A political battle on cultural terms?
KANKANA CHATTERJEE, SUPRIO BASU and JYOTIPRASAD CHATTERJEE
THE complexity and intricacies of the political processes involved
in the electoral dynamics have been once again testified by the 2021 West
Bengal Assembly election. As it had been conjectured, the Bharatiya Janata
Party (hereafter BJP) became a significant contender in this election compared
to the 2016 Assembly election. Still, the meteoric rise of the BJP on the
political scene in West Bengal, as in the 2019 Lok Sabha election, seems to
have been stunted to some extent in 2021.
The BJPÕs
stunning 2019 show seemed highly inadequate to dismantle the ruling All India
Trinamool Congress (hereafter AITC) which retained its stronghold here for the
third time
in a row. On top of that, the AITC further improved its vote and seat share as
compared to 2016. Table 1 captures the overall performance of the stakeholders
of the election and also illustrates that the decline in the significance of
the Left and the Congress (two important faces of the Sanyukta Morcha)
continues in 2021, pushing it further towards the margins.1
Usually it has
been a common practice to analyse electoral outcome through political and
socio-economic parameters. This is perhaps the first time cultural and
ideological concerns seem to have significantly affected the electoral outcome.
Throughout the phases of the electoral campaigns a cultural battle seemingly
raged between the AITC and the BJP.
The AITC,
capitalising on the quintessential Bengali cultural identity reinforced by a
typically Bengali political leadership, invoked the rhetoric of bahiragata
(outsider) to brand the BJP and its central leadership largely consisting of
non-Bengalis. The BJP, disproportionately dependent upon its central leadership
failed to overcome this stigma assigned to them. Vaguely gauging the importance
of the unique cultural legacy of Bengal in the everyday life of the Bengalis,
the BJP instead attempted vainly to imitate the Bengali language and other
cultural patterns. Somehow this, along with BJPÕs overarching Hindutva
ideology seemed to strengthen the discourse of bahiragata.
Indeed, in the CSDS-Lokniti West Bengal
Assembly Election Study, a majority (about 46%) of the respondents felt that
the AITC would be the best to protect the Bengali culture. Consequently, the
AITCÕs slogan Bangla nijer meyeke chay (Bengal wants her own daughter)
seemed to gain considerable public support. The significant influence of the
cultural concerns in this electoral outcome, hence necessarily calls for a
study of the electoral proclivities of the Bengali middle class that is often
considered the originator and perpetuator of the quintessential Bengali
culture.
To understand the electoral tendencies of
the middle class a consideration of Table 2 seems necessary.
The table
reveals a clear trend in the electoral preferences of the poor and the lower
economic classes. However the electoral preferences of the middle class and the
rich are not quite clear as they seem to have almost equal affinities to both
the major contenders AITC and BJP. Such electoral tendency of the middle class
in the context of a culturally contested election seems to problematize its
historical role in shaping and propagating the quintessential Bengali cultural
identity. A brief look at the history of the development of the unique cultural
atmosphere of Bengal heralded by the emerging new Bengali middle class in 19th
century seems to substantiate the above argument.
Table 2 identifies the middle class on a
purely economic basis. Though this gives us a close approximation of it, the
Bengali middle class cannot be ultimately defined economically. It has a deep
rooted cultural connotation in Bengal rising out of the colonial interaction
with the British and eventually assuming the pivotal role in the Bengali
political and cultural life over the course of the long 19th century. Imbibing
and imitating the Victorian high modernity of the British colonisers, the
English educated, Bengali upper caste middle class in Kolkata incorporated
certain typically ÔmodernÕ cultural and religious ideas with certain
traditional Indian values through a Ôstrategic essentialismÕ2.
This gave rise to a specific brand of colonial modernity that eventually shaped
the bhadralok3 culture in Bengal.
The contemporary civil society of Bengal is
also rooted in this cultural habitus. Franda defines bhadralok as an Ôelite
that is unique to the Bengali-speaking area.Õ He goes on to state:ÔNeither a
single class nor a single caste, the bhadralok (literally Òrespectable
people,Ó or ÒgentlemenÓ; sometimes called just borolok or Òbig peopleÓ)
are a privileged minority most often drawn from the three highest castesÉ
usually... employed in professional or clerical occupationsÉ very well
educatedÉ and highly skilled in maintaining communal integrationÕ.4
The bhadralok
phenomenon apart from ushering in a unique and overarching cultural overtone to
Bengali social life also happened to be the harbinger of the idea of Indian
nationalism. In this context, Chatterjee5 argues, Ônationalism was not simply about
a political struggle for power: it related the question of the political
independence of the nation to virtually every aspect of the material and
spiritual life of the peopleÕ. This material and spiritual distinction was
substantiated by the inner/outer, ghar o bahir (home and abroad) analogy
that eventually gave rise to the modern Bengali private sphere. Following
Chakrabarty we can relate this idea of bahir with the political/public
life of the modern individual that is Ôlived in citizenship.Õ6
This notion of the public life is
inextricably linked to the Ôinteriorized ÒprivateÓ selfÕ7 that Chakrabarty asserts is central to
the idea of the modern individual. Indeed, the idea of privacy is not peculiar
to the colonial modernity but is also one of the most significant markers of
the dominant discourse of modernity in general.
In the context
of Bengal, since the spiritual became analogous to the inner/home/private
essentially insulated domestic space, religious practices/rituals out of their
own accord came to be domesticated within the private sphere of the family.
Quite naturally religion hasnÕt traditionally been relevant in the political
life of Bengal. An analysis of Table 3 suggests that this trend seems to hold
sway even in 21st century Bengal.
From Table 3 it
is evident that most of the respondents pray daily, visit temples and keep
vrat/rozas/fasts on festivals and never watch religious television channels or
read religious books. This gives us three observations: (i) People are
not irreligious – they pray privately but regularly; (ii) People
avoid the overtly public exposition of religious practices by largely avoiding
religious television channels or religious books; and (iii) Religion
intrudes the public sphere only during festivals.
This table displays findings of a survey on
a randomly selected sample of respondents scattered all over Bengal. Though no
assertion regarding a monolithic essentially middle class culture can be made
in case of the diverse socio-cultural rubric of Bengal, this table certainly
asserts that the domestication of religion is not simply a middle class
bhadralok phenomenon but is observed all over Bengal at large. This might also
suggest that the bhadralok culture has over the time percolated throughout the
cross-sections of the Bengali society. Chatterjee and Basu8 also assert that the hegemony of the
bhadralok culture is usually accepted by the general mass of Bengal.
Our first and third observations lead us
into a further theoretical study of the place of religion in Bengali culture
and its links with 19th century colonial modernity. If we closely analyse the
place of religion in 19th century Bengali cultural life, it becomes evident
that religion though highly interiorized, still exhibits a private and a public
dimension. In the private sphere, religion is very much a part of everyday
life. There is a grihadevata (the protector deity) in almost every house
and every household action (including cooking and the meals) begins by paying
homage to the deity. Every morning and every evening begins by worshipping the
deity. The God doesnÕt reside separately in the temple, but every home is
sacred in the sense that a deity resides in it. Chakrabarty calls it Ôthe
everyday pantheism of Hindu familiesÕ.9
Hence the sanctity
of the religious practices is also hardly a matter of public exhibition but
very much a part of everyday life. The deity or God is an important family
member in the Bengali Hindu family. The lesser tendency of visiting temples
regularly, as is evident in Table 3, asserts that the reception of religion
continues to be the same in the 21st century. If we check out the popularity of
deities in the Bengali household as per Table 4, we can see that Krishna, Shiva
and Lakshmi are the most popular.
It might be
observed that these deities, interestingly, are the most relatable ones.
Krishna is worshipped in various forms – sometimes as the archetypal
naughty child, sometimes
as the lover and sometimes as a
friend and guide. Shiva is the archetype of the ideal and most desirable
husband. And Lakshmi, Chakrabarty notes, ÔÉregarded as the Hindu god VishnuÕs
wifeÉ has for long been held up in popular Hinduism, and in the everyday
pantheism of Hindu families, as the model of the Hindu wife, united in complete
harmony with her husband (and his family) through willful submission, loyalty,
devotion, and chastity.Õ10
In this context, BJPÕs propaganda of an
exclusivist Hindutva based on a highly public demonstration of Hindu religious
practices and emphatic chants of Jay Shree Ram failed to make a mark
upon the electorates with Ram and his ardent follower Hanuman already being the
least worshipped deities in Bengal. Even among the BJP voters, our study finds
that only 5.9% are devotees of Ram and Hanuman. The failure of the Hindutva
ideology to create a stir among the electorates can further be explained by a
discussion of the public dimension of the religious factor of Bengali culture.
The 19th century
Bengal Renaissance, apart from the various other modern/western ideas, thoroughly
imbibed the notion of secularism and endeavoured to look for its roots in the
traditional Bengali/Indian culture. As a result, the subaltern assimilatory
religious philosophies of the Bhakti movement under the leadership of Sri
Chaitanya and the Baul tradition came to be selectively reclaimed and
appropriated into the mainstream bhadralok culture. These subaltern religious
traditions were further blended strategically with certain aspects of the Vedic
philosophy and western theology and hence emerged a kind of synthetic concept
of religion based on secularism and tolerance. This concept emphasizes upon
communal harmony – a peaceful coexistence of various faiths still
retaining and recognizing the cultural uniqueness and eccentricities of each
faith.
This ideology of secularism
fervently exists both in the secular intellectual discourses and the religious
teachings of the time. The 19th century eminent Bengali religious figure Sri
Ramkrishna Paramahansa emphasizes on the essential truth of all religious
faiths and the same end theyÕre all directed to. Similarly, the middle class
intellectuals of the time including Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Rabindranath
Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam have considered humanity the highest religion and
transcending all narrow religious boundaries they consider the ultimate end and
aim of all religions to be directed towards the wholesome good of mankind.
The bhadralok
leadership in the successful agitation against the proposed partition of
Bengal, based on communal distinction in 1905, clearly asserts the strength of
the ideals of communal harmony in Bengal. Rabindranath Tagore universalized the
Hindu ritual of Rakhi Bandhan as the festival of universal brotherhood and a
celebration of communal harmony. This trend seems to continue even in the 21st
century as Table 3 suggests that religion intrudes the public space only during
festivals.
From Table 4 it
is found that Durga, Saraswati and Kali are not the most worshipped deities in
Bengal even though the greatest festivals of Bengal centre on the annual
worshipping of these deities. These contrary observations suggest that
religious festivals become sarbojonin (for all the people) hence
assuming a secular character in Bengal. Perhaps this substantiated Mamata
BanerjeeÕs claim Dharma jar jar utsav sobar (religion is personal but
festival is public) and culturally alienated the BJP further who promised to
revamp the Durga and Saraswati pujas, which they felt were not enough
religiously observed in Bengal.
The stern Hidutva ideology of the BJP found
itself at odds with the essentially liberal tolerant connotations of religion
in the Bengali public space. The BJP vainly tried to utilize the public
grievances against the ruling AITC for its alleged Muslim appeasement to construct
a rhetoric of Hinduism at stake in Bengal. However, its misplaced religious
dispositions, by attempting to polarize the electorates along their religious
identities, stirred the Bengali consciousness against it. While the majority of
the respondents (about 57%) of the survey believed that the Mamata Banerjee
government gives undue favour to Muslims, a sizeable 41.8% of the respondents
still believed that the AITC is the best party to protect the interests of
their religions. Besides, about 59% of the respondents believed that the ruling
party has to protect the interests of the minority community even if the
majority doesnÕt like it.
In this context when the BJP tried to
construct its image as the saviour of Hinduism in Bengal by constantly
threatening that the AITC will turn Bengal into a Ômini PakistanÕ and calling
Mamata Banerjee Begum,11 it actually ended up threatening the
traditional secular cultural ethos of Bengal. Hence, this narrative might have
backfired so much that along with the Muslims for obvious reasons, a large bulk
of the Hindus also turned against the BJP.12
Instead of achieving the desired
religious polarization it even legitimized the alleged Muslim appeasement of
the AITC government to a significant extent. This complex phenomenon has
finally been reflected in the electoral preferences of the respondents as is
revealed by Table 5.
The Table clearly shows that in spite of
believing that the Mamata Banerjee government gives undue advantage to the
Muslims, more than one third of them still remained in favour of the AITC.
Notwithstanding
such a secular cultural heritage, it is evident, as reveals Table 2, the BJP
has garnered a significant support of the middle class. Can it be attributed to
the characteristic ambivalence of the middle class? Or is it informed by the
emerging cultural heterogeneity within the middle class itself? Here also the
survey data seems to give us a direction.
Evidently, the
AITC has garnered a huge support from the middle class in the greater Kolkata
and its adjoining areas in South East Bengal. However, away from Kolkata, in
the Northern and Southwestern regions, the picture gets reversed. It can be
argued that the larger bulk of middle class votes in favour of the BJP came
from the fringe areas of Bengal. Again, a significant portion of these votes
for BJP came from the sporadic urban centres in these regions. The Election
Commission of India data confirms that the BJP has emerged victorious in most
of the district towns/ urban centers in these regions barring a few stray
exceptions.
In this context the differences in electoral
preferences of the urban middle class in a highly culturally contested election
can be attributed to the perceived cultural differences within the urban middle
class. The middle class both of Kolkata and these sporadic urban centres share
exactly similar socio-economic attributes. The only difference is that the
emerging urban middle class in the fringe areas doesnÕt share the habitus of
the dominant Kolkata centric bhadralok culture. Hence, the avowedly anti-BJP cultural
and ideological campaigns (like ÔNo Vote to BJPÕ, Nijeder Mawte Nijeder Gaan
– ÔOur song in our termsÕ) led by the civil society rooted in the
bhadralok culture failed to influence the middle class of these fringes in
spite of being quite popular in and around Kolkata.
There is a new
middle class emerging largely in post-independent Bengal sharing equal
privileges of the Kolkata centric middle class and hence in the best position
to challenge the hegemony of the dominant bhadralok culture. From their
radically different electoral preferences from the Kolkata centric middle
class, they seem to prioritize different socio- political and cultural
concerns.
In the recent elections in some other
states, the evolving nature of party competition is marked by a peculiar
preference for BJP on the national plane and regional/non-BJP parties on the
state level. The 2019 Lok Sabha and 2021 Assembly election results in Bengal
suggest that Bengal has followed the same pattern. The limits of religious
polarization as has been observed in the 2021 Assembly election in Bengal,
hints that the peopleÕs mandate is still in favour of retaining the secular
political space that has characterized Bengal for centuries. Finally, it
remains to be seen if the differences in the electoral affinities of the two
aforementioned segments of Bengali urban middle class might usher in a new
dynamics in the society and politics of Bengal.
Footnotes:
1. The Sankyuta Morcha comprised of Left, Congress and ISF could secure only one seat. Hence, though its vote share is mentioned throughout, the analysis of this paper has been restricted between the two main contenders – the AITC and the BJP.
2. Courtney Ahmed, Deconstructing
the Moment of Representation with Spivak and Derrida. Thesis submitted at
the Department of Philosophy, Haverford College, 27 April, 2017,
https://scholarshipz.tricolib.brynmawr.
edu/bitstream/handle/10066/20545/2018AhmedC.pdf?sequence=
1&isAllowed=y, accessed on 17.05.2021.
It deals with SpivakÕs advocacy of strategic essentialism as a way for
marginalized and excluded groups to achieve discursive power.
3. Bengal Government, Report of the Bengal District Administration Committee 1913-1914. Bengal Secretariat Press, Calcutta, 1914. J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth-Century Bengal. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968. Marcus F. Franda, Radical Politics in West Bengal. MIT. Press, Cambridge, 1971. Partha Chatterjee, The Present History of West Bengal: Essays in Political Criticism. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997. Jyotiprasad Chatterjee and Suprio Basu, Left Front and After: Understanding the Dynamics of Poriborton in West Bengal. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2020.
4. Marcus F. Franda, op. cit., p. 7
5. Partha Chatterjee, ÔColonialism, Nationalism, and Colonialized Women: The Contest in IndiaÕ, American Ethnologist 16(4), November 1989, pp. 622-633.
6. Dipesh Chakrabarty, ÔPostcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ÒIndianÓ Pasts?Õ, Representations 37, Winter 1992, pp. 1-26.
7. Dipesh Chakrabarty, op. cit., p. 9
8. Jyotiprasad Chatterjee and Suprio Basu, Left Front and After: Understanding the Dynamics of Poriborton in West Bengal. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2020.
9. Dipesh Chakrabarty, ÔPostcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ÒIndianÓ Pasts?Õ Representations 37, Winter 1992, pp. 1-26.
10. Dipesh Chakrabarty, op. cit., 1992.
11. The Tribune, ÔEC lets off BJPÕs Suvendu Adhikari With a Light Rap for ÒMini-PakistanÓ RemarkÕ, 13 April 2021, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/ec-lets-off-bjps-suvendu-adhikari-with-a-light-rap-for-mini-pakistan-remark-238604, accessed on 18.05.2021.
12. Suhas Palshikar, Shreyas Sardesai, Jyotiprasad Chatterjee and Suprio Basu , ÔWest Bengal Assembly Elections: The Limits to Polarisation in BengalÕ, The Hindu, 6 May 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/elections/west-bengal-assembly/csds-lokniti-survey-the-limits-to-polarisation-in-bengal/article34494009.ece, accessed on 10.05.2021.