The churn in Muslim politics in Kerala

R. SANTHOSH

ELECTORAL democracy in Kerala, despite claims about its secular character, is deeply interwoven with
and shaped by the religious and caste identities of various communities inhabiting the state. Around 8.8 million Muslims in Kerala, constituting 26% of the total state population, play an active role in democratic processes and have assumed a pivotal role in defining the electoral arithmetic of the state.

The community has been instrumental in shaping the contours of the coalition politics of Kerala, which revolve around the Congress-led United Democratic Front (UDF) and the CPI(M)-led Left Democratic Front (LDF) for the past several decades. While the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) has posi-tioned itself as the traditional Muslim representative, claiming the over-whelming support of Muslims in the state, the scenario is changing in a rapidly transforming political landscape marked by the ascendancy of Hindutva influence and the transformation of coalition politics in the state. These changes provide exciting insights into the complex, reciprocal relationship through which religious and sectarian identities among Muslims negotiate with the ideologies and organizations inhabiting the political space in the state.

The history of organized Muslim politics in Kerala dates to the pre-Partition period with the formation of the district committee of the All-India Muslim League (AIML) in Malabar in 1937. The creation of a separate Muslim state, Pakistan, following the partition of India in 1947, forced the AIML to redefine its role in post-independent India. Subsequently, on 10 March 1948, the IUML was established to promote the religious, cultural, educational and economic interests of the Muslims of the Union. The party since then enjoyed great success in South India, especially in Kerala, where it played a fundamental role in the political mainstreaming of Malayalam-speaking Muslims.

The Kerala Muslims display a strong ethnic identity given the specific historical factors behind the genesis of the community, shared Malayalam language affinity and the region’s relative geographic isolation that minimized contact with Islam in North India. The Muslim League (by which name the IUML is commonly called) acquired this distinct Kerala identity from the beginning, and its historical trajectory is punctuated by various tensions arising out of negotiating its parochial identity along with the claims of representing a national minority community. These historical reasons, coupled with small pockets of Muslim majority regions in Malabar, enabled the Muslim League to become an active player in the post-independent political scenario in Kerala.

Interestingly, no political party in Kerala is bereft of specific caste and community affiliations and the arising electoral support base to varying degrees, but the Muslim League has often been called out for its overt religious character. Even the mainstream political parties such as the CPI(M) and Congress have derided the Muslim League for its alleged communal character in different phases of Kerala’s electoral history to suit their political positions. Many scholars and political observers have pointed out that the Muslim League, despite being painted a communal colour, mostly used its clout emerging from its religious affiliation in a communitarian manner, i.e. using the Muslim identity to bargain with the state and other political parties for availing resources and political power.

This position is often contradistinguished from that of communalism, where a party with overt religious identitarian affiliation posi-tions itself in antagonistic relations with other religious groups and organizations. In that sense, the Muslim League has often been credited with playing a crucial role in the political mainstreaming of Muslims in the state and substantially contributing to maintaining a rather peaceful, secular coexistence in a multi-religious state like Kerala. Since 1985, when politics in Kerala began to revolve around two antag-onistic coalitions, the Muslim League has remained an integral part of coalition politics and continues to be a significant constituent of the UDF.

In Kerala, the Muslim League managed to maintain a near hegemony in the Muslim populated districts of Malappuram and Kozhikode but has a negligible presence in the southern parts of the state. The party shrewdly used the religious charisma of various Hadrami Tangal families in Kerala, who are widely revered among the Kerala Muslims for their purported family lineage reaching up to Prophet Muhammad.

The appointment of a Tangal family member at the helm of the party helped in various ways. It provides a religious and spiritual aura and legitimacy to the party. At the same time, it assuages the feelings of most Sunnis who are critical of the increasing leadership role assumed by the reformist Mujahids in the party. Most importantly, the Tangal connection helps the party to effectively deal with internal schisms and conflicts within the community on various theological, political and organizational matters. Though the party found itself mired in controversies related to corruption charges against its leaders, and faced criticism for its bias towards the wealthy and influential persons within the community, its mass base remained intact for a long time.

The theological differences among the Kerala Muslims also are inextricably connected to the political arithmetic of the state. The Muslim religious sphere in Kerala is marked by intense debates between the traditionalist Sunnis and the reformist organizations such as the Mujahid movement and Jamaat-e-Islami. Among the traditionalist Sunnis, who constitute the vast majority of Kerala Muslims, the E.K. Aboobackar faction – widely known as the E.K. Samasta – is the mainstay of the political support for the Muslim League. As most of Tangal families among Kerala Muslims belong to this faction, the Muslim League has been able to ensure the unflinching support of most Sunnis.

The other faction, known as A.P. Samasta – founded by A.P. Aboobackar Musaliar – had to fight the organizational might of E.K. Samasta and the political clout of the Muslim League since they broke away in 1989 to establish their own organizations and institutions. E.K. Samasta lever-aged the support of the Muslim League whenever the UDF government came to power since the nineties in their tussle with the A.P. Samasta on the ownership claims over mosques and other institutions. Gradually, the A.P. Samasta faction forged a political affiliation to the LDF, especially to CPI(M), as a tactical move to check-mate the E.K. Samasta faction from using the political might of the Muslim League.

The LDF too made use of this opportunity to make inroads into the hitherto bastions of the Muslim League, especially in the Malappuram and Kozhikode districts by exploiting factionalism among the Sunnis. A.P. Samata is scathing in its criticism against the reigning influence of the Salafis in the leadership position of the Muslim League, whom they consider as their adversaries. They accuse the Salafis of distorting the true nature of Islam in Kerala and spreading radicalism among the youth. Both the Sunni sections are on a revivalist path by redefining the traditionalist concepts and practices by adopting modern professional education, technological innovation, neoliberal entrepreneurial pursuits and offering novel theological interpretations to their belief systems that were the targets of the Salafi criticism.

The near monopoly of the Muslim League and its clout over the Muslim community came under increasing stress after the Babri Masjid demolition in 1992 as some sections of its followers criticized what they perceived as an overtly pacifist approach adopted by the party on the demolition. The first visible signs of a crack in the party emerged in the aftermath of the demolition. Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait, one of the most prominent faces of the Muslim League leadership, accused the party of surrendering to the Hindu appeasement of the Congress party. Not just stopping with the accusation, he resigned from the party and established the Indian National League.

Around this time, radical Muslim politics under the leadership of Abdul Nassar Maudany was taking root in Kerala. An orator known for his inflammatory speeches, Maudany was able to attract into his fold disgruntled Muslim youth who were in a state of ferment following the Babri Masjid controversy and the rising Hindutva violence. Maudany had established the militant Islamic Sevak Sangh in the early 1990s, which was banned in the aftermath of the Babri Masjid demolition. He then went on to found the People’s Democratic Party, a more democratically oriented, pacifist political party.

The most concerted and ideologically driven project espousing more radical and assertive Muslim politics in Kerala was the establishment of the National Development Front by a group of Muslims in Kozhikode in 1994 and its expansion into the Popular Front of India (PFI) in 2006 by merging with similar organizations such as the Karnataka Forum for Dignity (KFD) in Karnataka and Manitha Neethi Pasarai (MNP) that was founded in Tamil Nadu in 2001 with similar political objectives. The PFI also established the Secular Democratic Party of India (SDPI) in June 2009 as its political front with the stated objective of contesting elections and competing for political power.

Jamaat-e-Islami is another Muslim organization that has tried to test the political waters of Kerala. Dumping their long-held ideology of abstaining from electoral politics and being vehemently opposed to ideas of democracy and secularism, the organization established the Welfare Party of India as its electoral arm in 2011. Despite significant media propaganda and campaign through its mouthpieces, the Welfare Party’s influence remains insignificant among Kerala Muslims. Both PFI and the Welfare Party continue to exhort the necessity to form a large alliance of Dalits, Other Backward Castes (OBCs), tribals and Muslims to fight the surging Hindutva forces. The traditional politics championed by the Muslim League is branded by the PFI and Welfare Party as ineffective and one that is reluctant to assert Islamic identity by taking on the Hindutva forces decisively.

While the new political formations like the SDPI and Welfare Party could not challenge the electoral dominance of the Muslim League, organizations such as the PFI have mounted a concerted ideological attack on the politics practised by the Muslim League. They accuse the Muslim League of elitism, a non-democratic way of functioning and, most importantly, failing to protect Muslim interests by compromising with the Congress party. On the contrary, the PFI adopted a con-frontationist stance against Hindutva and exhorted the community members to be prepared for physical resistance against the Hindutva forces.

These Muslim organizations project Hindutva as the greatest threat to Indian society, especially to the minorities and Dalits. The organizations extensively use the Indian Constitution to assert their political demands and add force to their campaigns. Though the PFI vouches by its secular democratic credentials, political observers have pointed out that it has a strong Islamist, exclusivist orientation where Islam is used instrumentally as its ideological and organizational foundation. The organization is involved in several violent incidents to ‘safeguard Islam’ and has punished those it deems to have ‘insulted Prophet Muhammad’.

Scholars have pointed out that like the politics of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS), the PFI has attempted to create an exclusive moral community based on an ethicized religion. The politics of PFI primarily plays out as a response to the rise of the Hindutva threat. It is dismissive of secular political parties, branding them as ineffective in protecting Muslim interests and further asserts that self-defence is the only way forward for Muslims in India.

Though founded in Kerala, the PFI has spread to almost every state in India having a sizeable Muslim population. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) governments have targeted the organization in various states. Several of them had banned the outfit, which was revoked following judicial interventions. The BJP governments view the organization as the epitome of Muslim extremism and terrorism and therefore they seek to ban the organization for security reasons and violence. However, the radical politics sown by the organization has attracted a significant section of Muslims, especially the youth. They perceive the organization as the only one capable of physically resisting and even mounting a counter-attack against Hindutva aggression and violence.

In Kerala, the organization has made it a point to openly challenge the RSS on the streets and resort to revenge killings of RSS functionaries if Hindutva forces attack their party workers. Recently, the PFI executed two revenge killings of RSS functionaries in Kerala within 24 hours of their office bearers being attacked and killed. This tit for tat strategy is a well considered one as they are unflinching in their conviction that Hindutva forces cannot be resisted by peaceful methods or by seeking safety and protection from the state. While there are debates within the community about the desirability of resorting to violence to resist Hindutva politics, this form of retaliation also has come to attract its own followers and admirers.

The Muslim League as a political party is at a crossroads. The traditional Muslim politics practised by the party under the influence and aura of Tangal leaders seems to be losing its sheen. The party is also seen as adopting more assertive positions regarding Muslim religious issues to checkmate the growing influence of organizations like the PFI. On the one hand, the party is forced to highlight its tradition of following pacifist, non-radical positions by asserting the virtues of secularism, and on the other, such virtues seem out of place in a political environment characterized by raging Hindutva politics and associated social conflicts.

However, the party and the religious leaders who guide it – especially the clergy of E.K. Samasta – are categorical in their opposition to the politics of PFI and radical tendencies within the community. They vouch for the tradition of communal harmony and peaceful coexistence in Kerala and assert that it alone is the true Islamic way forward.

The overall secularization of Kerala society is also reflected in the Muslim politics of the state and the emerging gender politics among Muslims is a case in point. Notwithstanding the opposition of religious clergy regarding the participation of Muslim women in politics and public activities, there is a surge in Muslim women’s participation in political and civil society spheres. The trajectory of Islamic reformism in Kerala is closely linked with the story of women’s empowerment. While traditional Sunni sections consciously avoided addressing the gender issues, reformist organisations such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Kerala Nadwatul Mujahideen adopted a proactive stand towards gender equality. The Gulf migration that helped Kerala since the 1980s financially, in particular, played a significant role in enhancing the educational achievements of Muslim women in the state.

The establishment of private educational institutions and the opening up of higher education by traditional religious organizations were crucial in this transformation. Highly educated Muslim girls occupied these organizations, and their interventions brought several important transformations within the community. These girls, who were exposed to the feminist gender politics in Kerala, also began to use arguments from Islamic feminism to fend off criticism from the clergy that feminist ideas are un-Islamic. While Muslim reformist organizations found it easier to accommodate women in their cadre and earmarked separate organizational wings, the Muslim League took a long time to follow suit as it had to reconcile with the traditionalist, patriarchal Ulema who wield a strong hold over the party.

One of the most significant transformations in the political sphere was state intervention in the 1990s to earmark reservations for women candidates in the local self-governing body elections. While every political party found it hard to find and field women candidates, the Muslim League’s problem was compounded as it had to negotiate with the traditional Ulema, who derided women’s role in politics. Eventually, pragmatic politics triumphed, and the party too began to field Muslim women candidates. The Vanitha League was established in 1996 as a separate organization for women by the Muslim League.

While this was an imperative brought in by state intervention, Muslim women currently constitute a significant section of elected women representatives in local bodies across Kerala, providing administrative and political leadership to the people. E.K. Samasta too had to tacitly acknowledge the imperative of permitting Muslim women to enter politics and contest elections.

Though the PFI and Welfare Party provide far greater representation to its women cadres, the Muslim League usually finds itself on the backfoot on this crucial issue. Recently, a group of women in leadership position of ‘Haritha’, the girl student wing of the Muslim League, openly criticized the party leadership for failing to address its continuing misogynist tendencies. It is evident that the party leadership failed to understand the language of gender politics articulated by these professionally educated women. Despite several incidents and statements that reaffirm the patriarchal and misogynist position of the traditional Ulema, it is evident that Muslim girls, irrespective of their organizational and theological back-grounds, have broken the barriers and are actively engaged in the political and social spheres of contemporary Kerala.

The changed gender relations within the community are also reflected in the increased participation of Muslim women in various agitations on the street. Muslim women’s participation is highly visible in demonstrations of political parties and in development-related agitations, among others. For instance, the anti-CAA (Citizenship Amendment Act) agitation, organized under the auspices of various Muslim organizations in Kerala, witnessed active participation from Muslim girls and women. They demanded equality and justice based on Indian constitutional provisions. This increased awareness and political activism are sure to reshape the contours of Muslim politics in the years to come.

The re-election of the LDF government in 2021 proved to be a game changer for coalition politics in the state. It was the first time since 1985 that such a feat was achieved by any coalition front. This is bound to have implications for Muslim politics in the state, especially for the political fortunes of the Muslim League. It is evident that many religious minorities, especially Muslims, voted for the LDF during the 2021 elections. Many political observers point out that this changing stance of Muslims reflects their growing confidence in the Left Front in resisting Hindutva forces in the state. Especially among the youth and students, the appeal of the Muslim League is on the decline, and that space is now claimed by the left parties and new Muslim political formations like the PFI. The vote bank politics so far practised by the Muslim League is undoubtedly facing a crisis under the changed socio-political conditions in the state. With the steady decline of the Indian National Congress at the national level, the Muslim League will find its political future increasingly uncertain in Kerala in the long run.

Like other places in the country, Muslim politics in Kerala, too, is undergoing significant transformations in the present era of Hindutva majoritarianism. While the demographic composition of religious communities and peculiar historical and socio-political formations of the state make Kerala relatively inaccessible to Hindutva forces compared to other parts of the country, this scenario is rapidly changing. The communitarian model of electoral competition is slowly giving way to a more direct, identitarian and communal mode of politics that is taking root in the state as well. Hate speech and overtly communal statements and campaigns, often broadcast via social media, have become commonplace in Kerala, unlike in the past when communal overtures were relatively absent in the political sphere. The rise of Hindutva politics and the response of radical Muslim politics feed into each other, in the process shrinking the space for secularism and communal harmony in the society. The state can no longer afford to bask in the glory of its history of communal harmony and peaceful coexistence. The relatively higher socio-economic development and a vibrant legacy of socio-political activism make Muslim politics in Kerala better equipped to deal with the challenge facing Indian democracy. However, the Muslim community in Kerala is increasingly getting fragmented based on ideological and organizational affiliations, resulting in diverse forms of political responses. The conventional Muslim politics practised by the Muslim League is on the wane for sure, but what will replace it remains highly uncertain.