leaving the ‘unburnable fuels’ in the ground was born in the 1990s out of the many EDCs related to fossil fuels, and in particular by the bitter experience for decades in the Amazon of Ecuador and the Niger Delta in Nigeria. This is part of the world movement for environmental justice. The protestors are indigenous and relatively poor people in some instances, or middle class and professional people in other instances. They belong to or are supported by local EJOs and sometimes by international EJOs. Climate change related protests are more likely to attract international EJOs than purely local environmental protests about dispossession of land and water access rights.
In the EJAtlas as a whole, the success rate in environmental protests reaches 17 per cent, generally meaning ‘project stopped’. The rest are ‘failures’ and ‘don’t knows’. The success rate is similar for the 612 fossil fuel conflicts registered, of which 90 are deemed as successes (30 April 2021). Local complaints against fossil fuels (and also against many other investments that indirectly increase GHG emissions) contribute, if successful, to climate justice locally and globally. They prevent local damages and they avoid GHG emissions. However, there are many issues involved in such protests that cannot be reduced simply to accounting in terms of tons of GHG – or in money terms –such as avoidance of oil spills, mining accidents, coal dust, pollutants from power plants and respiratory illneses such as pneumoconiosis.
Our hypothesis41 is that the many grassroots LFFU complaints could make an encouraging supply-side contribution to the required decrease in carbon dioxide emissions and moreover have other side benefits. The local complaints have a multiplicity of expressions and social actors but there are similar structural roots to all of them: the industrial economy unavoidably marches to the commodity extraction and waste disposal frontiers because energy is not recycled and materials are recycled only to a small extent. The entropy causes conflicts, while the attempts to make the economy less entropic might cause other conflicts. It is the task of ecological economics and political ecology to reveal such connections.
* LFFU – leave fossil fuels underground.
1. W. Haas, F. Krausmann, D. Wiedenhofer, M. Heinz, ‘How Circular is the Global Economy? An Assessment of Material Flows, Waste Production, and Recycling in the European Union and the World in 2005’, Journal of Ind. Ecology 19(5), 2015, pp. 765-777; M. Giampietro and S.O. Funtowicz, ‘From Elite Folk Science to the Policy Legend of the Circular Economy’, Environmental Science and Policy 109, 2020, pp. 64-72.
2. J.W. Moore, ‘Sugar and the Expansion of the Early Modern World-Economy: Commodity Frontiers, Ecological Transformation, and Industrialization’, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 23(3), 2000, pp. 409-433; S. Joseph (ed.), Commodity Frontiers and Global Capitalist Expansion. Social, Ecological and Political Implications from the Nineteenth Century to the Present Day. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019; K. Hanácek, M. Kröger, J. Martinez-Alier, ‘On Thin Ice: The Arctic Commodity Extraction Frontier and Environmental Justice Conflicts’, Ecological Economics, 2021 (forthcoming).
3. A. Scheidel, F. Demaria, L. Temper, J. Martinez-Alier, ‘Ecological Distribution Conflicts as Forces for Sustainability: An Overview and Conceptual Framework’, Sustainability Science 13(3), 2018, pp. 585-598.
4. N. Georgescu-Roegen. ‘Energy and Economic Myths’, Southern Economic Journal 41(3), 1975, pp. 347-381.
5. Brototi Roy and A. Schaffartzik, ‘Talk Renewables, Walk Coal: The Paradox of India’s Energy Transition’, Ecological Economics 180, 2021, 106871.
6. J.W. Moore, 2010, op cit., fn. 2.
7. D. Banoub, G. Bridge, B. Bustos, I. Ertör, M. González-Hidalgo and J. de los Reyes, ‘Industrial Dynamics on the Commodity Frontier: Managing Time, Space and Form in Mining, Tree Plantations and Intensive Aquaculture’, Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space, 2020.
8. L. Temper, D. Del Bene, J. Martinez-Alier, Mapping the Frontiers and Front Lines of Global Environmental Justice: The EJAtlas’, J. of Political Ecology 22, 2015, pp. 255-278; L. Temper, F. Demaria, A. Scheidel, D. Del Bene, J. Martinez-Alier, ‘The Global Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas): Ecological Distribution Conflicts as Forces for Sustainability’, Sustainability Science 13(3), 2018, pp. 573-584; L. Temper, S. Avila, D. Del Bene, J. Gobby, N. Kosoy, P. Le Billon, J. Martinez-Alier, P. Perkins, B. Roy, A. Scheidel, M. Walter, ‘Movements Shaping Climate Futures: A Systematic Mapping of Protests Against Fossil Fuel and Low-Carbon Energy Projects’, Environmental Research Letters 15(2), 2020, 123004; A. Scheidel, A. Liu, J. Del Bene, B. Navas, G. Mingorría, F. Demaria, S. Avila, S.B. Roy, I. Ertor, L. Temper, J. Martinez-Alier, ‘Environmental Conflicts and Defenders: A Global View’, Global Environmental Change 63, July 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102104; J. Martinez-Alier, ‘Mapping Ecological Distribution Conflicts: The EJAtlas’, The Extractive Industries and Society, 2021 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2021.02.003
9. R. Guha and J. Martinez-Alier, Varieties of Environmentalism. Essays North and South. Earthscan and Oxford U.P., London and Delhi, 1997.
10. J. Dell’Angelo, G. Navas, M. Witteman, G. D’Alisa, A. Scheidel, L. Temper, Commons Grabbing and Agribusiness: Violence, Resistance and Social Mobilization’, Ecological Economics, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107004.
11. Temper et al., 2020, op cit., fn. 8.
12. S. Schindler and F. Demaria, ‘"Garbage is Gold": Waste-Based Commodity Frontiers, Modes of Valorization and Ecological Distribution Conflicts’, Capitalism, Nature and Socialism 31(4), 2020, pp. 52-59.
13. J. Martinez-Alier, M. O’Connor, ‘Ecological and Economic Distribution Conflicts’, in R. Costanza, J. Martinez-Alier, O. Segura (eds.), Getting Down to Earth: Practical Applications of Ecological Economics. Island Press/ISEE, Washington, DC, 1996; J. Martinez-Alier, The Environmentalism of the Poor. A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002.
14. G. Navas, S. Mingorría, B. Aguilar-Gonzalez, ‘Violence in Environmental Conflicts: The Need for a Multidimensional Approach’, Sustainability Science 13(3), 2018, pp. 649-660; A. Scheidel et al., 2020, op. cit., fn 8; D. Tran, J. Martinez-Alier, G. Navas and S. Mingorría, ‘Gendered Geographies of Violence: A Multiple Case Study Analysis of Murdered Women Environmental Defenders’, J. of Political Ecology 27(1), 2020, pp. 1189-1212.
15. L. Temper, J. Martinez-Alier, ‘The God of the Mountain and Godavarman: Net Present Value, Indigenous Territorial Rights and Sacredness in a Bauxite Mining Conflict in India’, Ecological Economics 96, 2013, pp. 79-87.
16. K.W. Kapp, The Social Costs of Business Enterprise (revised and enlarged edition of The Social Costs of Private Enterprise, 1950). Spokesman, Nottingham, 1963/1978.
17. J. Martinez-Alier, G. Munda, J. O’Neill, ‘Weak Comparability of Values as a Foundation for Ecological Economics’, Ecological Economics 26(3), 1998, pp. 277-286.
18. J. Martinez-Alier. 2002, op. cit., 2002, fn. 13.
19. P. Newell and T. Sikor, Globalizing Environmental Justice? Geoforum 54, 2014, pp. 151-157; L. Temper, ‘Globalizing Environmental Justice: Radical and Transformative Movements Past and Present’, in R. Holifield, J. Chakraborty and G. Walker (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Environmental Justice. Routledge, Abingdon and New York, 2018, pp. 490-503.
20. J. Martinez-Alier, ‘Climate Justice’, Development and Change 46(2), 2015, pp. 381-386.
21. J. Martinez-Alier with K. Schlüpmann, Ecological Economics: Energy, Environment and Society. Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.
22. N. Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate. Simon and Schuster, New York, 2014.
23. L. Temper, I. Yánez, K. Sharife, G. Ojo, J. Martinez-Alier, CANA, M. Combes, K. Cornelissen, H. Lerkelund, M. Louw, E. Martínez, J. Minnaar, P. Molina, D. Murcia, T. Oriola, A. Osuoka, M.M. Pérez, T. Roa-Avendaño, L. Urkidi, M. Valdés, N. Wadzah and S. Wykes, ‘Towards a Post-Oil Civilization: Yasunization and Other Initiatives to Leave Fossil Fuels in the Soil’. EJOLT Report No. 6, 2013, p. 204.
24. Nnimmo Bassey, ‘Let’s Leave Nigeria’s Oil in the Soil. No To More Oil Blocks in Niger Delta’, 19 February 2009. Available at https://www.pambazuka.org/land-environment/lets-leave-nigeria%E2%80%99s-oil-soil
25. Temper et al., 2013, op cit., fn. 23.
26. Temper et al., 2020, op cit., fn. 11; L. Temper, ‘Blocking Pipelines, Unsettling Environmental Justice: From Rights of Nature to Responsibility to Territory’, Local Environment 24(2), 2019, pp. 94-112.
27. Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘A New Approach to Tackling Climate Change’, Financial Times, 22 February 2010.
28. O. Godard, ‘Ecological Debt and Historical Responsibility Revisited: The Case of Climate Change’. EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2012/46. European University Institute, Florence, 2012.
29. R. Warlenius, G. Pierce, V. Ramasar, ‘Reversing the Arrow of Arrears: The Concept of "Ecological Debt" and its Value for Environmental Justice’, Global Environmental Change 30, 2015, pp. 21-30.
30. J. Martinez-Alier and L. Temper, ‘Oil and Climate Change: Voices from the South’, Economic and Political Weekly 42(50), 2007, pp. 16-19.
31. There are a few hundred such LFFU cases in the EJAtlas and more in reality (Temper et al 2013, 2020; Roy 2021). For a previous approximation, our 2017 EJAtlas Blockadia featured map with 70 cases https://ejatlas. org/featured/blockadia, reviewed in https://phys.org/news/2017-11-blockadia-reveals-global-scale-anti-fossil.html.
32. J. Martinez-Alier, 1987, op. cit., fn. 21.
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